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“This book is an extremely innovative comparative analysis between different 
national approaches to bio-bordering in the EU from a sociological and crimino-
logical perspective. It provides not only very valuable insights into the history and 
working of biometric databases in the EU, but also into the legal, political and 
policing systems of four EU Member States and the United Kingdom. The book 
impressively highlights EU blindness to national systems but also possibilities for 
harmonisation by science.”
—Dr. Saskia Hufnagel, Senior Lecturer in Criminal Law, 
Queen Mary University of London
“Borders do much more than delineate states, territories and populations. By 
exploring the development of DNA databases in Europe, this adventurous book 
carefully constructs the concept of bio-bordering. This book convincingly adds a 
next chapter to our understanding of borders and the connections and disconnec-
tions they make between political bodies, human bodies and technologies.”
—Prof. Dr. Huub Dijstelbloem, Department of Philosophy, 
University of Amsterdam
“This book marks a significant development of a field of study that has emerged 
since the end of last century. Building upon prior studies of bordering and surveil-
lance, this book marks a new milestone, providing an important new lens for 
understanding forensic genetics and trans-national law enforcement—which has so 
far remained relatively under-reported, and certainly under-theorised.”
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Abstract This introductory chapter sets out the key themes and argu-
ments of the book and provides a road map for the remaining chapters. It 
outlines the book’s ambition to contribute to the sociological and crimi-
nological literature on technological infrastructures, borders and specific 
visions of Europe by portraying what we call the biobordering processes at 
work in the EU. Relying on what Misa and Schot, reflecting on techno-
logical infrastructures, have called the ‘hidden integration’ and ‘hidden 
fragmentation’ of Europe, the transnational exchange of forensic DNA 
data organized through the Prüm system serves as an exemplary case 
through which to explore the different logics of biobordering dynamics at 
work across the European Union. We complement an EU-level analysis 
with country case analysis of modes of biobordering that emphasize the 
legal, scientific, technical, political and ethical dimensions related to the 
governance and uses of biometric technologies both at a national level and 
in a transnational collaboration.




We […] need to strengthen our defences against terrorism, build our resil-
ience and improve further the way we work together. Central to all of this is 
how we share information effectively. […] existing information systems 
need to be fully implemented and applied. For example, Member States still 
need to do more to implement Prüm.
Julian King, European Commissioner for the Security Union (12 July 
2016). (European Commission, 2016)
The Prüm system1 is a transnational system that links European Union 
(EU) Member States’ national databases and works on the basis of recip-
rocal automated searching and comparison of DNA profile information, 
fingerprints and vehicle registration data. The aims of the Prüm system are 
directed towards stepping up cross-border cooperation, particularly in 
combating terrorism and cross-border crime (Council of the European 
Union, 2008a, 2008b). Almost a decade after the EU implemented this 
transnational regime of data exchange, Julian King, European 
Commissioner for the Security Union, was invited to the Third LIBE2 
Security Dialogue hosted by the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
Committee in the European Parliament to talk about the Implementation 
and State of Play of the Prüm Decisions. As the above quotation outlines, 
Julian King argued in favour of the application and implementation of 
transnational regimes to set up and harmonize cross-border information 
systems based on biometrics in the name of unifying and integrating anti- 
terrorism and crime control policies.
In this book our aim is to contribute to the sociological and crimino-
logical literature on technological infrastructures, borders and specific 
visions of Europe. We take the Prüm system as an exemplary case of an EU 
techno-political project promoting integration in the area of security poli-
cies in order to reflect on the implications for de facto hidden integration 
and disintegration processes in Europe. It is important to note that we 
purposefully maintain a distinction between the terms ‘Europe’ and ‘the 
1 In this book we use the term ‘Prüm Convention’ to refer to the 2005 Convention involv-
ing seven countries, the term ‘Prüm Decision’ to refer to the 2008 Council Decision that 
established the mandatory nature of transnational data exchange for all EU Member States 
and the term ‘Prüm system’ to refer to the actual EU network.
2 According to its website, the LIBE Committee ‘is in charge of most of the legislation and 
democratic oversight for policies enabling the EU to offer its citizens an area of freedom, 
security and justice’ (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/home.html).
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EU’. As Misa and Schot write (2005, p. 2), ‘For many people, Europe 
increasingly represents the space occupied by the EU. (…) to a significant 
extent, European and EU identities have merged’. We feel that, in times 
when nationalist rhetoric is stronger than ever and the cultural and politi-
cal claims of the EU are much contested, the study of European integra-
tion processes is a pressing analytical issue. In line with that view, we argue 
that it is important to acknowledge the diversity of visions of Europe and 
to distinguish them from the views and practices of the EU as a political 
project materialized by supra-state institutions.
The programmatic policy agenda of integration in the EU is built into 
expectations of ‘full’ and ‘more’ implementation of information systems 
that—as we will outline in this book—are a response to diverse and less 
visible techno-scientific processes of (dis)integration across Member 
States. By looking into the Prüm regime of transnational biometric data 
exchange, we address the interplay between specific visions of Europe 
which foster the idea of Europe’s technological and political integration in 
law enforcement through borderless data exchange and the role of selected 
EU Member States in implementing or resisting those visions, a process 
that substantially contributes to how large-scale cross-border information 
systems evolve and are maintained.
We are interested in the multiplicity of what Misa and Schot (2005, 
p. 3), reflecting on technological infrastructures, have called the ‘hidden 
integration and hidden fragmentation of Europe’. The authors propose to 
study the history of European integration with a ‘focus not only on inte-
gration but also on fragmentation, segregation, disintegration, conflict, 
and exclusion (and without) underestimating the power of nationalism 
and the role of nation-states’ (Misa & Schot, 2005, p. 7). Hidden integra-
tion and disintegration is the result of the linking and delinking of techno-
logical infrastructures between nation-states. It also incorporates the 
movement of people, knowledge and artefacts across nation-states as cer-
tain ways of appropriating knowledge and artefacts in local contexts.
While Prüm evolved and became a techno-political security project car-
ried out formally by the EU’s Member States, we concur with Misa and 
Schot in approaching the notion of Europe and the processes of EU’s 
integration as having been contested throughout the twentieth and early 
twenty-first century, and not as a grand project with a set agenda, carried 
out from the top down. Through this lens, we are likewise interested in 
the hidden integration, but also disintegration, through shared and com-
peting visions of Europe and nationhood in Europe, made manifest 
1 INTRODUCTION 
4
through technologies. In the context of Prüm, we understand Prüm pri-
marily as the manifestation of one specific vision of Europe as a security 
union enacted by the EU through the enforcement of expansive data 
exchange across borders.
The vision implicit in the introductory quote by Julian King, which 
portrays Member States as implementers of the EU security agenda, turns 
out to be just one of many visions. We follow the proposal of Misa and 
Schot in viewing selected technology developments, such as the Prüm 
system, as Europe-building practices. Such practices reveal how specific 
concepts and visions of Europe—and, we might add, of nationhood—
become enacted through the designs of transnational DNA database sys-
tems. But they also play out when Member States appropriate the 
requirements to join the transnational DNA data exchange as responses to 
and articulations of their own visions of Europe and nationhood. Thereby, 
we also follow other scholars influenced by the tradition in the history of 
technology that explores the ‘hidden integration’ deriving from an analy-
sis of new transnational polities as outcomes of large-scale techno-political 
attempts at European integration (Misa & Schot, 2005; Schipper & Schot, 
2011; Pelizza, 2020). Studies in this tradition have focused on ‘infrastruc-
tural Europeanism’, by investigating European transportation, energy, 
water and communication infrastructures, and studying how particular—
potentially conflicting—visions of Europe become enacted (Pelizza, 
2020). Pelizza has explored how, throughout the emergence of the EU’s 
migration management regimes and specific migration control technolo-
gies, including biometrics, multiple visions of ‘Europe’ have been enacted. 
While some actors and their visions are privileged, authorized and legiti-
mized, others are marginalized or excluded.
The technological infrastructures in which we are interested are bio-
metric database systems crossing borders for the EU and Member States’ 
law enforcement. Our reflection will mainly focus on the Prüm system and 
portray and critically examine its implications for the hidden integration 
and disintegration of Europe. More particularly, we will use the case of 
transnational DNA-related data exchange within the Prüm system to illu-
minate our reflections about the complex, multi-layered and hidden pro-
cesses of integration and disintegration and to introduce and explore 
forms of what we will term ‘bioborders’ in law enforcement.
We understand bioborders to be elements that enable, restrict or con-
strain the linking of national DNA databases and the circulation of bio-
metric data across state borders. By developing the notion of bioborders, 
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we aim to develop an analytical approach that makes explicit the somewhat 
invisible bordering practices among transnationally expansive biometric 
technologies. The concept of bioborders also helps make visible the differ-
ent visions of Europe enacted by nation-state-based actor networks entan-
gled with national DNA databases and helps capture the reverse patterns 
of bordering practices linked to transnational biometric data exchange 
regimes.
The concept of biobordering is useful in reconstructing how the terri-
torial foundations of national state autonomy are partially reclaimed and, 
at the same time, partially purposefully suspended. We explore these pro-
cesses through five country cases: Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal and the UK.
The country cases have been selected with the aim of presenting diverse, 
yet complementary, examples of the dynamics, tensions and ambivalences 
of biobordering processes. The German case is that of a political driving 
force promoting permeable bioborders, while the Netherlands represents 
the case of a technological front-runner enabling technically and scientifi-
cally DNA data exchange across bioborders in the Prüm system. Our cases 
also include countries that have used Prüm to catch up with international 
crime control regimes and step up to EU standards as part of a drive for 
national modernization (Poland), countries that participate extensively in 
the Prüm system while maintaining a national protectionist regime 
(Portugal) and countries that remain ambiguous about the project of the 
EU and negotiate conditional participation in the Prüm system (the UK).
Yet, we wish to make clear that the book goes beyond the arguments 
around hidden integration and disintegration developed within approaches 
towards a European History of Science and Technology (Gillingham, 
2003; George & Bache, 2001). We do so by providing an in-depth under-
standing of the ways in which infrastructures are partially polycentrically 
governed across borders with regard to the concentration of authority to 
design, interpret and control technology.
Our study confirms the role of particular communities of practices, 
which have been called a European ‘forensic technocracy’ (Prainsack & 
Toom, 2010), on the one hand, and the power of nation-states’ embed-
ded agency, on the other hand. In identifying the technocratic drivers of 
integration in the case of the Prüm regime, Prainsack and Toom (2010) 
highlighted the role of forensic genetic scientists and their international 
organizations in standardizing forensic DNA profiling technologies across 
national borders. In order to further assess the role of nation-states’ 
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embedded agency, we believe that it is important to also explore how 
transnational technological infrastructure projects such as Prüm that pro-
vide new infrastructures for information exchange within police collabora-
tion (re)appropriate, (re)shape and contest notions of bioborders.
The development of transnational systems for the mass exchange of 
biometric data at and across borders has challenged conventional notions 
of borders. In migration studies, there is extensive literature about how 
digitization and biometrics have changed the character of border controls, 
which are explicitly about the control of border-crossings of people 
(Amoore, 2006; Leese, 2016; Bigo, 2014; Tsianos & Kuster, 2016; 
Dijstelbloem & Broeders, 2015). Yet, there is still a substantial lack of 
research on how digitization and biometrics have also changed the charac-
ter of borders more ‘silently’ and ‘implicitly’ by enabling and facilitating 
border-crossings of people while simultaneously implementing systems 
designed to detect the mobility of ‘risky individuals’, such as criminal sus-
pects. Aiming to fill this gap, this book brings to the fore how biometric 
data is increasingly travelling across borders in order to limit, control and 
contain the mobility of selected people, namely, criminalized populations. 
Consequently, the technological underpinnings of transnational criminal 
investigation and police collaboration regimes (Bigo, 2008; Hufnagel & 
McCartney, 2017; Machado, Granja, & Amelung, 2020) are at the heart 
of this book.
Prüm as a case through WhIch to study 
the dynamIcs of BIoBorders and theIr ImPacts 
on hIdden IntegratIon and dIsIntegratIon In the eu
We focus on the Prüm system, which established the mandatory exchange 
of forensic DNA data amongst EU Member States, because it is an under-
explored example that portrays diverse instances of biobordering. The 
book builds on extensive research carried out in a five-year project funded 
by the European Research Council.3
In law enforcement, different mechanisms to store and exchange bio-
metric data continue to exist in parallel. In the context of DNA data, the 
Interpol DNA Gateway and Interpol DNA Database (IDD), as well as the 
Europol Information System (EIS), enabled DNA data exchange before 
3 More information available: http://exchange.ics.uminho.pt/ (ERC Grant agreement 
No 648608).
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the Prüm DNA data exchange was established. However, the exchange of 
DNA data within Prüm is still an interesting case because it became the 
favoured option when the scope and efficiency of the previously estab-
lished information systems remained limited (Luif, 2007).
We focus on DNA data exchange, rather than on the exchange of fin-
gerprint and vehicle data, in the Prüm regime for the following reasons. 
First, forensic DNA data is underexplored as a biometric identifier used to 
track transnational mobility of criminal suspects. Although there is consid-
erable literature on how DNA technologies have been used in several 
national contexts (Williams & Johnson, 2008; Hindmarsh & Prainsack, 
2010; Machado & Prainsack, 2012), their transnational uses remain 
poorly analysed, and cross-country comparisons are almost absent. Second, 
investigating DNA technologies allows us to study the ‘bio-value’ linked 
to DNA in law enforcement, which has evolved with the promise of DNA 
technologies working as a successful ‘truth machine’ (Lynch, Cole, 
McNally, & Jordan, 2008). Thus, this study provides an opportunity to 
engage in an in-depth analysis of how the transnational exchange of DNA 
data reflects the hidden (dis)integration of Europe materialized through 
seemingly uncontested biometric technologies. Third, the ‘bio-value’ of 
DNA forensic tools also conveys certain notions of risky people and spe-
cific modalities associated with transnational mobility and emphasizes cer-
tain modes of regulation in law enforcement (Machado et al., 2020). Such 
modalities are expressed through preferences for biometric evidence and 
constructions of suspicion related to it. One example of this is the priority 
given to certain crimes in criminal investigation over others. As Lawless 
puts it:
The Prüm regime’s emphasis on certain forms of evidence could potentially 
shift the focus of international policing from certain crimes onto others. The 
exchange of DNA, fingerprints and registration data could divert transna-
tional police activity towards certain physical crimes to people or property 
but away from other recognized transnational threats such as fiscal or com-
puter crime. (Lawless, 2016, p. 177)
By looking into the transnational exchange of DNA data, we, thus, 
explore the different logics of biobordering dynamics at work at the EU 
level by highlighting the legal, scientific, technical, political and ethical 
dimensions of data exchange across borders. Such biobordering dynamics 
enable a levelling mode of ordering aimed at diminishing technical, 
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scientific and legal ‘obstacles’, and by doing so facilitate a seemingly 
smooth techno-political integration across the EU. We complement this 
EU-level-focused analysis with country case analysis that emphasizes the 
legal, scientific, technical, political and ethical dimensions related to the 
governance and uses of biometric technologies both at a national level and 
in transnational collaboration. We demonstrate how certain patterns coin-
cide and others become distinct in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal and the UK.
We provide a panorama of cross-country dynamics and of the different 
countries’ situations by demonstrating how the particularities of national 
policy regulations and judicial traditions, as well as technological infra-
structures and techno-political cultural repertoires, either enforce, com-
plement or counter the biobordering dynamics of the EU. Therefore, we 
examine, portray and compare in detail the experiences and traditions of 
several countries with regard to their use of national forensic DNA data-
bases, recent applications of forensic genetic innovations and forms of 
engagement with the Prüm system.
Taken together these elements reveal a multiplicity of heterogeneous 
dimensions constituting bioborder regimes. The portrayals of each coun-
try’s position regarding DNA data exchange provide insights into how 
national autonomy and sovereignty is claimed, negotiated and suspended 
not only through legal and political bordering processes but also through 
scientific and technical bordering practices that correspond with techno- 
political cultures and manifest specific regimes for biological data reten-
tion and exchange.
Book overvIeW
We begin, in Chap. 2, with an outline of the historical evolution of bio-
metric databases in the EU and explore how these developments reconfig-
ure notions of borders within the EU and at its outer edges. Our aim is to 
outline the EU’s political and technical attempts to secure the unhindered 
flow of biometric data among Member States. The historical summary 
covers the evolution of a range of diverse biometric technologies and data-
base systems and their use in the context of crime and migration control. 
This broad framework helps us to understand why the Prüm system is of 
relevance to the reconsideration of bioborders.
In Chap. 3, we begin by reviewing recent impulses from border studies 
to clarify why we are proposing to use the concept of ‘biobordering’. We 
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introduce the concept of ‘biobordering’ and use it to explore the modes 
of ordering through ‘distributed agency’ across actors including biometric 
specialists, criminal justice system personnel, data protection authorities 
and oversight bodies enacting and reinforcing borders through biological 
data in unexpected manners. We argue that the concept of biobordering is 
useful in trying to understand the modes of ordering entangled with large- 
scale IT database infrastructures for the exchange of biometric data. The 
chapter continues by outlining the notion of biobordering and its mean-
ing in the context of the transnational exchange of DNA data regulated by 
the Prüm system. Taking the nationally grown crime control regimes into 
account, we argue that our conceptual proposal of bioborders is useful in 
capturing how the territorial foundations of national state autonomy are 
partially reclaimed—what we will call rebordering—and, at the same time, 
partially purposefully suspended—what we will call debordering. The 
chapter portrays how political and regulatory ambitions regarding 
European integration have translated into practices of debordering biobor-
ders in the EU. This provides the basis for a closer look at how different 
biobordering regimes have evolved among EU Member States and how 
their modes of ordering have responded to the EU’s debordering tenden-
cies. We close with an introduction to the case studies in the next chapters, 
which reveal emergent processes of de- and rebordering that are maintain-
ing and contesting specific visions of Europe and enforcing references to 
state autonomy.
In Chap. 4 we portray the German case, which serves to illustrate an 
expansive and diffusive mode of debordering and provides evidence of the 
political blaming/shaming of Prüm non-compliers. Germany’s DNA 
database started in 1998 and has grown into one of the biggest in the 
EU. Its location in Central Europe has made Germany interested in rap-
idly increasing its bilateral exchange relations. Led by its Minister of the 
Interior, Germany was among those countries that drove the creation of 
the Prüm Convention. The German vision of Prüm was to harmonize 
international police collaboration by relying on biometric data. The politi-
cally dominant narrative of the government has repeatedly used the rhe-
torical repertoire of blaming and shaming with regard to those Member 
States not yet participating properly in the Prüm system and has thus 
echoed the debordering claims of the EU. However, several civil societal 
actors within Germany, casting a critical eye over the evolution of the data-
base, have warned of risks deriving from the Prüm regime relating to pri-
vacy, the lack of transparency and accountability, and the manipulation of 
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the assumption of innocence. In consequence, they have called for over-
sight and safety mechanisms, not necessarily as national standards in the 
sense of rebordering, but for the whole Prüm system.
Chapter 5 presents the case of the Netherlands. The Netherlands also 
serves as an exemplary case of an expansive and diffusive mode of deborder-
ing, although with important differences to Germany. The Dutch DNA 
database has been operational since 1997, and the Netherlands has a track 
record of ‘innovation’ regarding the regulation and practical application 
of genetic technologies for forensic purposes. In 2003, the Netherlands 
became the first country to regulate the use of genetically determined 
externally visible characteristics in criminal investigations. Since then, con-
troversial uses of DNA data, such as familial searching and DNA dragnets, 
have gained importance in criminal investigations in the country. Like 
Germany, the Netherlands was also involved from the beginning with the 
Prüm Convention and, since then, has been a front-runner in building 
and implementing the technical framework for Prüm in its most expansive 
form. The Netherlands is the most active country in the Prüm regime 
(exchanging DNA data with all operational countries), and Dutch experts 
have proactively trained and supported implementation in other Member 
States of the Prüm system and have made considerable efforts to study and 
monitor cross-border DNA matches between the Netherlands and other 
operational Member States.
Chapter 6 provides insights into the Polish situation. Poland represents 
a country ambitious to catch up with an expansive mode of debordering. 
Among the five cases presented in the book, Poland was the last to join the 
EU. However, it then developed an ambitious approach to catching up 
with international crime control standards. Poland established its DNA 
database in 2007. From the beginning, issues of standardization and the 
facilitation of international DNA data exchange were considered as funda-
mental to Poland’s project to technologically modernize and integrate 
into the political EU. Poland joined the Prüm system in 2013 and, accord-
ing to the latest data available, is one of the most proactive members, hav-
ing established connections with 20 other countries. As a Member State 
aiming to further internationalize and modernize, police collaboration 
and expansion of its capacities as a security state frame the discourse about 
the importance of joining collective efforts to control cross-border crimi-
nality in the EU.
Chapter 7 explores the Portuguese case, which serves as an example of 
latent rebordering dynamics. Portugal established its forensic DNA 
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databases in 2008 on the basis of one of the most restrictive regulatory 
frameworks in the EU with regard to the criteria for the entry and deletion 
of DNA profiles. In 2015, Portugal started connecting with the Prüm 
system’s genetic data exchange. Portugal represents a situation where the 
requirements of the EU regulations regarding Prüm have been fully 
enforced while, simultaneously, access to biometric data has been severely 
restricted. This situation mainly derives from particularities of national 
policy and judicial traditions. Portugal, thereby, enacts dynamics of rebor-
dering that maintain restrictive regimes of regulation, legislation and data 
protection as a consequence of its own historically and culturally shaped 
political and judicial environment. Portuguese bioborders are thus 
addressed through a continuously oscillating pendulum between debor-
dering and rebordering dynamics.
The final country case—that of the UK—follows in Chap. 8. The UK 
case serves as an example of an ambiguous mode of bordering. The UK 
established its database in 1995 and is, thereby, the possessor of the world’s 
oldest, and one of its largest, DNA databases. For several decades the UK 
has been dealing with substantial social and ethical implications related to 
the size and scope of its database. In this regard, the ‘S. and Marper’ case 
became a landmark against which to orient the possibilities and limitations 
of using forensic DNA.  The UK withdrew from the Prüm system in 
December 2014. However, after running tests with other countries, it 
decided to rejoin the Prüm system in 2015, a decision that became opera-
tional in 2019. However, the recent Brexit scenario has politicized 
decision- making on bioborders and brought new challenges regarding the 
UK’s position in the Prüm system. The UK’s ambiguous mode of bordering 
is evidenced by its simultaneous rebordering, by negotiating limitations 
on access to its own data, and debordering, by claiming access to ‘for-
eign’ data.
The book concludes with Chap. 9, which summarizes, first, the modes 
of ordering at the EU level resulting in debordered bioborders, emphasiz-
ing the legal, scientific, technical and political dimensions. It does so by 
providing an overview that visualizes the analytical tools applied in each of 
the country case studies. Second, the final chapter shows how the Member 
States’ modes of ordering—which have national technical, scientific legal, 
organizational and civic epistemological dimensions—have resulted in 
diverse forms of de- and rebordered bioborders. The chapter also dis-
cusses how the mandatory elements of the Prüm Decisions were politically 
enforced without taking into consideration the significant differences 
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between EU countries. Thus, disintegration comes as a contingency 
regarding, for example, operational and organizational traditions, legisla-
tion, the nature of the criminal justice system and national variations 
around the human and economic resources to invest in forensic DNA 
databases, DNA profiling technologies and other kinds of police informa-
tion databases.
The levelling mode of ordering at the EU level enforced a specific ver-
sion of bioborders that reflects the political belief that the interoperability 
of DNA databases is a mere technical–scientific issue. Thus, ‘European 
integration’ is believed to be achieved by the harmonization of scientific 
and technical procedures between laboratories and police forces in differ-
ent countries.
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CHAPTER 2
A Brief History of the Evolution 
of Biometrics and Biometric Database 
Systems Crossing Borders in EU Law 
Enforcement
Abstract This chapter provides an outline of the historical evolution of 
biometric databases in the European Union and explores how these devel-
opments reconfigure notions of borders within this region of the world. 
This sets the scene for understanding how the melange of biometrical 
technologies and digitization has reconfigured how we think about the 
mobility of people, how modes of surveillance relate to human rights and 
ethical issues, and what modes of regulation are being enforced. This brief 
historical summary covers the evolution of a range of diverse biometric 
technologies and database systems and their use in the context of migra-
tion control and law enforcement. Furthermore, the chapter contextual-
izes why the Prüm system, a decentralized database system designed to 
facilitate the mandatory exchange of forensic DNA data amongst EU 
Member States to control criminality and terrorism, is of relevance to the 
concept of bioborders.
Keywords EU • Biometric technologies • Decentralized and 
centralized databases • Prüm • Law enforcement
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IntroductIon
This chapter begins with an outline of the historical evolution of biometric 
databases in the European Union (EU) and explores how these develop-
ments reconfigure notions of borders within this region of the world and 
at its outer edges. This sets the scene for understanding how the melange 
of biometrical technologies and digitization has reconfigured how we 
think about the mobility of people, how modes of surveillance relate to 
human rights and ethical issues, what modes of regulation are being 
enforced, and how notions of borders have been changed.
This brief historical summary covers the evolution of a range of diverse 
biometric technologies and database systems and their use in the context 
of migration control and law enforcement. More particularly, it reflects 
upon the expanding use of DNA technologies, along with other biometric 
technologies such as fingerprinting and facial recognition, across border 
control. The overview of the uses of biometric technologies in migration 
control and law enforcement helps to contextualize why the Prüm system, 
a decentralized database system designed to facilitate the mandatory 
exchange of forensic DNA data amongst Member States to control crimi-
nality and terrorism, is of relevance to the concept of bioborders.
From the ‘PolItIcs oF Fear oF crIme’ to new 
technologIes In eu law enForcement
Increasing concerns around transnational organized crime and terrorism 
in the last two decades have given rise to a new type of politics: ‘fear of 
crime’ (Hope & Sparks, 2012, p. 5). This pervasive ‘fear of crime’ responds 
to the perception of omnipresent global risks of social conflict which make 
everyone a potential victim. Security policies, thus, respond to quests 
which derive from feelings of—what the sociologist Anthony Giddens 
describes as—‘ontological insecurity’ (Giddens, 1990) associated with 
globalization and global threats. In his words, contemporary society faces 
a lack of ‘confidence that most human beings have in their self-identity 
and the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of 
action’ (Giddens, 1990, p. 92). Linked to ontological insecurity, crime 
control strategies are responding to global transformations around the 
fear of crime, which result in the expansion of state surveillance. In paral-
lel, criminal justice systems are also gradually becoming more dependent 
on the cross-border collaboration of police and judicial actors.
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Cross-border collaboration for controlling crime has long motivated 
the transnational exchange of information across Member States. Yet, 
motives for exchanging data have changed over time. Initially, expecta-
tions about the benefits of exchanging information about stolen goods or 
about criminals who attempted to escape prosecution by fleeing to another 
country guided the interest in establishing information exchange. Later, 
criminal activities were imagined to be more often coordinated transna-
tionally. By then, information exchange was considered to help assemble 
knowledge about the identities, organization and methods of transna-
tional criminals (Aden, 2016, p.  324). Organized cross-border crime 
evolved with an increase in transport infrastructures, and it transformed its 
character due to the fast evolution of information and communication 
technology (ICT). Such technology gave rise to virtual crimes and finan-
cial crimes, enabling the movement of money globally (Fiodorova, 2018). 
In parallel, from the 1970s, information exchange among police organiza-
tions across borders also grew due to the increasing use of ICT (Aden, 
2016, p. 324).
Reflecting on recent developments shaping today’s perceptions of 
global risks and threats to security, which have changed substantially since 
the 1970s (Fiodorova, 2018, p. 28), we come to new perceptions of soci-
etal vulnerabilities. While transnational or cross-border crime has long 
been the focus of security policies, forms of criminality have changed. The 
securitization of the mobility of migrants and travellers has become prob-
lematized since the increased mobility into and across the ‘borderless’ 
Schengen space was perceived as a threat. Lately, dramatic terrorist events, 
such as the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, in Madrid (Spain) on 
11 March 2004 and in London (UK) on 7 July 2005, have been under-
stood as shocks by both society and security organizations and have, de 
facto, changed security policy agendas.
‘Illegal migration’, ‘transnational organized crime’ and ‘terrorism’ have 
become standard political ‘categories of blame’ (Aas, 2013). Such catego-
ries serve to legitimize rigorous and sometimes extreme measures to 
defend states and societies against their perceived enemies. More specifi-
cally, such categories of risk have contributed to the justification, imple-
mentation and normalization of complex architectures of transnational 
police and judicial collaboration in the EU. These architectures of transna-
tional collaboration are anchored in sophisticated technologies that use 
biometric identifiers and complex apparatuses for information exchange 
across borders.
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Louise Amoore has proposed in a joint article (Johnson et al., 2011) 
that two forms of bordering emerged and gained importance in the world 
of technical landscapes of control and surveillance after the events of 
9/11. On the one hand, a form of ‘bordering in society’ constituted and 
strengthened by the social, cultural and political distinction between social 
groups emerged. On the other hand, new ‘state practices of bordering’ 
emerged that simultaneously reinforced state sovereignty over border con-
trol with new technologies, to be found not solely in border areas but also 
far beyond. Understanding how the EU’s commitment to biometrics in 
transnational police and judicial collaboration transforms ‘state practices 
of bordering’ and is entangled with ‘bordering in society’ (Johnson et al., 
2011) is crucial to the ambition of this book.
In recent scholarship, political geographers, international relations 
scholars, political scientists and sociologists have extensively contributed 
to the study of borders and have reassessed how notions of borders have 
expanded over time. Instead of focusing on the border itself, scholarly 
interest has targeted bordering practices or bordering processes. With the 
term ‘bordering’, scholars aim to capture analytically the continuous pro-
cesses of fixating and regulating mobility as ‘an ongoing strategic effort to 
make a difference in space among the movements of people, money or 
products’ (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002, p. 126).
Since the early 1990s, scholars have tended to consider the exercise of 
state sovereignty at great distances from the national borders themselves as 
‘bordering’ (Johnson et al., 2011, p. 61). This point of view has come 
with the argument that favours the inclusion of different sites of bordering 
practices beyond physical state borders. This brings into the analysis spatial 
sites inside sovereign territory and also beyond state boundaries at which 
bordering practices are carried out in the name of extending internal secu-
rity, as is the case for the EU (e.g. Bigo, 2014). But it also invites us to 
embrace the ‘banal sites’ of less visible, mundane, technocratic modes of 
governance (Walters, 2008) or sites where technologies such as biometric 
identification are used to connect and structure institutionalized forms of 
cross-border collaboration in the name of security (Bigo, 2008; Amoore, 
2006). The inclusion of different sites of bordering practices beyond the 
physical state has been accomplished by, for instance, studying the involve-
ment of security professionals (Bigo, 2014) or data analysts (Amoore, 
2011) in bordering processes.
The increasing permeability of the internal borders of the EU for peo-
ple, money and products on the one hand and yet new forms of 
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concentration of state power in the context of transnational cooperation 
on the other hand have become prioritized research topics in recent bor-
der studies scholarship around the topic of transnational cooperation. 
Predominantly, these intertwined phenomena have been explored in the 
context of Euroregions as borderlands along specific territorial borders, 
for example, regions with a sense of joint belonging on different sites of 
state borders (Johnson et al., 2011; Popescu, 2008). In this regard, in this 
book we aim to advance the body of literature on bordering practices and 
bordering sites both internal and external to state territory. We wish to do 
so by exploring the supranational policy developments that have paved the 
way for the increasing permeability of borders for data exchange, suprana-
tional tendencies towards harmonization yet facing occasionally resisting 
Member States’ autonomous state power.
From early on, experts and analysts proposed policy solutions and fea-
sible technical options to new global threats that included the expansion 
of surveillance and growth of information exchange. Such strategies build 
on ‘dataveillance’ (Clarke, 1988)—the processes of monitoring digital 
data related to the characteristics of individuals—and include the use of 
biometric data to identify and track those who are considered risky per-
sons. The development and availability of biometric technologies as iden-
tification and registration technologies have shaped what have been 
considered feasible technical options for various security problems.
Since the 1970s, digital techniques have helped to develop automated 
human identification based on biometric identifiers. Today, fingerprints, 
facial images and DNA have become the preferred biometric identifiers 
taken up by the EU to be stored or exchanged across large-scale informa-
tion database systems for various purposes. While DNA technologies are 
used for criminal identification purposes, the other biometric technologies 
are used for identification purposes of applicants and beneficiaries of inter-
national protection, passengers, visa applicants, missing or wanted per-
sons, third-country nationals and migrants in an irregular situation.
Since the late 1990s, strategic documents from the European Council 
have demonstrated the constantly increasing relevance and reliance on the 
exchange of information among police organizations. In order to develop 
a common EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1997) introduced the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Since then, 
several other programmes—the Tampere Programme (1999), the Hague 
Programme (2005) and the Stockholm Programme (2010) (Aden, 
2016)—have further informed the common strategy for policing and 
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internal security and have emphasized the relevance of facilitating the 
transnational exchange of information. The Tampere Programme pro-
moted the principle of ‘mutual recognition’, which was meant to establish 
trust, even in the absence of shared legal, judicial and administrative tradi-
tions in law enforcement. The Hague Programme introduced the princi-
ple of ‘availability’, making it mandatory that Member States make 
information available for other Member States. As a trust-building mea-
sure, the degree to which human rights should be protected was spelled 
out in the Stockholm Programme: ‘The protection of the rights of sus-
pected and accused persons in criminal proceedings is a fundamental value 
of the Union, which is essential in order to maintain mutual trust between 
the Member States and public confidence in the Union’ (European 
Commission, 2010, p. 10).
With the introduction of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and 
the strategic programmes that followed, the common joint legal funda-
ment was established, preparing the way for the introduction of transna-
tional information technology database systems ready to collect, store, 
compare and exchange diverse kinds of data for different purposes. Border 
and migration control was one domain and law enforcement was the 
other. Despite emerging as distinct policy areas, migration and crime con-
trol have increasingly merged over time with regard to both their legal 
fundaments and their database infrastructures (Aas, 2011).
PromotIng euroPean IntegratIon by buIldIng 
large- scale transnatIonal bIometrIc 
database systems
Rommetveit (2016) has argued that biometric technologies and databas-
ing are part of a transforming vision that easily lent itself to political visions 
of enhanced border control as a way of promoting European integration. 
This argument is made by referring, on the one hand, to EU policies 
driven towards tighter security measures to combat events such as 9/11. 
On the other hand, the EU’s inclusion of ten new members in 2004 is 
identified as having caused the perceived need for further coordination 
and collaboration. With the integration of Central and Eastern European 
countries—the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia—plus Malta and Cyprus, it became mandatory 
to integrate them in the cooperative police and judiciary networks to fight 
 N. AMELUNG ET AL.
21
against criminality. The integration of the new countries was regarded 
with suspicion and caution regarding their values and interests by the 
Western European nations (Lauristin, 2007) and revealed asymmetries in 
East–West relations and perceptions. The aim of enhancing border control 
then became the establishment of biometric data exchange systems facili-
tating a unified biometric vision inscribed onto border control-related 
technologies. The unified biometric vision was instructive, for instance, in 
redesigning travel documents and other biometric technologies serving to 
verify a person’s identity (see also Aas, 2011; Dijstelbloem & Broeders, 
2015; Kloppenburg & van der Ploeg, 2018). Rommetveit (2016) has 
identified the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information 
System II (SIS II) and EURODAC centralized database systems as the 
biggest and most important ones to reveal the politically set agenda behind 
biometric technologies aimed at political and technical integration. 
Complementarily, Misa and Schot (2005) have used the lens of technol-
ogy to explore integration as the emergent outcome from a process of 
linking national technical infrastructures and establishing transnational 
technical infrastructures. They have also assessed the tensions that derive 
from linking the different visions of Europe associated with such infra-
structures. We follow Misa and Schot (2005) in looking beyond the set 
agenda of the EU to be sensitive to the implications for de facto (dis)inte-
gration and focus on the specific role of biometric data and information 
infrastructures for political and technical (dis)integration.
The European security studies scholar Pedersen (2015) has distin-
guished between two modes of ordering integration through data infor-
mation systems that differ regarding the role of state autonomy and state 
power: vertical Europeanization and horizontal Europeanization. We 
make use of this distinction to illustrate the implications deriving from 
centralized or decentralized architectures for information systems. The 
‘vertical Europeanization’ mode of ordering integration builds on 
European institutions for the creation or preparation of a range of central-
ized European databases with different purposes. It has been much more 
used in migration and border control; SIS, VIS and EURODAC, as well 
as steps taken to enhance the interoperability of these databases, are exam-
ples of ‘vertical Europeanization’ at work. ‘Horizontal Europeanization’ is 
the result of Member States beginning to use each other as sources of data 
without going ‘through’ the European institutions; decentralized and net-
worked database systems such as Prüm serve as examples of this. Law 
enforcement actors have for long attempted to maintain state authority 
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and have therefore opted more often for decentralized solutions that 
allow, at least partially, the retention of some pillars of state autonomy.
M’charek, Schramm, and Skinner (2014) have looked into the impact 
of integration through biometric information infrastructures and explored 
the racializing effects of European regimes of border management and the 
related governance of populations. They demonstrated how such infra-
structures—by taking the cases of SIS, Frontex, VIS, Eurodac and Prüm 
as examples—simultaneously constitute and discriminate against racialized 
groups of people in practice, even if the explicit language of race and eth-
nicity is largely absent from its official remit. Regarding Prüm, the authors 
(M’charek et al., pp. 481–482) precisely encouraged further research to 
look at the dynamics of convergence between countries’ database develop-
ments but considering the differences between legal frameworks, systems 
of governance and, indeed, between policing and laboratory practice 
around DNA across the various national databases in Europe. Such dif-
ferentiated exploration is crucial in order to understand the ‘unequal con-
sequences of surveillance through Europe’s technobureaucratic systems’ 
(M’charek et al., p. 482) (Table 2.1).
Since the introduction of the first EU-wide biometric information data-
base system (EURODAC) in 2000, the historical evolution of diverse bio-
metric database systems in Europe has been dedicated to the expansion of 
‘datafication’ (Broeders & Dijstelbloem, 2016; Cukier & Mayer- 
Schoenberger, 2013), that is, the transformation of social action into digi-
tal quantified data, trackable and accessible for further analysis. Datafication 
serves as the foundation for ‘dataveillance’ (Clarke, 1988) as a form of 
surveillance that has likewise drastically enlarged in the last two decades. 
Since its introduction the scope of ascribed purposes of the database sys-
tem and targeted persons has been substantially extended. EURODAC’s 
purpose was to assign Member State’s responsibility for individual asylum 
requests and to prevent so-called asylum shopping (multiple attempts to 
request for asylum in different Member States). It used fingerprints as a 
biometric identifier. Later on, EURODAC became accessible to law 
enforcement agencies as well. Backed by the European Councils in Laeken 
(2001) and Seville (2002), the next system, the common VIS, established 
fingerprints as a biometric identifier and targeted non-EU citizens 
(Liberatore, 2007).
From 1995, the SIS had already established a common database that 
enabled the relevant authorities in each Member State to have access to 
alerts on persons and property. Initially, it worked without biometric data 
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Table 2.1 Centralized large-scale IT systems using biometrics (existing and 
planned)
Database systems Main purpose Persons covered Biometric 
identifiers
EURODAC Determines the Member 
State responsible for 











VIS Facilitates the exchange of 
data between Schengen 
Member States on visa 
applications
Visa applicants and 
sponsors
Fingerprints
SIS II—police Safeguards security in the 
EU and Schengen 
Member States






SIS II—borders Processes alerts for the 
purpose of refusing entry 
into or stay in the 
Schengen Member States





Entry/Exit System (EES) Calculates and monitors 
the duration of authorized 
stay of third-country 
nationals and identifies 
over-stayers
Travellers coming 






System for Third 
Country Nationals 
(ECRIS-TCN)
Shares information on 
previous convictions of 
third-country nationals
Third-country 







Establishes a framework 
for interoperability 
between EES, VIS, 




by Eurodac, VIS, 





Source: Authors relying on a publication of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2018, 
p. 23). The table shows biometric database information systems in the EU, including migration, border 
control and law enforcement-based systems. Biometric identifiers in italics are part of the planned trans-
formations. With white background are the existing databases, with grey background the additional 
planned database systems
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and was used for the purposes of border checks and other police and cus-
toms checks, such as issuing visas, residence permits and the administra-
tion of legislation on non-Schengen citizens in the context of the Schengen 
Convention. In April 2013, the second-generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II) was launched with enhanced functionality, including the 
use of biometrics. In June 2018, decision-makers agreed on a new package 
for the Schengen Information System, the implementation of which will 
be completed in 2021 and which contains the collection of palm prints, 
fingerprints, facial images and, in limited circumstances, DNA related to 
missing persons (European Commission, 2020). Thereby, it has become 
clear how, over time, migration and border control have merged with law 
enforcement and stimulated the use of biometrics across purposes. The 
dominant policy narrative argues that this merging facilitates police coop-
eration on missing and unwanted persons as well as border control coop-
eration regarding the mobility of migrants in irregular situations (European 
Commission, 2020).
Proposals adopted and signed by the European Council in 2017 aimed 
at enhancing the management of Europe’s external borders through the 
use of biometrics included the introduction of an Entry/Exit System 
(EES) which is planned to be operational in 2020 (Kloppenburg & van 
der Ploeg, 2018). In 2019, another centralized system, the European 
Criminal Records Information System for Third Country Nationals 
(ECRIS-TCN), received its legal foundation with the regulation EU 
2019/816 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Centralized 
data from Member States holding conviction information on third-
country nationals and stateless persons supplements the European 
Criminal Records Information System. The latest iteration of expansion is 
the current ‘interoperability’ initiative, which is attempting to connect 
diverse centralized database systems and make data available for multiple 
purposes and to streamline systems’ users for law enforcement, judicial, 
migration and asylum matters. The planned Common Identity Repository 
(CIR) belongs to the backbone of the interoperability project as it aims at 
centralizing biographic and biometric information of third-country 
nationals. CIR will store biometric data of SIS II, VIS, Eurodac, ECRIS- 
TCN and EES which then is available for search and comparison (see 
Table 2.2).
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aPProachIng transnatIonal crImInal mobIlIty: 
the Prüm system
Although practically all of the technologies and database systems men-
tioned above evolved over time to control mobility across borders, some 
of them—such as the Prüm system—were intended primarily to support 
transnational criminal investigations (Machado & Granja, 2018, 2019a; 
Machado, Granja, & Amelung, 2020; Prainsack & Toom, 2010, 2013; 
Toom, 2018). It is therefore important to remind ourselves of the differ-
ences of the groups targeted by migration and border control, on the one 
hand, and law enforcement, on the other. The major groups targeted by 
migration and border control database systems are third-country nationals 
seeking entry into the territory of Member States and EU nationals travel-
ling across countries (Broeders & Dijstelbloem, 2016). The groups tar-
geted by law enforcement database systems, such as Prüm, are individuals 
with some previous involvement with the criminal justice system. The 
Prüm system thereby fits what Williams and Johnson would consider as ‘a 
type of surveillance which is essentially concerned with “management” of 
those already deemed criminal (…) delimiting them from the wider popu-
lation and managing them through assured detection’ (Williams & 
Johnson, 2004, p. 11).
It was in May 2005 that officials from seven countries met in the small 
German town of Prüm. Member States had become increasingly con-
cerned about the transnational movement of people deemed risky and, 
consequently, about the growth of transnational crime. Supported by the 
Schengen Agreement and the Hague Programme, Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain, France, Luxembourg and Austria signed the Prüm 
Merging of policy sectors
























Table 2.2  Securitization and evolution of large-scale information systems
Source: Authors
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Convention. The Convention intended to strengthen the cooperation 
between those seven countries through the exchange of information to 
combat terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. Preventing 
and investigating cross-border crime (i.e. terrorism, human trafficking, 
drug smuggling and illicit arms traffic) has been, at the discursive level of 
policy formation, the main driving force and justification for most of the 
crime investigating regimes in the EU that build on biometrics (Aas, 
2011). In 2008, some of the Prüm Convention provisions were subsumed 
into the police and judicial cooperation provisions in EU law by a Council 
Decision commonly referred to as the Prüm Decision (Council of the 
European Union 2008a, 2008b). This Decision made it mandatory for all 
Member States to join this pan-European data network (Toom, Granja, & 
Ludwig, 2019).
The latest report on the progress of the implementation of Prüm, dat-
ing from February 2020, indicates that there are 26 Member States 
exchanging DNA data. Greece and Italy are not operational in the Prüm 
system. This does not imply, however, that all countries have established 
the same level of connections. For instance, while the Netherlands and 
Austria are connected to 24 countries, the UK and Denmark are exchang-
ing DNA data with just 7 countries (Council of the European Union, 2020).
decentralIzed databases
The Prüm system established transnational exchange on the basis of a 
decentralized database system, thereby deciding that, instead of aggregat-
ing information into one database, data should remain the property of the 
Member State where it was collected. As such, it challenges notions of 
borders in a different way to centralized database systems such as those 
that evolved from the JHA policies. In contrast to centralized database 
systems, decentralized law enforcement networks, such as Prüm, often 
derive from pre-existing networks of security professionals or through 
common professional activities among biometric experts and thus included 
people who knew each other previously (Aden, 2016). Prainsack and 
Toom (2010) have emphasized that the Prüm system derived from tech-
nocratic drivers of integration.
Efforts by forensic scientists to standardize forensic DNA profiling 
technologies across national borders date back to the late 1980s, when the 
European DNA Profiling Group (EDNAP) was established with the aim 
of preventing and being prepared for an ‘escalation of cross-border crimes’ 
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in an increasingly integrated Europe. The European Network of Forensic 
Science Institutes (ENFSI) has been similarly important in the standard-
ization of scientific procedures. Forensic scientists from such networks set 
up the basic conditions of possibility for the Prüm system: the so-called 
European Standard Set (ESS) was proposed by a group of forensic scien-
tists of the ENFSI. The EU promoted such developments by providing 
funding to the ENFSI that increased collaboration ‘between European 
laboratories, ultimately leading to the formation of a pan-European data-
base’ (Gill, Sparkes, Fereday, & Werrett, 2000, p. 1). What Prainsack and 
Toom have coined as ‘forensic technocracy’ (Prainsack & Toom, 2010, 
p. 1125) was what substantially enabled the political process of the Prüm 
implementation. Although the EU’s interoperability initiative has been 
considered in relation to centralized database systems, Prüm—as a decen-
tralized system—has nevertheless also been listed as a candidate for 
interoperability in the future (EU Commission, 2017).
Decentralized systems also play out in a specific form with the level of 
autonomy that each Member State has in establishing the norms and 
actors that will be actively involved in data exchange. Considering that 
each country remains in control of its database, the EU regulation of the 
Prüm system stipulates that, for the purposes of supplying data, each 
Member State shall designate a National Contact Point (NCP), and the 
powers of the NCPs shall be governed by the applicable national law 
(Decision 20008/615/JHA). Different countries have given custody of 
their national DNA databases to different entities, ranging from judicial 
authorities to police forces.
In the great majority of countries involved in the Prüm system, the 
Ministry of the Interior (or Ministry of Internal Affairs or Ministry of 
Home Affairs)—a government ministry typically responsible for policing, 
emergency management, national security and immigration—has custody 
of the national criminal DNA database. The exceptions to this scenario are 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden, in which the Ministry of 
Justice has custody over the national DNA database. The Ministry of 
Justice typically has specific duties associated with the organization of the 
justice system, and it oversees public prosecutors and maintains the legal 
system and public order. In this diverse context, the roles and responsibili-
ties of Prüm NCPs may vary among countries, according to their different 
organizational structures and national legislation.
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PrevIous studIes on Prüm
Over the last years, the Prüm system has received academic attention that 
can be divided into two main approaches. The first includes studies that 
focus on the societal, political and ethical challenges posed by the system. 
In this domain, scholars have been outlining the challenges deriving from 
the mandatory implementation and rapid expansion of the Prüm system. 
They have highlighted concerns over the enormous disparities in national 
legislation and data protection; ongoing issues of transparency, account-
ability and trust; and the lack of ethical oversight of the transnational flow 
of law enforcement information (Amankwaa, 2019; Hufnagel & 
McCartney, 2015; Matos, 2019; McCartney, 2014a, 2014b; McCartney, 
Wilson, & Williams, 2011; Prainsack & Toom, 2010, 2013; Toom et al., 
2019). In this domain, a recent number of empirically grounded studies 
exploring what ‘ethics’ means to forensic practitioners actively involved in 
transnational DNA data exchanges under the Prüm system have also 
emerged (Machado & Granja, 2018). Furthermore, scholars have 
addressed how forensic DNA evidence is given meaning within the differ-
ent ways of constructing a police epistemic culture in the context of Prüm 
(Machado & Granja, 2019a). Additionally, the fluid and flexible forms of 
constructing suspicion which take shape in transnational governance of 
crime through forensic DNA databases (Machado et al., 2020) and how 
NCPs perceive the risks and benefits of transnational exchange of forensic 
DNA data (Machado & Granja, 2019b) have been recently explored. The 
second main approach in the literature focusing on the Prüm system has 
assessed the geographical patterns of cross-border crimes solved by trans-
national exchange of DNA data (Bernasco, Lammers, & van der Beek, 
2016; Taverne & Broeders, 2015, 2016). In this regard, one study, based 
on an analysis of the official statistical dataset of the Prüm system, sug-
gested a territorial divide between Western and Central European coun-
tries and Eastern European countries. The research revealed a trend 
showing that the majority of DNA profiles they collect come from indi-
viduals originating from Eastern European countries (Santos & Machado, 
2017). The implicit assumption behind this association between the popu-
lations of Eastern European countries and the suspicion of crime reveals 
the subjectivizing effects of surveillance processes. The transnational 
exchange of DNA data via the Prüm system represents a technological 
infrastructure that targets the movements of particular suspect communi-
ties across Europe (Machado et al., 2020). The continuous (re)creation of 
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assertions concerning criminality and specific populations from certain 
East European countries is sustained by generalizations of what Didier 
Bigo has described as the fears of ‘transnational movements of people 
from poor countries to richer ones’ (Bigo, 2008, p. 94).
horIzontal euroPean (dIs)IntegratIon: 
bIoborderIng In the case oF Prüm
The focus of this book lies in the phenomena of biometric data informa-
tion crossing Member States’ borders by looking at the particular case of 
Prüm. By approaching it as hidden (dis)integration in Europe, we study 
the partial suspension and partial reclaiming of nation-state-rooted power 
along the site of borders for biometric data exchange. More particularly, 
we propose to combine border studies scholarship, with its focus on trans-
forming nation-state autonomy, and studies that have explored the pro-
cesses of European (dis)integration (Misa & Schot, 2005) with a sensitivity 
to the role of technology.
Centralized database systems mostly used for the purpose of migration 
control have been widely addressed in the literature with regard to their 
transformative effects on understanding borders and remaking Europe via 
vertical Europeanization (Pedersen, 2015). However, horizontal 
Europeanization, traditionally more common in police collaboration and 
law enforcement, and its transformative effect on bioborders, remains 
understudied. Aiming to fill this gap, this book therefore focuses on how 
the Prüm system, as an example of horizontal Europeanization, reflects 
and shapes the implications of the hidden (dis)integration of Europe and 
reconfiguration of its bioborders.
In the following chapter, we begin by reviewing recent impulses from 
border studies more systematically to clarify why we are proposing to use 
the concept of ‘biobordering’, and we will outline biobordering’s compo-
nents and dynamics. Furthermore, in the chapter we will focus on the 
Prüm system and begin to outline how it reveals instances of debordering 
and rebordering that make borders more or less permeable.
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Abstract This chapter introduces the concept of ‘biobordering’. Taking 
the nationally grown crime control regimes into account, we argue that 
the proposed concept of bioborders is useful in capturing how the territo-
rial foundations of national state autonomy are partially reclaimed (what 
we call rebordering) and at the same time partially purposefully suspended 
(what we call debordering). The concept of biobordering is particularly 
fruitful for understanding how modes of bordering entangle with large- 
scale IT database infrastructures for the exchange of biometric data in the 
context of crime control. It highlights in particular the legal, scientific, 
technical, political and ethical dimensions of data exchange across borders 
across the EU. The chapter reviews recent insights from border studies 
and continues by outlining components and dynamics of biobordering 
that make bioborders more or less permeable for expansive biometric data 
exchange.
Keywords Modes of biobordering • National state autonomy • 
Debordering • Rebordering • EU
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IntroductIon
In this chapter, we introduce the concept of ‘biobordering’. Taking the 
nationally grown crime control regimes into account, we argue that the 
proposed concept of bioborders is useful in capturing how the territorial 
foundations of national state autonomy are partially reclaimed (what we 
call rebordering) and at the same time partially purposefully suspended 
(what we call debordering). The concept of biobordering is useful in try-
ing to understand how modes of biobordering entangle with large-scale 
IT database infrastructures for the exchange of biometric data in the con-
text of crime control. We do so, in particular, by looking into attempts to 
track the mobility of certain ‘risky’ individuals across state borders and 
identify people related to crimes, including victims, and missing persons.
In this book, the concept of biobordering aims to address the following 
research question: who or what is acting when transnational large-scale IT 
database infrastructures facilitate the exchange of biometric data for the 
purposes of crime control and tracking of mobile ‘risky’ people? In order 
to try to provide some answers, we use the concept of biobordering to 
understand actions and interactions that go beyond state-as-actor-centred 
perspectives. Therefore, we consider multiple actors and actions, including 
those that constitute or contest notions of the autonomy and territorial 
borders of nation-states. We take into account the actions and practices 
that confirm, but also suspend or contest, nation-states’ legal and territo-
rial borders. In summary, in this book we look in depth into the notion of 
nation-state-embedded agency in the context of the establishment and 
operation of such transnational infrastructures and understand such agency 
as activities that contribute to the performance of the actions of transna-
tional infrastructures which remain shaped by nation-state logics.
Taking inspiration from research in technology and organizations, we 
mobilize the notion of ‘distributed agency’ (Rammert, 2008, pp. 78–83), 
which relates to the strong interdependence between the material and the 
social given the complexity and interaction between human and non- 
human elements. On the one hand, we assume that there are modes of 
ordering through ‘distributed agency’ across several human actors, includ-
ing biometric specialists, criminal justice system personnel, data protection 
authorities and oversight bodies. On the other hand, we also take into 
account advanced technologies, such as biometric technologies and IT 
database systems, which perform action ‘closely knit together’ through 
their interrelations with human actors in a heterogeneous network of 
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activities (Rammert, 2008, p. 82). By looking into ‘distributed agency’ 
across actors and technologies involved in the transnational infrastructures 
at stake, our aim is to understand how borders are enacted and reinforced 
through biometric technologies and biological data exchange in unex-
pected ways.
In this chapter, we begin by reviewing recent insights from border 
studies to clarify why we are proposing to use the concept of ‘bioborder-
ing’. We continue by outlining biobordering’s components, including 
debordering and rebordering dynamics, that make bioborders more or 
less permeable for expansive biometric data exchange. Afterwards, we 
explore the different logics of the debordering dynamics at work at the 
EU level, highlighting the legal, scientific, technical, political and ethical 
dimensions of data exchange across borders that are configured to achieve 
technological integration across Member States. In addition, we outline 
the notion of biobordering and its meaning in the context of the transna-
tional exchange of DNA data regulated by the Prüm system, portraying 
how political and regulatory ambitions have translated into debordering 
practices of the EU institutions.
BIoBorderIng: Who Borders What and hoW?
Recent insights from border studies have turned to approaches that under-
stand borders not as given, but as continuously ‘being made’ and as involv-
ing ‘b/ordering practices’ (van Houtum, Kramsch, & Zierhofer, 2005; 
Kolossov & Scott, 2013). We situate our own approach in line with 
approaches that understand borders as emerging through socio-political as 
well as techno-scientific processes. Broeders and Dijstelbloem (2016) have 
stated that, in the context of new technologies of surveillance and the digi-
tization of information about border policies, the nature of the border has 
changed radically (Broeders & Dijstelbloem, 2016). Now the border is 
‘everywhere’ (Lyon, 2005). It has changed into a ‘border security con-
tinuum’ (Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Trends towards the virtualization and 
digitization of measures for transnational police collaboration in the con-
text of migration and crime control have shifted formal border policy 
agendas and actual polities. Under the labels of ‘smart borders’ (Lehtonen 
& Aalto, 2017; Leese, 2016), ‘iborders’ (Pötzsch, 2015) and ‘virtual bor-
ders’ (Johnson et al., 2011), these trends have been addressed in policy 
discourse and extensively reflected in border studies (Amoore, 2006).
3 BIOBORDERING AS A CONCEPT 
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Louise Amoore coined the term biometric borders to describe how 
biometrics shape borders in society. By studying ‘dataveillance’ in the war 
on terror, Amoore (2006, p. 339) found that biometric techniques involve 
processes of objectivization, that is, practices that divide and break up a 
subject into calculable risk factors that transform the subject into an object. 
Such objectivization results in new technologies of surveillance identifying 
‘what effectively become suspect populations or “risky groups”’ (Amoore, 
2006, p. 339). Performing the very idea of the biometric border is then 
described as an exercise of biopower (Amoore, 2006, pp. 337–339), by 
which the bodies of migrants and travellers themselves turn into sites of 
multiple encoded social, legal, gendered and racialized boundaries. In a 
collectively published contribution, Paasi in a subsection of a joint article 
(Johnson et al., 2011) has argued, with reference to Amoore, that techni-
cal landscapes of control and surveillance monitored by increasingly tech-
nical devices and biometrics may also contribute to the bordering in a 
society. By expanding Amoore’s concept of ‘bordering in society’, Paasi 
specifies how borders can also be constitutive of social, cultural and politi-
cal distinctions between social groups in relation to technologies. In this 
sense, Paasi argues that new technologies associated with border control 
for the purposes of preventing terrorism or illegal immigration may indeed 
exist ‘everywhere’ (Johnson et al., 2011).
Very few studies (Tsianos & Kusters, 2016; Tazzioli, 2019) have 
addressed what such biometric borders mean for the people affected. An 
exception is Scheel’s work (2013), which explores how migrants contrib-
ute to what he calls ‘processes of biometric rebordering’ when biometrics 
impact the ways in which migrants appropriate their mobility to counter 
biometric border regimes. Scheel emphasizes how this in return requires 
us to rethink moments of autonomy in migration. The studies that do 
address targeted populations focus on migration control, but rarely on 
crime control. An exception is Machado and Prainsack’s (2012) study on 
prisoners and their perceptions of DNA technologies, which primarily 
focuses on situated understandings of targeted populations in Austria and 
Portugal rather than on the impact of borders. Biometrics for identification 
applied not specifically and narrowly for the purpose of migration and crime 
control but with an effect of constructing suspicion and partially criminaliza-
tion of targeted populations are at stake in the context of India’s Aadhaar 
programme. With the world’s largest national biometric identification data-
base which was initiated in 2009 the Government of India aimed to confront 
two problems. First, comprehensive biometric identification was thought as 
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a solution to the lack of identification papers amongst the rural and urban 
poor and thus providing access to government welfare and benefits. 
Second, it was meant to identify and eliminate ‘fake’, ‘duplicate’ and 
‘ghost’ identities to defraud the welfare system (Nair, 2018, p. 143). Nair 
(2018, p. 153) stated that instead of providing benefits or entitlements, 
Aadhaar turned out as a surveillance technology ‘understood and con-
tested through entwined ideas of identity, belonging, and criminality’ and 
identified blurred categories and boundaries of ‘what differentiates the 
body of the innocent from the culpable, the citizen from the illegal immi-
grant’ in post-colonial India.
While most border studies interested in biometrics in the EU have been 
concerned with the role of borders in relation to people and people’s bod-
ies, we argue that the shift towards attempts to make national borders 
permeable for biometric data exchange deserves further attention. We call 
such borders ‘bioborders’ and assume that unpacking such bioborders will 
help us to understand how they shape new forms of surveillance of ‘risky 
groups’ across Europe. Bioborders emerge as a result of heterogeneous 
attempts to organize data border-crossings. The shift of focus towards 
making borders permeable for data exchange may also help make visible 
the multiplicity of nation-states’ situations and their different approaches, 
from enforcement to ‘laissez faire’, to data bordering practices and help us 
understand how different nations install different modalities of border 
control for biometric data and have multiple and diverse social consider-
ations about its associated ethical impacts for tracked and implicated people.
The purposeful acts of creating and configuring bioborders are also 
better understood by using van Houtum and van Naerssen’s (2002) 
notion of ‘b/ordering practices’. The authors highlight the close connec-
tion between the different bordering and ordering practices which simul-
taneously co-create normative, regulatory and organizational orders 
constructing differences. Modes of ordering emerge as attempts to regu-
late what happens on one nation’s side of the border and on the other and 
what happens to those who cross the border. While van Houtum and van 
Naerssen use the concept of ‘b/ordering’ to highlight the impact of order-
ing practices on people, our approach is interested in the organizational, 
regulatory and normative ordering processes for data border-crossings. 
Van Houtum and van Naerssen also explore the practices of ordering and 
othering people, thus emphasizing how differences become reinforced. 
Complementarily, our approach analyses attempts to enable 
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quasi-borderless data flow as an attempt to undo the legal, scientific, tech-
nical, political and ethical differences across borders.
In this book, we argue that biometric database systems constructed in 
the JHA area for security and surveillance purposes deserve additional 
attention beyond their explicit use in migration and border control. 
Transnational law enforcement and police cooperation building increas-
ingly on biometric data information systems are framed in policy discourse 
as promoting forms of integration across EU Member States (Council of 
the European Union, 2003). However, different dynamics shape how 
multiple occurrences of the state’s rooted autonomy and the integration 
ambitions of EU institutions meet and configure diverse bioborders for 
data exchange.
deBorderIng and reBorderIng dynamIcs
This book furthers the analysis on ‘biobordering’ (Amelung & Machado, 
2019) to explore the establishment of transnationally applied biometric 
technologies. Such biometric technologies come explicitly with regulation 
of how data may (or may not) cross the borders of nation-states and 
implicitly produce a heterogeneous landscape of historically contingent 
and intentional reordering processes that partially overcome and partially 
reinforce nation-states’ territorial borders through bodies, data and 
technology.
A particular ‘biometric imaginary’ (Gunnarsdóttir & Rommetveit, 
2017) drives attempts to track the mobility of certain people in the con-
text of crime control across state borders. This imaginary builds on the 
idea that the more data is exchanged, the more useful it is, and that the 
expected benefit of such technologies is to enhance the security of societ-
ies (Prainsack & Toom, 2010).
We understand the transnational biometric technology systems enacted 
for law enforcement to be ‘attempts to expand biometric data exchange 
and establish “borderlessness” for data flows and to overcome the logics 
of nation-state boundaries’ (Amelung & Machado, 2019, p. 396). The 
aim of such endeavours is to diminish technical, scientific, operational and 
legal obstacles, resulting in increasingly permeable bioborders (ibid). Yet, 
the nation-state’s situated modes of ordering may derive from territorially 
driven logics in which the state’s autonomy drives the creation or mainte-
nance of its own systems for collecting, sharing and protecting biometric 
data. Therefore, nation-states’ trajectories of biometric databasing remain 
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contingent on their own historically and culturally shaped political–judi-
cial paths of biometric technology and database development. Bioborders 
are thus understood as historically grown boundaries separating different 
national systems of biometric data collection. In order to allow biometric 
data to cross a nation-state’s territorial borders, bioborders need to 
become reordered and constructed in a way that interconnects national 
infrastructures of regulatory, biometric, information technology and orga-
nizational dimensions dedicated to the retention of biometric data.
The ambition to create expansive biometric data exchange requires 
what we call the debordering of historically grown bioborders: bioborders 
must be made permeable and data made available across borders (Amelung 
& Machado, 2019). By ‘expansive’ biometric data exchange, we refer 
foremost to the extent of types of data made available as well as to the 
extent of connections built which in consequence affect the scope of expo-
sure of data subjects to international police collaboration. At the same 
time, when confronted with requirements to make their data available, 
actor networks in the Member States respond by raising a diverse range of 
concerns over data protection, technical infrastructure, and the need to 
install appropriate safeguards and oversight to prevent malfunctions of the 
data exchange systems. Consequently, actor networks in Member States 
may create conditions that reinforce bioborders—what we call reborder-
ing—by making them only selectively permeable and by putting data 
border- crossings under stricter regimes of control.
We follow Rumford’s (2012) invitation to make a ‘multiperspectival 
study of borders’ by differentiating and combining perspectives of ‘seeing 
like a state’ and ‘seeing like a border’. Rumford offers a couple of reflec-
tions that correspond with our approach. He proposes that state-centred 
views on borders should not be seen exclusively as synonymous with a 
predominant interest in territorial nation-state borders. Furthermore, he 
assumes that borders do not always work in the service of the state. Finally, 
he states that ineffectual borders may be in place in spite of, or even 
through, local or partial bordering practices.
In line with Rumford (2012), our approach favours a specific way of 
‘seeing like a state’. That is, we shift away from notions of the EU or the 
Member States as coherent, rational and intentionality-driven actors 
towards the distributed, yet collective, agency of a heterogeneous set of 
actors with multiple intentions and rationalities, potentially even conflict-
ing ones. They may rely on different but co-existing nation-state referenc-
ing rationalities. Distributed agency then—as explained above—is attributed 
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also to advanced technologies involved in the technoscience of biometrics 
and database exchange (Rammert, 2008). ‘Seeing like a border’ in our 
context provides insights into how national autonomy and sovereignty are 
claimed, negotiated and suspended not only through legal and political 
bordering processes but also through scientific and technical bordering 
practices that correspond with techno-political cultures and that manifest 
specific regimes for biological data retention and exchange. In order to 
specify that idea for the dynamic of debordering, we can imagine a commit-
ment to expansive biometric data exchange as driven by policy- makers 
establishing the legal conditions, but at the same time it can be also driven 
by a forensic technocracy establishing scientific and technical conditions 
(Prainsack & Toom, 2010). Thereby the established technical solutions 
and their rationales itself may contribute to facilitate and expand the data 
exchange and create further affordances to maintain or advance the data 
exchange as might become plausible when considering recent trends 
towards interoperability between database systems (see Chap. 2). An 
important distinction with regard to debordering dynamics is related to the 
range of influence which we call either circumscribed or diffusive deborder-
ing. We may find debordering oriented towards expanding the data flows 
bounded to the own nation-state’s bioborders. Such circumscribed debor-
dering refers to the expansion of data exchange via types of data made avail-
able and/or the speed of making and the number of connections. The 
expansion influences the scope of one’s country data exchange network 
and the volume and/or categories of data. In consequence, circumscribed 
debordering, firstly, expands the volume of data and/or the type of data 
subjects that are exposed to possible matching with other data from other 
countries’ databases. Secondly, it enlarges the exposure of data subjects to 
wider geographical data landscapes by including the exchange with more 
country databases and to additional transnational law enforcement. We 
may find diffusive debordering as attempts of expanding debordering 
beyond one’s own country, for instance, via spreading the political princi-
ples, technologies, IT infrastructures, tacit knowledge and trainings on 
Prüm operations in order to deborder bioborders of other nation-states.
While, as one form of biobordering practice, debordering dynamics 
might conceptually be more intuitive than rebordering dynamics, since 
debordering conforms with formal EU policy agendas and policies around 
integration, it is important to understand that debordering comes with a 
specific mode of ordering. We present the EU’s political and technical 
attempts to secure the unhindered cross-border flow of biometric data 
 N. AMELUNG ET AL.
43
among Member States as a levelling mode of ordering aimed at diminish-
ing technical, scientific and legal ‘obstacles’.
Our take on rebordering deserves three further clarifications so that 
rebordering is not confused with a simple failure of nation-state embedded 
sets of actors to secure more than a nominal implementation of the initial 
ambition of debordering dynamics. First, understanding rebordering as a 
distributed agency comes with the consequence that it is not necessarily a 
deliberately agreed-upon and intentional process designed by the whole 
actor network involved in biobordering dynamics aimed at restricting data 
exchange across bioborders. Instead, it can be an ambiguous process deriv-
ing from multiple constellations of intentions, motives and unintended, 
but tolerated, developments that result in the maintenance or creation of 
technical, scientific, operational and legal idiosyncrasies. Measured with the 
debordering ambition, such constellations may be understood as ‘obsta-
cles’ and restrictions to ‘borderless’ data exchange. Consequently, the 
mode of ordering in rebordering dynamics might be driven by emphasiz-
ing aspects of nation-state autonomy and therefore reclaiming borders to 
manifest specific conditions for expansive data exchange.
Second, taking the regulatory dimension into consideration as one par-
tial site for driving rebordering dynamics outlines how the state’s monop-
oly on pre-establishing national law shapes specific legacies. Such legacies 
play out in how transnational collaboration in law enforcement has 
changed, but also in how legal data protection and human/civil rights 
regimes have evolved differently (Fiodorova, 2018). These contingencies 
deserve attention not only with regard to how they form judicial and legal 
‘obstacles’ for the establishment of cross-border collaboration, including 
information exchange, but also for the ways in which they contribute to 
harmonizing regimes to protect civil and human rights that are potentially 
disproportionally under threat. National laws—for example, criminal law, 
immigration law and data protection law—‘do not generally transcend 
national borders’ (Bantekas & Nash, 2007, p. 407). Thus, national laws 
are contained within territorial limits rooted in state sovereignty and its 
implementation of judicial, administrative and coercive powers. From a 
legal viewpoint, it was for a long time safe to say that country borders 
signalled that one legal order had ended and another begun (Fiodorova, 
2018, p. 7). As we have made clear, this is no longer the case: transnational 
criminality has challenged legal country borders.
Third, in order to understand the somewhat counter-intuitive dynamics 
of rebordering better, we rely on Saskia Hufnagel’s comparative work on 
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the EU and Greater China, which has explored the facilitation of cross- 
border flows of police information (Hufnagel, 2017). The author argues 
that human rights are necessitating the building of ‘congestions’ that stop 
or slow down the flow of information. She specifically explores different 
forms of obstacle to the ‘free flow’ of policing. She argues further that the 
free flow of policing is not in anyone’s interests, since in democratic poli-
tics, the police—as an executive branch of the government—is supposed 
to serve and not potentially harm the people.
We build on the idea of legitimate ‘obstacles’ that are justified to the 
nation as a valid barrier and restriction to borderless data exchange and 
explore the justifications and legitimacy claims behind attempts to restrict 
free cross-border information flow. Yet, we do so in a broad sense, by not 
only referring to different regimes of human rights and jurisdictions but 
also including ‘obstacles’ that are considered legitimate as being in the 
national interest or more specifically in the interest of the national people. 
An important distinction to Hufnagel’s conceptualization (2017) is related 
to the understanding of human rights within the EU. In comparing the EU 
as a single entity with Greater China, she is working with the assumption 
that the EU has a shared human rights regime. Our approach remains sen-
sitive to the differences between EU Member States not only in human 
rights practices but also with regard to technical, scientific, operational and 
other legal practices that are linked to legitimacy claims rationalized 
through national collective subjectivities and democratic justifications.
the estaBlIshment and Performance of BIoBorders 
In euroPe
By taking inspiration from Johnson, Williams, and Martin (2003, p. 26), 
we can advance towards the different material, regulatory and epistemic 
layers that contribute to the establishment of bioborders. Johnson et al. 
(2003, p. 26) proposed four constitutive components of national criminal 
DNA databases, which we have built on to reflect on data exchange flows 
across them (Amelung & Machado, 2019, p. 397):
• Regulations, legislative frameworks and governance principles of the 
countries sanctioning the collection, use and retention of DNA data, 
including data protection regimes
• DNA technology development, including the scientific knowledge that 
DNA technologies build on, material artefacts and biological 
resources like samples and paperwork
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• Technical database infrastructures necessary to digitally store and 
compare data and the definition and management of data categories 
applied to databases
• Organizational imperatives and principles, such as reliability, trans-
parency and public accountability, which translate into work routines 
such as inputting biometric data, reporting hits, following up corre-
spondence when there are matches and providing transparent and 
publicly available statistics
We consider these legal and regulatory, techno-scientific biometrical, IT 
database and organizational components to be constitutive of border infra-
structures. Agency is distributed across a heterogeneous actor network of 
regulators, security professionals, forensic technocratic experts and other 
criminal justice systems’ stakeholders who are involved in national biomet-
ric data collection and retention and in operational data exchange and who 
jointly contribute to the constitution of bioborders (Table 3.1).
In order to portray and typify different bordering dynamics, we use the 
following three analytical dimensions in making cross-country compari-
sons of the bioborders in question:
• The national legacies of DNA databases and DNA technologies and 
how they produce particular notions of nationhood and are linked to 
nation-state-bound legitimacy claims
• The promises/expectations/criminological interests of Member States 
deciding to commit, or not, to joining the transnational DNA data 
Table 3.1 Analytical heuristic for the study of bioborders
Constitutive components of 
bioborders




Organizational imperatives and principles
Dimensions of biobordering 
dynamics
Notions of nationhood co-produced in national legacies 
of DNA databases
Promises/expectations/criminological interests of 
Member States
Types of data travelling across borders
Source: Authors
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exchange system and how these co-produce notions of the integra-
tion/disintegration of Europe
• What data travels across borders and, thus, who counts as a suspect, 
offender or differently eligible for data exchange and how expan-
sive/restrictive is the data exchange with regard to how many cate-
gories are exchanged and with how many countries
We propose to analyse the national historical legacies that shape DNA 
databasing, DNA technologies and transnational DNA data exchange as 
acts of imagining the nationhood. We approach ‘nationhood’ inspired by 
Benedict Anderson’s take on nations as ‘imagined communities’ 
(Anderson, 2006). His approach builds on an abstract sense of imagined 
belonging, ‘because the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet 
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (Anderson, 
2006, p. 6). We complement Anderson’s perspective on imagined com-
munities with the co-constitution of specific politics of belonging. As pro-
posed by Yuval-Davis (2006), such politics separate the world population 
into ‘us’ and ‘them’, thereby including some people/and excluding oth-
ers. By following this approach, we aim to remain sensitive to post- 
colonialist criticism, which considers the historical experience of 
colonization and dispossession and the relationship between the processes 
of colonization and criminalization. Such an approach refuses to take 
offending rates at face value and argues that the contribution of institu-
tional practices and legal frameworks within which criminalization is 
embedded needs to be taken into account. That is, it argues that institu-
tional practices contribute to reproducing marginalized peoples as crimi-
nal subgroups and therefore reconsiders the reasons for their 
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system (Wacquant, 1997).
Prüm and ‘de- and reBorderIng’ of the actor 
netWork at the eu level
After the Prüm Convention was incorporated into the EU’s legal frame-
work through the Prüm Decisions, all Member States were obligated to 
establish or appropriate the technical infrastructure needed for the imple-
mentation of DNA databases. They were also required to enact adequate 
legislation to set up the operational requirements needed to establish con-
nections with other Member States and exchange data (Sallavaci, 
2015, 2017).
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The deadline for all EU countries to comply with Prüm Decisions was 
August 2011. However, most countries were unable to comply with the 
deadline for various reasons (McCartney, Wilson, & Williams, 2011; 
Prainsack & Toom, 2013). Some faced difficulties mobilizing political 
majorities to adapt national laws to Prüm provisions; some faced conflicts 
between stakeholders over who should take responsibility for Prüm; and 
others lacked human and financial resources (Prainsack & Toom, 2013; 
Töpfer, 2011). In addition, although the first DNA databases emerged in 
Europe from 1995, countries like Portugal or Poland had yet to put a 
database in place by 2005.
As Amelung and Machado (2019) have shown, the levelling mode of 
ordering, which builds on the distributed but collective agency of the het-
erogeneous actor network at the EU level, enforced a specific version of 
bioborders: the political biometric imaginary that the interoperability of 
DNA databases is a mere technical issue. Attempts at integration and 
debordering are undertaken by approaches aimed at the standardization 
and harmonization of scientific and technical procedures between forensic 
genetic laboratories based in different countries. Yet, confronted with the 
differences in the scientific and technical conditions among Member 
States, such standardization involves a continuous process of negotiation.
It is inherent in transnational attempts, such as Prüm, to control crime 
that they restructure the game of criminal investigation and evidence and 
the rules of criminal justice centred on the power of the state. Initiatives 
to expand and automate information exchange across borders and to build 
on specific forms of intelligence, such as biometrics, as constitutive com-
ponents of cross-border collaboration reconfigure and try to standardize 
what counts as a ‘crime’ and a ‘convicted criminal’, a ‘criminal suspect’ 
and a ‘victim’. These attempts of standardization are thought to be as 
effective as possible when as many countries as possible join the data 
exchange on the one hand and when data categories are aligned on the 
other hand.
Data categories related to the DNA analysis files being exchanged 
within the Prüm system cover a wide range, including convicted persons, 
suspects, crime stains, victims, unidentified persons, unidentified human 
remains, missing persons, relatives of missing persons and others.
According to the information provided by the Council of the EU in 
February 2020, Portugal and Greece allow the other Member States the 
least access to their data in terms of different data categories (Council of 
the European Union, 2020). They only provide access to files of two 
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categories of data: Portugal to the categories of DNA profiles of ‘con-
victed’ persons and ‘crime stains’; Greece to the categories of ‘suspects’ 
and ‘crime stains’. Other operational countries share between files related 
to three or eight data categories. The most common categories exchanged 
with other countries are ‘convicted’ persons (shared by 25 out of 26 oper-
ational countries), ‘suspects’ and ‘crime stains’ (shared by 25 out of 26 
operational countries), and ‘unidentified human remains’ (shared by 17 
out of 26 operational countries).
As we have outlined in this chapter, at the EU level, we find a levelling 
mode of ordering at work that aims to diminish the technical and legal 
obstacles that contribute to debordering dynamics. Political and legal 
entities are aiming to harmonize crime control across the Member States 
through common scientific–technical standards applied in the exchange of 
DNA data and materialized in the digital infrastructure of a decentralized 
database system. The Prüm system at the EU level enacts a version of 
bioborders, increasing their permeability across states and thus fostering a 
hidden integration through technology.
This provides the basis for a closer look at how different biobordering 
regimes have evolved among Member States and how their modes of 
ordering have responded to the EU’s debordering tendencies. In the next 
chapters, we present empirical cases that reveal the emergent processes of 
de- and rebordering that are maintaining and contesting a sense of Europe 
and enforcing references to state autonomy. The focus on the Prüm sys-
tem enables us to portray diverse instances from Member State-embedded 
actor networks of biobordering and thus to provide a complex picture of 
the hidden (dis)integration of Europe.
The following chapters continue to explore cases from five European 
countries: Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the UK. These 
specific jurisdictions have been selected with the aim of presenting exam-
ples of the dynamics, tensions and ambivalences of biobordering pro-
cesses. We emphasize the legal, scientific, technical, political and civic 
epistemological dimensions related to the governance and use of biomet-
ric technologies and demonstrate how certain patterns of biobordering 
become distinct, how expansive or restrictive—as debordering or rebor-
dering—dynamics of biometric data exchange are obtained.
As Table 3.2 shows, the five country cases are different with regard to 
when they initiated their DNA database. While the UK, the Netherlands 
and Germany were among the early starters in the EU, beginning imple-
mentation at the end of the 1990s, Portugal and Poland only started their 
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DNA database a decade later. The selected countries’ databases have also 
developed differently with regard to their size,1 partly because of when 
they were started, but also because of their differing inclusion and reten-
tion regimes. While Poland and Portugal have comparably small databases, 
Germany and the Netherlands have average databases (also in comparison 
with other EU Member States), and the UK has by far the largest database 
in the EU.  The selected countries also represent a broad variety of 
European cases with regard to when they joined the Prüm system. The 
Netherlands and Germany were among the initial signatories of the Prüm 
Convention; Poland and Portugal were among a later generation of coun-
tries to join. The UK is the latest country to have joined the Prüm system 
and, given its exit from the EU, its future participation remains ambiguous.
Their involvement in the DNA data exchange differs widely. Taking a 
closer look again at the example of the data categories of DNA analysis 
files, we find a diversity among those five countries regarding their avail-
ability to exchange specific data categories.
Considering the selected countries in the focus of this book, the 
Netherlands covering six and Poland covering five different data 
categories are among those countries exchanging files of a higher number 
of categories (see Table  3.3). Germany and the UK tend to be more 
1 As the ENFSI report is to our knowledge the latest statistic which provides comparable 
information across countries, we refer to it to compare all country cases in this study. Data 
available at http://enfsi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ENFSI-Survey-on-DNA-
Databases-in-Europe-June-2016.pdf (last access on 23 June 2020). In the country case 
chapters, we provide additional sources for updated numbers which do not change the over-
all distinct characteristics.
Table 3.2 National database characteristics
Country Start of DNA 
database






Germany 1998 1.07 2008 Inquisitorial
Netherlands 1997 1.4 2008 Inquisitorial
Poland 2007 0.12 2013 Mixed
Portugal 2008 0.09 2015 Inquisitorial
UK (England and 
Wales)
1995 10.0 2019 Adversarial
Source: Authors based on ENFSI (2017, p. 28)
















































































































































































 N. AMELUNG ET AL.
51
restrictive by exchanging data files of only three different data categories. 
Portugal is among the countries providing the most limited access to 
DNA analysis files.
Finally, the criminal justice systems in Europe have been differently 
shaped by their respective legal systems, which shape how the custody of 
forensic DNA databases and the provision of forensic services are practi-
cally organized (Santos, Machado, & Silva, 2013). A substantial distinc-
tion is whether the justice system is adversarial or inquisitorial, as this can 
have an impact on which institution is the custodian of the DNA database. 
Most continental countries, including the Netherlands, Germany and 
Portugal, follow the inquisitorial system: the public prosecutor has the 
burden of proof, owns the monopoly of criminal investigation and, assisted 
by the police, has the power to initiate the necessary diligences (Hindmarsh 
& Prainsack, 2010). In adversarial systems, such as that in the UK, the 
judge plays an active role as ‘fact finder’ and is regarded as the ‘experts of 
experts’, while the disputing parties (the prosecution and the defence) 
present their versions of the facts and might have unequal access to 
resources and experts. Poland is considered to have a mixed system 
(Ryan, 2016).
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Abstract Germany’s DNA database was established in 1998 and grew 
into one of the mid-sized databases in the EU. Under the leadership of its 
Minister of the Interior, Germany was among the countries that drove the 
creation of the Prüm system and was among the first signatories of the 
Prüm Treaty in 2005. The 2007 German Presidency of the EU, along 
with the European Commission, also pushed for the integration of the 
Convention of Prüm into an EU legal framework. In terms of bordering 
practices, the German situation serves to illustrate an expansive and dif-
fusive mode of debordering. This expansiveness is documented by the coun-
try’s early involvement and comprehensive establishment of data exchange 
with most of the countries in the system; this diffusive character is illus-
trated by the string-pulling practices employed by Germany, and some 
other Member States’ governments, to influence transnational police 
collaboration in the EU.




Germany’s DNA database was established in 1998 and has grown into one 
of the mid-sized databases in Europe. According to the European Network 
of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI), as of June 2016, the German 
DNA database held 857,666 profiles of individuals (ENFSI, 2017).1 This 
amount of DNA profiles relates to 1.07 per cent of the resident population 
(of 80,000,000). More recent data shows that as of July 2017, there were 
869,435 person profiles held in the database (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2017) which does not change significantly the portion of the population 
because the overall population grew likewise. Among the databases of 
countries in Europe, the German database is an average size, comparable 
to that of the Netherlands (Reed & Syndercombe-Court, 2016).
Germany, under the leadership of its Minister of the Interior, was 
among the countries that drove the creation of the Prüm system and was 
among the first signatories of the Prüm Convention in 2005, which the 
German Parliament ratified in 2006. The 2007 German Presidency of the 
EU, together with the European Commission, also pushed for the inte-
gration of the Convention of Prüm into an EU legal framework (Töpfer, 
2016, p. 812).
The German vision of Prüm was that it would harmonize international 
police collaboration through the use of biometric data. Prüm would help 
to interconnect different available data (Töpfer, 2016, p. 809). Germany’s 
expansive approach is documented in its early involvement and compre-
hensive establishment of data exchange with most of the countries in the 
system. According to the latest data available, Germany is among the 
Member States with the most connections. It is connected and operational 
with 21 Member States (Council of the European Union, 2020). As we 
will detail later in the chapter, the German case provides evidence of the 
string-pulling practices employed by the governments of some Member 
States to influence the architecture and performance of transnational 
police collaboration in Europe. Germany’s diffusive approach aims to 
enforce the implementation of Prüm elsewhere through political blaming 
and shaming of Prüm non-compliers and public calls for the EU to take 
1 As the ENFSI report is to our knowledge the latest statistic which provides comparable 
information across countries, we refer to it to situate Germany in comparison to the other 
country cases in this study. Data available at http://enfsi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/
ENFSI-Survey-on-DNA-Databases-in-Europe-June-2016.pdf (last access on 23 June 2020).
 N. AMELUNG ET AL.
57
disciplinary measures against non-compliers. Therefore, the German case 
serves to illustrate an expansive and diffusive mode of debordering.
Germany’s situation regarding genetics stands out because of its his-
torical and cultural particularities. Public perceptions regarding genetics in 
Germany are still influenced by memories of Germany’s Nazi past and of 
how science was used in racializing genetics and the eugenics movement 
(Kattmann, 2017). Germany’s past has contributed to a strong sense of 
privacy regarding genetics and a general suspicion of state and law enforce-
ment agencies having access to the sensitive genetic information of their 
citizens (Sperling, 2008). Such public scepticism was also dominant when 
the DNA database was established in 1998 (Lee, 2016, p. 216; BT-DRS 
13/667).
There also seems to be particular racial sensitivities in Germany’s crimi-
nal justice system and in wider public perceptions that can be illustrated by 
the ‘Phantom of Heilbronn’ case (Samuel & Prainsack, 2019, p. 32). In 
Germany’s recent history, the case has demonstrated the problematic 
entanglement of the media, the institutional prejudice of investigators and 
forensic DNA-based investigation methods in the construction of high- 
profile crime cases (Lipphardt, 2018; Samuel & Prainsack, 2019). In the 
‘Phantom of Heilbronn’ case, following a series of murders in Heilbronn 
in 2007, the DNA from the same person was linked to 40 crimes perpe-
trated between 1993 and 2009 in various countries: France, Germany and 
Austria. The DNA analysis suggested that the suspect was an East- 
European female, and criminal investigators took this as implicating the 
Sinti and Roma community (Samuel & Prainsack, 2019, p. 32). However, 
the presence of the DNA from the same person in dozens of crime scenes 
in different countries was eventually found to be the result of contamina-
tion caused by a Polish factory worker packaging cotton swabs that were 
then used in different forensic labs across Europe for the investigation of 
crime scene stains. In 2012, the Minister of the Interior for the German 
State of Baden-Württemberg apologized to the Sinti and Roma commu-
nity for the police’s bungled interpretation of DNA evidence after the 
Heilbronn murders (Lipphardt et al., 2016). The case revealed the ‘poten-
tial for over-investment in or misunderstanding of test results in the con-
text of existing stigmatisation of minority groups’ (Skinner, 2018, p. 4).
A different aspect of discrimination of minority groups derives from the 
use of forensic DNA analysis in the context of migration and border con-
trol for the purpose of family reunification of immigrants (Heinemann, 
Helén, Lemke, Naue, & Weiss, 2015). As immigrants have no say on what 
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happens to their DNA analysis results, their data is not required to be 
deleted and instead may be used for criminal prosecution purposes in case 
of reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence might be committed 
(Heinemann, Naue, & Tapaninen, 2013, p. 198). Heinemann and Lemke 
(2014, p. 501) assumed that data deriving from family reunification of 
immigrants might be stored and potentially exchanged via the Prüm 
regime for crime prevention purposes.
The particular notion of nationhood in Germany is entangled with cul-
tural meanings of forensic DNA technologies that reveal historical traumas 
and their potential to enforce socially constructed differences between 
population groups. While we find overall a sense of societal ambiguity 
towards genetic technologies because of Germany’s Nazi past, we also 
have exemplary cases illustrating modes of racism and discrimination 
towards minority groups being enacted through forensic genetic 
technologies.
natIonal dna database development
Germany’s DNA database started in 1998 and grew to become a medium- 
sized database in comparison with the other databases in Europe (Reed & 
Syndercombe-Court, 2016). Forensic DNA analysis was used for the first 
time in a German court case a decade before the creation of the database, 
in 1988. In the case, the accused gave consent for their blood to be col-
lected, but was not informed of the DNA analysis. Since the result seemed 
to indicate his guilt, he admitted the offence (Schultz & Wagenmann, 
2017, p. 30). At that time, the use of identification by DNA profile was 
not regulated by law.
The legislative framework in Germany is characterized by a traditional 
civil law system built on an inquisitorial system. The main sources of law 
are the German constitution and codified law passed by the federal gov-
ernment. A first step towards the regulation of the DNA retention regime 
was that, in 1990, the Federal Supreme Court declared DNA profile anal-
ysis to be admissible as evidence in court, as it might help find criminals 
and exonerate the innocent. But the use of DNA analysis was only consid-
ered legitimate in cases of serious crimes. The first legal regulation of 
forensic DNA analysis followed in 1997, after the German Parliament and 
the courts had begun adjusting policies on the collection of DNA samples 
in response to peoples’ fears about the dangers of genetic technology in 
the mid-1990s. The emerging policies regulated the limits of the use of 
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DNA technologies (Lee, 2016, p. 216), as outlined in the reasoning for 
the 1997 legislation, which was first proposed in 1995:
[Legal regulations] also appear necessary because the determination of clear 
boundaries can counter the fears that are generally associated with genetic 
engineering and which are found in large parts of the population, that the 
use of such investigations in criminal proceedings leads to disproportionate, 
the essence of personality affecting interventions. (BT-DRS 13/667)
With the Criminal Investigation Amending Act DNA Analysis 
(Strafverfahrensänderungsgesetz DNA-Analyse), the federal government 
defined the conditions for the use of forensic DNA analysis.2 In 1998, the 
Interior Ministry installed a central DNA database at the Federal Criminal 
Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt or BKA) following the increasing media 
attention on cases of sexual abuse and murder of children. Among the 
cases to receive substantial media attention was that of an 11-year-old girl 
murdered in Strücklingen in 1996. The killer was arrested following the 
largest DNA dragnet operation in the world to that date, which involved 
collecting DNA samples from 16,400 men between the ages of 18 and 30 
(Krimsky & Simoncelli, 2011, pp. 205–207). The Federal Criminal Police 
Office became the custodian of the DNA database. Public prosecution 
services can also be provided with data from the German DNA database 
for criminal justice purposes (Van Camp & Dierickx, 2007).
Over time, the legislation further outlined the conditions for the col-
lection and storage of DNA profiles. The first specifications determined 
that DNA profiles could be created and stored for severe crimes (Schultz 
& Wagenmann, 2017, p. 32). A second specification followed in 1999, 
outlining the catalogue of crimes that count as ‘severe crimes’ and jus-
tify the creation of a DNA profile of convicted persons. In addition to 
capital crimes, the repeated commission of other criminal offenses 
including burglary, defamation and full intoxication can lead to the col-
lection of DNA profiles3 (ibid.). In 2005, a third specification expanded 
2 The conditions were integrated into the German Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Strafprozessordnung or StPO) in 2005. Since then forensic DNA analysis can only be 
applied to a confined category of purposes, to investigate the identity of accused persons in 
an ongoing criminal procedure (§ 81a (3)) and to investigate paternity matters (§ 81e (1)). 
The analysis of a DNA profile must be ordered by a judge and the sample destroyed on 
completion of the criminal proceedings (§ 81f (1)).
3 In German criminal law, full intoxication is a criminal offence under § 323a of the 
Criminal Code (StGB). The paragraph states: ‘Anyone who deliberately or negligently gets 
intoxicated with alcoholic beverages or other intoxicating substances will be punished with 
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the type of offences qualifying for the collection and storage of DNA pro-
files of suspects to include minor offences, if they are regarded as repeat 
acts. Another substantial change was that a judge’s order was no longer 
absolutely necessary and people could voluntarily agree to provide DNA 
samples for a DNA profile analysis. This amendment resulted in a massive 
increase in the number of DNA profiles collected (Schultz & Wagenmann, 
2017, pp.  32–33). The latest legal changes in Germany have legalized 
‘familial searching’—the search for relatives through near matches between 
DNA profiles—although it is a forensic genetic technology that has been 
contested for a long time due to privacy concerns (see below).
With regard to its deletion practices, Sallavaci confirms that Germany 
follows the ruling in S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 
1581 (see Chap. 8) in relation to DNA profiles and fingerprint evidence 
and deletes an individual’s data ‘if they are found not guilty, charges are 
dropped or where after an arrest and investigation no further evidence is 
found’ (Sallavaci, 2017, p. 9). According to the BKA law (§77 Abs. 1 S. 2 
BKAG), the retention regime regulates that profiles of adults and of crime 
stains will be reviewed after ten years and profiles of minors after five years, 
and then either corrected or deleted.
Regulation concerning forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP) has been on 
the policy agenda since December 2016. In 2018 the federal govern-
ment’s coalition agreement and the Bavarian State Police Law had 
advanced with the plans of inclusion of FDP techniques. In 2018, Bavaria 
explicitly permitted the prediction of age, hair, eye and skin colour under 
the specific condition of what was called ‘pre-emptive immediate threats’ 
or ‘imminent danger’ (Momsen & Weichert, 2018). Momsen and 
Weichert (2018, p. 4) explain:
[…] the extremely vague concept of ‘imminent danger’ suggests that the 
line between averting imminent danger and prosecuting potential criminals 
should be blurred. The ‘endangered’ is not a category of applicable law. 
People or groups are declared potential offenders, who are sanctioned by 
police law in anticipation of a later punishment.
Contested by civil society groups, forensic geneticists and data protection-
ists, the change allows FDP to be carried out based on the police’s 
imprisonment of up to five years or a fine if the person commits an unlawful act in this state 
and cannot be punished because the intoxication was incapacitating the person [...]’. (own 
translation).
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presumption about an existing ‘imminent danger’. Momsen and Weichert 
(2018, p. 4) conclude that ‘[t]he proposals are therefore unconstitutional 
and contrary to European law. They do not take into account the highly 
personal relevance of genetic data and the associated risks of 
discrimination’.
After a bundle of FDP techniques were incorporated already into the 
first state’s legal system—in a federal state system of 16 states—the national 
parliament passed a bill including the prediction of externally visible char-
acteristics and age, but excluding the prediction of biogeographic ancestry 
by the end of 2019 (Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Strafverfahrens, 
2019). The federal law does not refer to the concept of ‘imminent danger’ 
and instead regularizes FDP for the whole country.
With regard to the technical database infrastructure, the federal state 
structure of Germany affects the organization of, and access to, the data-
base. Officials from the BKA and the state criminal police offices of 
Germany’s 16 states have direct access to the database. The IT system the 
database runs on was developed in Germany and has been rebuilt several 
times. The database works with an Oracle system. Germany was also 
involved in developing the Prüm software, which was developed jointly by 
DNA and IT experts from the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) and staff from 
the Ministry of the Interior of Austria and the Netherlands Forensic 
Institute in the Netherlands (Table 4.1).
Regarding the organizational imperatives and principles, such as reli-
ability, transparency and public accountability, which govern the database 
and translate into work routines, a particularity of the German system is 
the parallel structures of oversight regarding data protection at the federal 
and state levels. There are data protection commissioners in each of the 16 
Table 4.1 Development of the German forensic DNA database
Year In total Person profiles Stain profiles
1998 643 403 240
2000 81214 72,354 8,860
2005 449,115 366,294 82,821
2010 895,941 711,159 184,782
2015 1,133,973 849,907 284,066
2017 1,183,290 869,435 313,855




states who control the creation of entries in the national DNA database 
and maintain the deletion periods for the data they ‘own’. The data pro-
tection commissioner at the federal level, together with the internal data 
protection commissioner at the Bundeskriminalamt, is in charge of over-
seeing the few entries the Bundeskriminalamt contributes to the database, 
which are few in comparison with the entries made at the state level 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2017).
Differently than in Portugal, the Netherlands and the UK, in Germany, 
information about the categories of DNA data included in the DNA data-
base and about data exchange with other countries is only made public on 
request, as there are no annual reports that include such information. 
Requests must be made through parliament and are often initiated by 
opposition parties. The government then provides an official response 
about the situation of the database, the data development in the database, 
and the data exchanged transnationally. In consequence, this lack of public 
accountability necessitates an attentive parliament, ready to call for trans-
parency and be a critical ‘watchdog’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017).
Alongside the data protection commissioners and parliament, other 
stakeholders complement the panorama of public voices accompanying 
(often critically) the national DNA database, DNA technology develop-
ment and data exchange. Several social scientists as well as civil societal 
actors within Germany have cast a critical eye over the evolution of the 
DNA database. General criticisms of expansionary DNA profiling regimes 
have been voiced sporadically, for example, by the activist German 
‘Campaign against DNA collection frenzy’ (Gen-ethisches Netzwerk e.V., 
2011; Williams & Wienroth, 2014, p. 8). The presence of at least partially 
critical civil society actors, including independent data protection experts 
and legal scholars, represents the demand for further accountability 
regarding the DNA database.
Regarding the development of DNA technology, as in other countries, 
recent technological innovations in forensic genetics have entered 
Germany’s regulatory context. Familial DNA database searching is one of 
them. It is based on near matches between a crime stain and a databased 
person, who could be a near relative of the true perpetrator (Maguire, 
McCallum, Storey, & Whitaker, 2014). Before regulations on their use 
existed, it became publicly known during a dragnet operation that the 
German police was already using familial searching strategies. In the little 
town of Dörpen in northern Germany, the police arrested a young man 
accused of rape after they analysed the DNA of his two brothers, who had 
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participated in the dragnet. Partial matches between crime scene DNA 
profiles of the perpetrator and of the brothers’ profiles identified the young 
man as the suspect (Roewer, 2013, p.  7). In 2012, the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany decided against the future use in court 
of evidence derived from familial searching. However, in November 2013, 
the German government decided to legalize familial searching if it is used 
as part of a DNA dragnet (Lee, 2016, p. 218). This decision was contro-
versial after the court decision from the previous year had determined that 
there was no legal basis for familial searching’s use in that way (Lee, 2016, 
p. 218). Yet, in 2017, the legislator legalized familial searching with the 
‘DNA-Beinahetreffer’ (Voß, 2017, p. 5).
As FDP was regularized at the federal level, the regulatory process and 
accompanying public debate provide insights on how forensic genetic 
innovations have stimulated controversies recently. A range of symposiums 
and workshops to discuss and debate the possibility of permitting FDP 
already took place in 2017, including those hosted by the Ministry of 
Justice (March 2017) and by the University of Lübeck/Kiel at the 
Department of Legal Medicine (December 2017). Samuel and Prainsack 
(2018, p. 41) have explored the public debates and controversies accom-
panying the legal initiatives arguing in favour of FDP. The authors named 
a couple of ‘key players’ in the debates, such as an interdisciplinary 
Freiburg-based group that includes geneticists and biostatisticians, as well 
as the German Stain Commission, the board of the German Society for 
Legal Medicine, and the Working Group of Academic Forensic Geneticists. 
Most of the experts argue that ‘this technology is a meaningful expansion 
of forensic methods as long as an appropriate regulatory framework pro-
tects against misuse’ (Samuel & Prainsack, 2018, p. 41). In 2019, a final 
consultation process was conducted by the Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Consumer Protection and provoked supportive as well as critical invited 
and uninvited advisory opinions on the draft law in response. Zieger and 
Roewer (2019), two forensic geneticists, have argued that the intrusion 
into personal integrity is at stake with the regularization of FDP and that 
its proportionality needs to be constantly adjusted according to its actual 
applications in practice and the ongoing scientific development in the area 
of forensic genetics. Schneider, Prainsack, and Kayser (2019, p. 879) rec-
ommended to complement the regularization of FDP by measures of 
transparency and proportionality which counter tendencies of growing 
xenophobia and potential discrimination of minority populations through 
trainings of forensic geneticists as well as of criminal justice actors. 
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Favouring the establishment of oversight institutions which anticipate and 
oversee the ambiguous aspects related to FDP, forensic geneticists such as 
Zieger and Roewer (2019) also proposed to install a national ethics com-
mittee for extended forensic DNA analyses which would decide its appli-
cation on a case-by-case basis. Such recommendations have not been 
considered up to now.
borderIng practIces and orderIng transnatIonal 
dna data exchange
The origins of the Prüm Decision go back to a German initiative that fol-
lowed the G8 summit of 1996, when the interior and justice ministers of 
the eight most powerful industrial nations agreed to improve information 
exchange and establish national and international DNA databases (Töpfer, 
2016). It was Germany’s Interior Minister, Otto Schily, who negotiated 
the Prüm contract and its technical implementation with the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, Austria, France and Spain. In 2005 this group 
of countries signed the Prüm Convention in the German town Prüm.
In accordance with Article 51 of the Prüm Convention, Schily’s succes-
sor, Wolfgang Schäuble, began to ask other countries to participate. Töpfer 
(2016) states that Schäuble’s approach was an open affront to the EU 
Commission, as he mobilized seven further Member States to ratify the 
Convention soon after and thus bypassed the EU institutions and pro-
cesses. It is said that this was done to avoid the lengthy processes of har-
monizing data protection regimes (Töpfer, 2016, p. 812). Supported by 
interested Member States, Schäuble used the German Presidency of the 
Council of the EU in the first half of 2007 to secure the Europeanization 
of the Prüm model (Töpfer, 2016, p. 812). In 2008, the Prüm Convention 
was transformed into the Prüm Decision. Its development, choreographed 
and decided by a small group of Member States, followed the model of the 
Schengen agreement (which was likewise a German initiative) and shaped 
the particular standards of cross-border police collaboration in Europe 
(Töpfer, 2016, p. 813).
A particularly critical issue with regard to transnational DNA data 
exchange that raised criticism was the lower scientific standards applied to 
the storage of DNA profiles in the beginning of data exchange in Germany 
(Töpfer, 2010). German forensic laboratories used a lower number of 
markers in their analysis than other countries that joined the Prüm system 
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early on, and this risked creating a higher number of false positive matches 
when exchanging data that would need to be double-checked (Santos, 
2017). False positive matches match two profiles that do not derive from 
the same person. Scientific ambiguities and the risk of near matches, 
potentially leading to the incorrect identification of suspects, were there-
fore of great relevance in the German case. It is, thus, important to take 
into consideration the approaches to data security taken by other Member 
States with regard to the German data.
Kees van der Beek (2011, p.  10), a former custodian of the Dutch 
DNA database, has highlighted the lower quality of 600,000 reference 
DNA profiles contained in the German DNA database. The lower quality 
was seen in the comparably lower number of loci—the unique physical 
locations of a gene (or specific sequence of DNA) on a chromosome 
(Butler, 2009, p. 453). The DNA profiles in the German DNA database 
were based on a particular set of loci (the so-called old European Standard 
Set, which includes seven loci plus the locus SE33) to be applied in DNA 
testing and to produce DNA profiles. The particular circumstances of the 
reference DNA profiles in the German database increased the chance of 
near matches when comparing DNA profiles. Near matches occur when a 
locus does not match (completely) between two DNA profiles from the 
same person (ENFSI, 2017, p. 24) and require additional tests to exclude 
the probability that apparent matches are no matches. According to 
ENFSI (2017, p. 23), ‘the lower the number of loci, the higher the match 
probability of the DNA profile and the risk of near matches’. And Taverne 
and Broeders (2015, p. 40) have confirmed that there was a higher prob-
ability of false positive or adventitious matches—matches to the profile of 
a person who is not the true donor of that profile (Butler, 2009, p. 440)—
in the early years of exchange in the Prüm system because of the overall 
larger number of matches with Germany.
Since the issue was addressed in the specialist groups of forensic geneti-
cists European DNA Profiling Group (EDNAP) and ENFSI, Germany 
increased its standards in accordance with an ENFSI agreement that was 
formalized in 2009 by the EU Council of Interior and Justice Ministers 
(Töpfer, 2010, pp.  84–85; ABl. EU C 296/1 v. 5.12.2009) and that 
added five loci (to the existing seven) to the European Standard Set. A 
decision was made in favour of standardizing the number of loci across 
Member States participating in Prüm’s transnational DNA data exchange 
and in favour of extending the mandatory number of loci to be analysed 
in a DNA profile (Gill et al., 2006). In consequence, Germany increased 
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the number of markers—the number of genes or specific DNA sequences 
of known location on a chromosome—that are used as a point of reference 
in the mapping of other loci (Butler, 2009, p. 453). Nonetheless, civil 
society actors in Germany have called for radical measures, including the 
abolition of the Prüm system (Gen-ethisches Netzwerk e.V., 2011), warn-
ing of risks relating to privacy, a lack of transparency and accountability, 
and manipulation of the assumption of innocence.
Regarding the dynamics of data border-crossings and the provision of 
access to data categories, Germany allows access to data on ‘convicted’, 
‘suspects’ and ‘crime stains’, which are the most common categories 
exchanged among Member States (Council of the European Union, 
2020). Its geographical position in Central Europe has made Germany 
interested in rapidly increasing its bilateral exchange relations. There is a 
clear priority to exchange data with neighbouring countries along particu-
lar German border zones, and such exchange is expected to be more pro-
ductive in producing hits across databases than exchanges with other 
countries. This priority was most obvious in the initial choices Germany 
made in expanding its network for data exchange. Thus, for the first con-
nection, made between the Dutch and German databases in July 2008, 
‘approximately 25,000 Dutch crime scene profiles were submitted to 
Germany, and approximately 125,000 such profiles from Germany were 
sent to the Netherlands’ (Prainsack & Toom, 2010, p. 1122).
Regarding the national legacies of DNA databases and DNA technolo-
gies, Germany not only was among the countries which influenced the 
content and establishment of the Prüm system but has also continued to 
pull strings during the implementation and expansion of the Prüm system 
by attempting to put pressure on Member States that have been slow in 
engaging with Prüm. The dominant narrative of the German government 
repeatedly uses the rhetorical repertoire of blaming and shaming with 
regard to those Member States not yet participating properly in the Prüm 
system; in this, it echoes the debordering claims of the EU.
In 2016, the European Commission formally communicated to Italy, 
Croatia, Greece and Ireland that they were not in compliance with the EU 
rules regarding the exchange of DNA data to combat terrorism and seri-
ous crime and that it had initiated infringement proceedings (Phelan, 
2017). The European Commission gave the respective national govern-
ments a period of two months in which to implement the Prüm Decision, 
highlighting the fact that they were supposed to have done so in 2011. In 
January 2017, Joachim Herrmann, the German Minister of the Interior of 
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the Federal State of Bavaria, publicly complained that this group of coun-
tries should receive a penalty, arguing that countries that do not comply 
with EU orders on matters of anti-terrorist security should leave the 
Schengen space; his remarks were covered in the media internationally 
(Bandeira, 2017).
In terms of the motifs and notions of nationhood mobilized in complying 
with the Prüm system, it becomes obvious that Prüm has been a political 
project for the German government. A distinct national policy agenda in 
the context of security and crime control was pushed forward in an attempt 
to prevent rigid data protection regulations (Töpfer, 2016). In this, 
Germany manoeuvred outside EU institutions to align a smaller number 
of Member States to create borderless data flows and, thus, can be consid-
ered as the political architect behind the Prüm system. Only afterwards, 
through the joint agenda of some of the more proactive countries in the 
domain of international security—including Austria and France—aimed at 
regularization and Europeanization, did it become mainstream to get 
involved in transnational information flows.
In terms of hidden (dis)integration in Europe, we can confirm that the 
German case provides a complex scenario with regard to technical and 
scientific matters. On the one hand, the lower standards for the number of 
loci in DNA profiles—in comparison to other Member States such as the 
Netherlands—that were employed in the German database and generated 
600,000 DNA reference profiles were a techno-scientific obstacle for some 
other countries exchanging data with Germany (Taverne & Broeders, 
2015). On the other hand, the diverse number of loci used for DNA pro-
files across Member States triggered some debate. In consequence, further 
efforts were made to harmonize the techno-scientific standards of DNA 
data exchange and the rules for declaring matches across profiles. These 
efforts required also the integration of diverse understandings of the 
potential risks of DNA data exchange and how to cope with them. In sum-
mary, the German situation provoked the alignment over and anticipation 
of the risks of adventitious matches, which can result in innocent people 
being implicated in a crime. And Germany increased its standards regard-
ing the number of loci used for DNA profiles to conform with the new 
European Standard Set.
From the German debordering approach, we learn about the diffusive 
mode of debordering and how German political actors have attempted to 
disseminate the Prüm regime to other Member States through the politi-
cal arena by enforcing the political commitments to the principles of 
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Prüm. Furthermore, we learn how diffusion takes place through being 
considered as an example for others of an expansive mode of debordering.
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Abstract The Netherlands’ DNA database was legally established in 1994 
and became operational in 1997. It represents one of the mid-sized data-
bases in the EU.  The Netherlands has a track record of ‘innovation’ 
regarding the regulation and practical application of genetic technologies 
for forensic purposes. The Netherlands was involved with the Prüm regime 
from its beginnings in 2005. In terms of bordering practices, the country 
serves as an exemplary case of an expansive and diffusive mode of deborder-
ing. This positioning derives from the fact that the Netherlands has been 
a front-runner in building and implementing the technical framework for 
Prüm in its most expansive form; it is currently one of the most active 
countries in the Prüm regime. In addition, the Netherlands has also pro-
actively trained other Member States, guiding them towards effective 
implementation and thus diffusing the expansive mode of debordering.




The Netherlands’ DNA database was legally established in 1994 and 
became operational in 1997. According to the European Network of 
Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI), in June 2016, the database held 
237,254 profiles from individuals, which represented 1.4 per cent of the 
country’s population.1 In April 2020, the Dutch DNA database held 
328,542 profiles from individuals,2 which represents 1.9 per cent of the 
country’s population (of 17,134,1783).
The Netherlands has a track record of ‘innovation’ regarding the regu-
lation and practical application of genetic technologies for forensic pur-
poses. In 1994, it was the first country to introduce dedicated legislation 
for the use of forensic DNA to compare DNA profiles from a suspect and 
from a crime scene (M’charek, Toom, & Jong, 2020; Toom, 2012a). In 
2003, the Netherlands was also a pioneer in regulating the use of geneti-
cally determined externally visible characteristics in criminal investigations 
(Hopman, 2020; Hopman & M’charek, 2020; M’charek, 2008). Since 
then, controversial uses of DNA data, such as forensic DNA phenotyping, 
familial searching and mass screenings, have gained importance in criminal 
investigations in the country (Jong & M’charek, 2017).
The Netherlands was also involved with the Prüm regime from its 
beginnings in 2005. Now, it is one of the most active countries in the 
Prüm regime, exchanging DNA data with most operational countries. 
More particularly, it is connected with all 24 Member States in the system 
(Council of the European Union, 2020). Dutch bioborders are addressed 
as an exemplary case of an expansive and diffusive mode of debordering. 
This position describes the processes by which the Netherlands has been a 
pioneer in building and implementing the scientific–technical framework 
for Prüm. In addition, the expansive and diffusive mode of debordering also 
reflects the Netherlands’ role in diffusing the use of DNA data exchange 
1 As the ENFSI report is to our knowledge the latest statistic which provides comparable 
information across countries, we refer to it to situate the Netherlands in comparison to the 
other country cases in this study. Data available at http://enfsi.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2017/01/ENFSI-Survey-on-DNA-Databases-in-Europe-June-2016.pdf (last 
access on 23 June 2020).
2 Data available at https://dnadatabank.forensischinstituut.nl/resultaten/aantal-pro-
fielen-dna-databank-strafzaken (last access on 18 June 2020).
3 Data available at https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/netherlands-popu-
lation/ (last access on 23 June 2020).
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by actively assisting other Member States in setting up the techno- scientific 
and operational infrastructures needed to participate in forensic DNA data 
exchange. In this, the Netherlands also promotes and guides other coun-
tries towards the expansive mode of debordering.
The Netherlands’ historical and cultural particularities make it an inter-
esting case in terms of biobordering dynamics. The country has been 
active in the European unification process from the very beginning. It was 
one of the six countries that established the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1952 and signed the Treaties of Rome in 1957, which 
established the European Economic Community and the European 
Atomic Energy Community. The Netherlands was also among the 12 
Member States that signed the Treaty of Maastricht, which is considered 
to be the basis of the European Union (EU). Just as it was among the 
pioneers of EU integration, the Netherlands is also at the forefront of the 
techno-scientific development and operational business of forensic DNA 
technologies and DNA data exchange within the Prüm system.
Public and regulatory debates accompanying the development and 
implementation of forensic genetic technologies in the Netherlands have 
brought specific issues to the surface that suggest an entanglement of 
country-specific idiosyncrasies regarding the national cultural identity. 
Kešić and Duyvendak have reflected on the notion of ‘nativism’ in the 
Netherlands—‘an intense opposition to an internal minority that is seen as 
a threat to the nation due to its “foreignness”’ (Kešić & Duyvendak, 
2019, p. 441)—and how it has combined with Islamophobia, racism and 
right-wing populism to produce an exclusionary character in recent politi-
cal and public debates (Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019, p. 461). In this con-
text, the rape and murder of Marianne Vaatstra has become a ‘paradigmatic 
case’ for understanding the materialization of race in public debates, media 
coverage, regulations and public understandings of forensic DNA tech-
nologies (M’charek et al., 2020, p. 2). Identifying the criminal suspect in 
the case led to a process in which a suspect population (asylum seekers of 
origin from Iraq and Afghanistan) was socially constructed on the basis of 
phenotypic differences but the offender was finally confirmed to be of 
Dutch origin (M’charek et al., 2020, p. 4). The Vaatstra case (described in 
more detail below) and its materialized forms of biological racism reveal 
an instance of cultural ideas of nationhood and belonging being translated 
into forensic genetic technologies.
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natIonal dna database development
The Dutch DNA database was established under the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Justice and is, therefore, connected to the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor. The legislative framework of the Dutch DNA database is regu-
lated by the Code of Criminal Proceedings and the Law on DNA 
Investigation in Criminal Proceedings (1994, 2001, 2003 and 2005) 
(Reed & Syndercombe-Court, 2016). The Dutch legislative framework is 
organized according to inquisitorial principles—like Germany and 
Portugal and to some degree Poland—by which forensic evidence is 
attached to a practice that puts trust in experts, legal professionals and 
institutes (Toom, 2010b, 2012b). According to this inquisitorial orienta-
tion, the Office of Public Prosecution leads the process of criminal inves-
tigation, makes the decision on whether to bring legal cases and suspects 
to court, and prosecutes. Judges actively search for truth during court 
proceedings and impose sanctions. In the process of drafting and passing 
laws for forensic DNA profiling, infringements of individual rights and 
more general legal principles were weighed against the gains of using 
forensic genetic technologies in the Dutch Parliament (Toom, 2010b, 
2012b). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, DNA evidence could only be 
obtained with the consent of a suspect. In 1994, the Netherlands became 
the first country to introduce dedicated legislation for the use of forensic 
DNA to compare DNA profiles from a suspect and from a crime scene 
(M’charek et al., 2020; Toom, 2012a). The 1994 Forensic DNA Profiling 
Act (Staatsblad, 1993) rendered suspects of serious crimes (e.g. homicide 
and sex crimes) subject to mandatory body searches. The same law also set 
legal provisions for uploading and speculatively searching DNA profiles in 
a DNA database, determined the period for retention of DNA profiles, 
and established rules for the deletion of DNA profiles and destruction of 
reference samples (Koops & Schellekens, 2008; M’charek, 2008; Toom, 
2010a, 2010b; M’charek, Toom, & Prainsack, 2012). Whereas the 1994 
law restricted the use of DNA to capital crimes, such as rape and murder, 
a 2001 amendment extended the use of DNA profiling to allow individu-
als suspected of having committed volume crimes to be body-searched to 
obtain saliva for DNA profiling (M’charek, 2008). This change in the 
Dutch Forensic DNA legislation was the first step to moving from a 
restrictive stance to an expansive and extensive use of DNA databases.
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The extensive mode of using forensic DNA databases and DNA analy-
ses for the support of criminal investigation had important steps in the 
years that followed. Technological advancements in forensic genetics, 
along with high-profile criminal cases which had unprecedented media 
coverage and intense public attention, turned the Netherlands into a pio-
neer in the use of controversial technologies for supporting criminal inves-
tigation. One key example is forensic DNA phenotyping that makes it 
possible to infer some externally visible characteristics of an unknown indi-
vidual from DNA analysis. In 2003, an amendment to the Dutch law 
introduced forensic DNA phenotyping. According to some commenta-
tors, this change in the Dutch Forensic DNA legislation added race to the 
features permitted to be determined, therefore widening the scope for 
forensic genetic technologies from identifying individuals to producing a 
population to be of interest to be targeted by criminal investigators 
(M’charek et al., 2020, p. 5).
Currently, the Dutch legislative framework allows DNA samples to be 
taken and stored in the database for the following categories: profiles of 
crime scene stains, profiles of suspects involved in a recordable offence4 
and profiles of persons convicted of a recordable offence. Regarding crime 
scene stains, police officers are allowed to collect all crime scene DNA 
stains that possibly belong to a criminal offender. However, they are not 
authorized to order a DNA analysis of these DNA samples; that power 
belongs to the public prosecution officer or the judge-commissioner 
(Reed & Syndercombe-Court, 2016).
The expansive orientation of the Dutch Forensic DNA legislation is 
evident in several other aspects, such as the retention regime and the con-
sent for obtaining a body DNA sample from a criminal suspect. Criminal 
suspects are offered (in writing) the opportunity to voluntarily provide a 
DNA sample. If the suspect refuses consent, a sample may be taken coer-
cively provided there are serious indications of involvement in a recordable 
offence. Profiles from suspects may be entered in the database if the sus-
pect is arrested in connection with an offence that can lead to provisional 
detention or if their inclusion is authorized by an investigating judge or 
prosecutor. Finally, if convicted individuals refuse consent, samples may 
also be taken coercively. In terms of retention and deletion criteria, sam-
ples from convicted offenders are retained indefinitely and samples of sus-
pects who are acquitted must be destroyed as soon as is reasonably 
4 A recordable offence is an offence that in law carries a term of imprisonment.
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practicable. Regarding profiles, unidentified crime scene stains are removed 
from the database, 10, 20 or 80 years from the date of entry. When sus-
pects are acquitted, their DNA profiles are deleted once the public prose-
cution office has confirmed that the individual is no longer considered a 
suspect. Profiles of convicted persons are kept for 20, 30, 50 or 80 years, 
depending on the seriousness of the offence and the conviction (Reed & 
Syndercombe-Court, 2016, p. 67).
Regarding the technical database infrastructure, the Dutch DNA data-
base is managed and overseen on behalf of the Minister of Justice by the 
Director of the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI).5 The database in the 
Netherlands uses CODIS (Combined DNA Index System), the IT system 
developed by the FBI (ENFSI, 2017).
In terms of organizational imperatives and principles, the NFI is exter-
nally audited annually for compliance with the Dutch Data Protection 
Law. Since 2006, the NFI has published an annual report on data relating 
to the number of profiles inserted in the DNA database, as well as the 
number of national and international matches (Netherlands Forensic 
Institute, 2018). These organizational imperatives reflect governance 
principles committed to notions of public accountability. However, 
according to Victor Toom (2010a), in contrast with countries like the UK, 
public discussions with regard to Dutch forensic DNA databasing and its 
practices have been largely lacking. The influence of organizations involved 
in policy development and governance (e.g. Dutch Data Protection 
Authority) is generally minor (Toom, 2012b).
In terms of the development of DNA technology, the Netherlands has a 
track record of ‘innovation’ regarding the regulation and practical applica-
tion of genetic technologies for forensic purposes. New genetic technolo-
gies useful for criminal investigation (forensic DNA phenotyping, familial 
searching and mass screenings) have been authorized for use in police 
enquiries and have gained importance in criminal investigations in the 
country (Hopman, 2020; Hopman & M’charek, 2020; Jong & M’charek, 
2017; M’charek, 2008; Toom, 2006, 2012a).
5 The NFI conducts DNA research and manages the DNA databases of the Caribbean 
Netherlands (Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. From 1 
February 2018, it is legally permitted to compare the included single DNA profiles from the 
DNA databases from the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao, St Maarten and Bonaire, Sint 
Eustatius and Saba. More information available here: https://dnadatabank.forensischinsti-
tuut.nl/dna-databanken/dna-databanken-andere-koninkrijksdelen (last access 20 
June 2020).
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Netherlands became the first 
country to regulate the use of genetically determined externally visible 
characteristics in criminal investigations (Staatsblad, 2003). At the time, 
such traits were sex and race. As pointed out by Victor Toom, ‘[t]he law 
was deliberately designed as “window-case legislation” to enable future 
physical traits to be included in the law, and to enable further genetic 
research for these purposes’ (2012a, p. 162). In 2012 and 2017, addi-
tional traits were legalized, respectively, for eye and hair colour (Hopman, 
2020). In 2012, new legislation permitted familial searching, that is, 
searching for relatives to whom an unknown suspect is allegedly geneti-
cally related through near matches between DNA profiles, in the national 
criminal DNA database (van Kooten, Kal, & Slooten, 2015). The exam-
ples of forensic DNA phenotyping and familial searching in the Dutch case 
illustrate the capacity of contemporary forensic genetics to render ‘race’ 
and ‘family’ as tools to produce leads to support criminal investigation 
(M’charek et al., 2020). The ethical and social implications of both foren-
sic DNA phenotyping and familial searching are paramount (Granja & 
Machado, 2019; Granja, Machado, & Queirós, 2020).
One element that helps to explain, albeit partially, the innovative orien-
tation of the trajectory of forensic genetic technologies in the Netherlands, 
and its connections with notions of national identity, is the criminal case of 
Marianne Vaatstra (briefly described above). In 1999, a girl named 
Marianne Vaatstra was found murdered in a rural area in the Netherlands. 
In the absence of a suspect, in 2000, the public prosecutor asked a Dutch 
forensic laboratory to infer the geographic descent of the unknown perpe-
trator from a DNA sample found at the crime scene. The inference of 
personal characteristics from DNA in the criminal justice process was 
unlawful in the Netherlands at that time. Based on a study of the DNA 
sample, the forensic laboratory suggested that the offender was most likely 
a man of North-Western European descent.
In 2007, Marianne’s father, on the advice of an expert from a private 
forensic services company, pushed for familial searching. At the time, the 
use of this forensic genetic technique was not legally allowed in the 
Netherlands. However, familial searching technology was considered to 
be particularly suitable in the Vaatstra case. In 2012 a familial searching in 
the national DNA database commenced. When this did not provide any 
leads, a mass screening, in which 8080 men were asked to participate, was 
announced. During this mass screening, which took place in 2012, a full 
match was discovered (Jong & M’charek, 2017).
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The case of the murder of Marianne Vaatstra was a milestone in the 
regulation of forensic DNA in the Netherlands. Not only did it play a 
crucial role in the development and implementation of forensic DNA phe-
notyping, familial searching and mass screenings but it also had an impact 
on public discourse and political debates about forensic genetic technolo-
gies (Jong & M’charek, 2017; M’charek et al., 2020). The Vaatstra mur-
der became a high-profile case that spoke to national concerns, namely, 
societal concerns, about the vulnerability of citizens to senseless violence 
and a lack of safety at night. But the case also became linked to debates on 
national asylum policy because Marianne was murdered near a centre for 
asylum seekers. Due to the fact that asylum seekers were initially targeted 
as probable suspects by part of the local village population, the Vaatstra 
murder fuelled criticism of xenophobia and racism (Jong & 
M’charek, 2017).
borderIng practIces and transnatIonal dna 
data exchange
The Netherlands was one of the countries, with Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Luxembourg and Austria, which signed the Prüm Convention on 
27 May 2005 agreeing to commence the exchange of data relating to 
DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration plates. According to Victor 
Toom (2018, p.  15), in January 2007, England and the Netherlands 
began a pilot project outside the Prüm Convention to try to compare the 
DNA data held on their national databases. The authorities of the 
Netherlands posted a disk containing 2159 DNA profiles of unsolved 
crimes to the UK Crown Prosecution Service. These profiles were com-
pared with the almost 4 million DNA profiles held in the national database 
in the UK and led to 45 potential matches. These matches underwent 
further testing, and consequently only five were considered to be a real 
match; the remaining matches were identified as false positive matches. 
After this initial test, the Netherlands started operating the Prüm system 
from its inception in 2008. Before the Dutch government ratified the 
Prüm Convention, it was discussed in both chambers of the Dutch 
Parliament in 2006 and 2007 (Toom, 2018).
In terms of data border-crossings, the Netherlands exchanges data per-
taining to commonly exchanged categories, such as ‘convicted individu-
als’, ‘suspects’ and ‘crime stains’. In addition, the Netherlands exchanges 
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data on ‘unidentified persons’, ‘unidentified human remains’ and ‘missing 
persons’, which are among the less common categories to be identified 
(Council of the European Union, 2020).
In addition to being among the countries that exchange the most data 
categories, the Netherlands is also one of the most active countries in the 
Prüm system: it exchanges DNA data with most operational countries (the 
only exception is Ireland) (Council of the European Union, 2020). The 
transnational exchange of DNA data within Prüm had, on 1 March 2018, 
led to 12,323 matches between the Dutch database and the 23 other data-
bases (Toom, 2018). The 2017 annual report on the Dutch DNA data-
base reported that a total number of 12,040 international matches had 
been made between 2008 and 31 December 2017 (Netherlands Forensic 
Institute, 2018). Furthermore, the Netherlands has offered the most sup-
port to Member States within Prüm, providing practical guidance includ-
ing evaluation visits to Member States just beginning to exchange DNA 
data transnationally; the Netherlands has supported six other Member 
States in this way, while Germany has supported four (Council of the 
European Union, 2020, pp. 15–19). Dutch experts were part of the sup-
porting teams in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Sweden and UK 
(Council of the European Union, 2020). Thereby, expert and tacit knowl-
edge about DNA databasing as well as operating transnational DNA data 
exchange spreads and shapes norms and practices of doing data exchange. 
The Netherlands—together with Germany—also took the lead in devel-
oping the technical framework of the Prüm system: Prüm’s software was 
developed jointly by DNA and IT experts from the Bundeskriminalamt 
(BKA) in Germany, the Ministry of the Interior of Austria, and the 
Netherlands Forensic Institute.
The number of categories the Netherlands exchanges and the number 
of connections its database has with other countries’ databases show how 
the country has been at the forefront of building and implementing the 
technical framework for Prüm in its most expansive form. Thus, in terms 
of national legacies of DNA databases and DNA technologies, the 
Netherlands—due to its extensive experience of DNA databasing and 
technologies—has performed a dominant and diffusive role in Prüm. 
Through the technical help it has actively given to other Member States 
implementing Prüm, it has also guided them towards the expansive mode 
of debordering.
Dutch forensic experts who have been actively involved in the Prüm 
system have also made considerable efforts to study and monitor 
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cross-border DNA matches between the Netherlands and other opera-
tional Member States. The former Dutch custodian of the national DNA 
database, Kees van der Beek, was the leading DNA scientist and coordina-
tor of the EU Working Party on Information Exchange and Data 
Protection (DAPIX), which handles work relating to the implementation 
of legislation and policies on the information exchange and protection of 
personal data in the field of law enforcement. DAPIX also cooperates 
closely with Europol, especially regarding the Information Management 
Strategy (IMS) on streamlining cross-border information exchange.
The dominance of the Netherlands in the Prüm system has also been 
strengthened by the involvement of Dutch forensic practitioners in certain 
empirical studies of the implementation, evaluation and strengthening of 
the structures for the exchange of DNA data in Prüm. One particular rel-
evant example is the PIES (the Prüm Implementation, Evaluation and 
Strengthening of Forensic DNA Data Exchange) research project, which 
focused on the cases of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the UK. The 
PIES project resulted in particularly relevant studies of cross-border 
matches between the Netherlands and other Prüm countries (Taverne & 
Broeders, 2015) and between the Netherlands and Belgium (Taverne & 
Broeders, 2016). One of these studies analysed data provided by the 
Dutch DNA database custodian for the year 2010 to record the drop-out 
of cross-border DNA matches. For the year 2010, a total of 2020 matches 
were found in Prüm Step 1 (the automated exchange of DNA profiles) for 
the Dutch database (Taverne & Broeders, 2015). Only 138 (6.8 per cent) 
of the matches resulted in a request for mutual legal assistance (Prüm Step 
2), and those hits led to 37 (1.8 per cent) matches being used in a prose-
cution (see also Toom, 2018).
Among the motifs and notions of nationhood mobilized in complying 
with the Prüm system is the Netherlands’ performance of the leading role 
in encouraging other countries to join the Prüm system and take advan-
tage of the benefits of using the DNA profiles stored in the Dutch DNA 
database. The Netherlands’ role in the development and diffusion of the 
Prüm system is fuelled by the impact of many success stories from the 
Prüm regime (Prainsack & Toom, 2010). One example of the Netherlands 
as the ‘triumphant hero’ in the transnational exchange of DNA data is the 
following story of a criminal case solved by the Prüm system, which is very 
popular among forensic practitioners who support its expansion:
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On 21 May 2015, an elderly couple of 75 and 74 years were found at their 
home in Vienna. The Austrian police found the DNA of the alleged killer, 
but no matches in the national DNA database. However, under the Prüm 
system, a match was found in the Dutch DNA database with a 29-year-old 
man from Poland. Having the name of the person—Dariusz Pawel 
Kotwica—the Austrian authorities could start looking for him. The suspect 
was arrested on June 8 at the railway station of Düsseldorf, in Germany. 
After his extradition to Austria, Kotwica also confessed to a murder in 
Sweden, committed a few weeks earlier, and attempted murder in Salzburg. 
Under Prüm, several other EU countries started running the Polish forensic 
DNA database to see if it matched samples found at the scenes of unsolved 
crimes. The media reported that there was a strong suspicion that Kotwica 
had also committed serious crimes in the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, 
and the Netherlands. The media renamed the case as the ‘Euro-ripper’ case, 
and hurled headlines like ‘Europe’s first cross-continental serial killer’. 
(Machado & Granja, 2018)
Toom and colleagues have reported another case that put the Dutch 
forensic DNA database and its role in the Prüm system at the forefront 
(Toom, Granja, & Ludwig, 2019, p. 50):
On 22 March 2016, a bomb was detonated at Maalbeek station in Brussels, 
killing twenty people. In connection with the criminal investigation, auto-
matic rifles were found in a house near Paris two days later. After re- 
examining the rifles in early 2018, biological traces were collected and DNA 
profiles were obtained. The profiles were uploaded to the French national 
DNA database and, on account of the Prüm Decisions, compared with 
DNA profiles held on national DNA databases connected to the Prüm sys-
tem. The cross-border comparison led to matches with three individuals 
whose DNA profiles were held on the Dutch DNA database. The suspects 
were arrested in the Netherlands on 18 June 2018.
The tacit claim of these two criminal cases is that the removal of obstacles 
to the circulation of DNA data between countries created extraordinary 
opportunities for solving serious murders that might otherwise have 
remained unsolved. In this context, the matches found in the Dutch DNA 
database are presented as ‘heroic’ in the public sphere and among the 
inner circles of policy-makers and promoters of the Prüm system.
The Netherlands’ mode of biobordering therefore sheds light into the 
diffusive mode of debordering as it reflects the Netherlands’ role in assisting 
other Member States to set up the technologies and IT infrastructures 
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needed to participate in forensic DNA data exchange. The Netherlands’ 
diffusive mode of debordering is also expressed in the commitment to 
study and monitor cross-border DNA matches between the Netherlands 
and other operational Member States within Prüm. Furthermore, as one 
of the more active countries in the transnational exchange of DNA data, 
considering the speed of developing connections, number of connections 
established with other countries and number and type of data categories 
exchanged, the Netherlands is also considered as an example of an expan-
sive mode of debordering. Diffusive debordering here, therefore, refers to 
the spread of expert and tacit knowledge about operating data exchange, 
spreading technology standards, monitoring practices as a form of control 
mechanism and leading by example.
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Abstract Poland established its DNA database in 2007 and joined the 
Prüm system in 2013. In comparison to the other countries in the 
European Union, the Polish DNA database is small. The facilitation of 
international DNA data exchange was considered as fundamental to 
Poland’s project to technologically modernize, integrate into Europe and 
incorporate international crime control standards. Furthermore, the coun-
try has demonstrated openness to those new and emergent forensic DNA 
technologies that have been critically assessed and strictly regulated in 
other countries. Poland is among Prüm’s most proactive members and is 
a country ambitious to catch up with a circumscribed expansive mode of 
debordering. This proactivity is manifested in the range of bilateral data 
exchange connections Poland has made with other Member States and in 
the data categories it makes available. Poland’s commitment to expansive 
debordering dynamics goes hand in hand with the EU’s agenda of inte-
grating security policies.




Poland established its DNA database in 2007. According to the European 
Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI), in June 2016, the Polish 
database had 45,679 profiles of individuals in its DNA database. This 
accounts for 0.12 per cent of the resident population of 38,200,000. In 
comparison to the other countries in the European Union, the Polish 
DNA database is small, although it is comparable to Portugal’s, which 
holds profiles of 0.09 per cent of the resident population (Reed & 
Syndercombe-Court, 2016).
From the beginning, forensic DNA data exchange was considered as 
fundamental to Poland’s project to technologically modernize, integrate 
into Europe and catch up with international crime control standards. The 
prominence of migration flows from Poland (and some other East 
European countries) to other European countries and assumptions about 
the role of Polish criminal networks have shaped the imaginations of secu-
rity professionals engaged in EU transnational police and judiciary coop-
eration. These views about Polish criminals have also influenced EU 
Member States’ interest in connecting with Poland within the Prüm sys-
tem to control cross-border criminality in the EU (Machado, Granja, & 
Amelung, 2020).
Among the five national cases presented in this book, Poland is the last 
to have joined the EU. While the others joined between 1958 and 1986, 
Poland joined in 2004. Poland’s trajectory thus poses a particularly inter-
esting scenario with which to understand modes of (dis)integration in 
Europe through the study of bioborders. Poland joined the Prüm system 
in 2013. According to the latest DAPIX report, Poland exchanges DNA 
data with 22 countries and is, therefore, one of Prüm’s most proactive 
members (Council of the European Union, 2020). Beyond that, Poland 
exchanges a broad range of DNA data categories, including data related to 
‘unidentified persons’, ‘unidentified human remains’ and ‘missing per-
sons’, which are among the less common categories identified (Council of 
the European Union, 2020). In this context, Poland represents a country 
ambitious to catch up with an expansive mode of debordering.
As Ryan (2016, p. 308) has emphasized, Poland has a ‘chequered his-
tory’ that has influenced its legal and criminal justice cultures. From 1795 
to 1918, its history was characterized predominantly by occupation and 
control by foreign powers, as it was divided between the Russian, Prussian 
and Austrian Empires. Independence followed in 1918. However, after 
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the Second World War and up to the fall of the communist regime in 
1989, Poland was again under the control of Soviet Russia. The primacy 
of politics over law in the Stalinist period affected Poland’s public life as 
part of its ‘Sovietization’. The criminal justice system was instrumental-
ized to ensure conformity with the norms and rules of the Communist 
Party, and this had effects that have lasted until today (Ryan, 2016, 
p. 310).
Poland’s transition towards being a democratic, capitalist society, and 
the absence of many welfare guarantees, such as for housing or work, 
which had been ensured by the communist regime, had an impact on rates 
of criminality in the country. In particular, petty crime increased after the 
fall of communism (Ryan, 2016, p. 311). After analysing data on criminal 
cases presented by the Ministry of Justice, Bulenda, Gruszczynska, 
Kremplewski and Sobota (2006) record that, between 1993 and 2002, 
the number of cases filed annually with the public prosecution service 
increased by 64 per cent (from 1,033,893 to 1,644,763). However, after 
a peak in the early 2000s, the crime rate decreased again to the end of the 
first decade of the new millennium. Harsher crime policies were the gov-
ernment’s response to the crime statistics and to the growing public fear 
of crime at that time. These developments coincided with the harmoniza-
tion of law to prepare and comply with the requirements for entry into the 
EU (Buczkowski, 2016).
A particularity of the Polish context is a project of nationhood linked to 
the humanitarian use of DNA technologies in the investigation of missing 
person cases as a way to heal and overcome the collective traumas of the 
past (Granja & Machado, 2019). DNA technologies are, on the one hand, 
applied to overcome painful and traumatizing periods in Polish history 
and to give visibility, dignity and respect to victims of oppression and their 
relatives. On the other hand, it is used, with great media visibility, to iden-
tify missing persons in the present, as Poland has an additional DNA data-
base dedicated to civil identification purposes.
natIonal dna database development
In 2007, the Polish DNA database was created as a direct consequence of 
the Council of Europe’s Rec(92)1 of 10 February 1992 on the use of 
DNA analysis within the framework of the criminal justice system and the 
European Union Resolution of 9 June 1997 (97/C193/02) 56 (Sándor, 
Sliwka, & Bárd, 2009, p. 20), which asked Member States to consider the 
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possibility of creating national genetic databanks. It took a decade to set 
up the legal conditions and get the first national DNA database started as 
a technical infrastructure.1
The legislative framework of the forensic DNA database needs to be 
understood in the context of Poland’s legal system. Since 1989, the crimi-
nal procedure system in post-communist Poland has been described by 
commentators as a mixed system that combines elements of inquisitorial 
practices shaped by its socialist past and adversarial practices deriving from 
recent reforms of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ryan, 2016, 
pp. 308–311). Wilson (2016, p. 321) has concluded that ‘these changes 
culminated in July 2015 with a switch to a more adversarial approach that 
appears to have created significant challenges for prosecutors, the police 
and the forensic science community’. However, in parallel, Ryan (2016, 
p. 322) concludes that although the forces of the EU Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, on the one hand, and the European Court of Human 
Rights, on the other hand, bring Europe’s criminal procedural traditions 
(including Poland’s) closer together, ‘the criminal procedure appears to 
depend very much on which political party holds the political power’, and 
recent politics are taken as a signal of a return to socialism in Poland.
Poland’s forensic DNA database is regulated by the Police Act, the 
Code of Penal Proceedings and the Data Protection Act.2 The Police Act 
was amended several times as it established the legal framework to regulate 
the conditions for the DNA database over time. In 2001, a substantial 
amendment provided the initial legal basis for the establishment of a DNA 
database. In 2004, another modification clarified that it was one of the 
police’s main tasks to run a database that includes DNA-related informa-
tion. Yet, the Polish Ombudsman, an oversight body that ensures that 
legislation conforms with the constitution and, in particular, with human 
rights, had various concerns regarding some of the amendments at that 
time. In consequence, they were subject to Constitutional Tribunal 
scrutiny. The main concerns were related to the seemingly insufficient 
clarification of conditions for gathering DNA data and the absence of reg-
ulations for data removals in cases where suspects were acquitted or 
proceedings terminated. In 2005, the Constitutional Tribunal confirmed 
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data removal criteria after acquittal, the Tribunal approved the existing 
legislation and did not note any infringement. It argued that ‘under cer-
tain circumstances gathering data on acquitted persons might be appropri-
ate given that such data is not of a sensitive nature’ (Sándor et al., 2009, 
p. 20). In the following amendment to the Police Act, in 2006, it was 
settled in Article 20 Section (2a) that, while carrying out their statutory 
duties, the police could gather, process and use DNA data (including per-
sonal data) without the individual’s knowledge or consent if they were 
‘suspected of committing a crime that is prosecuted upon public accusa-
tion, a minor who committed unlawful acts prosecuted upon public accu-
sation, of unidentified personality or tries to disguise his or her personality, 
[or] fugitive’ (Sándor et al., 2009, p. 21). Yet, data cannot be obtained if 
there is no detection, evidence or identification purpose to an investiga-
tion procedure. In addition, the Code of Penal Proceedings defines that 
the national DNA database stores and processes DNA profiles for the fol-
lowing criteria:
of individuals as laid out in Articles 74 and 192a of the code of penal pro-
ceeding, i.e. accused, charged, suspects and other persons, in relation to 
whom there were no premises for removal from case files and destruction of 
evidential material collected from these persons; of unknown individuals or 
persons trying to conceal their identity; of unknown dead corpses; of 
unknown stains collected at crime scenes, whose origin cannot be attributed 
to a particular person.3
If a suspect individual does not give consent for a DNA sample to be 
taken, an order for compulsory collection can be issued by a court (Reed 
& Syndercombe-Court, 2016, p. 70).
Poland’s data protection regime is defined by the Act on the Protection 
of Personal Data of 1997 (Dz. U. 1997 Nr 133 poz. 883 with later 
amendments), which is applicable to forensic databases and the collection 
of genetic information in Poland for investigative purposes. Personal data 
can only be collected and stored if it is exclusively of non-coding regions 
of the DNA (Sándor et al., 2009, p. 21). Every ten years, police bodies are 
required to verify all collected and stored information and remove obso-
lete data. Personal data that discloses ‘the race or ethnicity, political views, 




membership, data about health, addictions or sexual relations of persons 
suspected of a crime prosecuted by a public prosecutor that have not been 
convicted for those crimes, shall be destroyed promptly after a relevant 
ruling takes effect’ (Sándor et al., 2009, p. 24). The removal of data must 
be witnessed by a committee, and a report must evidence the process. The 
retention periods for DNA data are 20 year or 35 years for data related to 
suspects and those prosecuted or sentenced in connection with a crime 
(ibid.).
As noted above, in 2013 and 2015, major amendments to the Code of 
Criminal Procedure shifted the criminal justice system towards a more 
adversarial approach. The amendments have also had an impact on the 
collection and use of forensic biometric data, including its uploading to 
the national database. Further new legislation—the Act on Proceedings 
against Persons with Mental Disorders—that involves forensic biometrics 
and deals with unidentified bodies and persons who attempt to conceal 
their identity might ‘also have placed extra demands on forensic database 
management and staff during the Prüm implementation period’ (Wilson, 
2016, p. 321).
The technical database infrastructure of the national DNA database is 
operated by the Biology Department of the Central Forensic Laboratory 
of the Police (CFLP), which is the custodian of the DNA database as well 
as of other biometric databases. As one of the main providers of forensic 
services in Poland, CFLP is responsible for casework, provision of techni-
cal and forensic resources, but it is also involved in forensic science research 
(Sándor et al., 2009, p. 19). CFLP participates in the development of the 
research methodologies, procedures and standards to be used during 
criminal investigation.4 Two groups are in charge of operations: one is 
responsible for profiling DNA from evidential material, and the other is 
responsible for profiling samples from persons and introducing them into 
the national database. Regional forensic laboratories provide information 
on profiles developed from crime stains that are added to the central 
database.
The IT system used in Poland is CODIS (Combined DNA Index 
System).5 The support provided by the FBI for CODIS, which includes 
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have chosen to use the system for the collection and search of DNA pro-
files. Thus, the software has led to some standardization across national 
systems (Council of the European Union, 2020).
Regarding the organizational imperatives and principles that shape how 
the national DNA database is managed, Poland’s trajectory has been 
shaped by its history. Since the fall of the communist regime in 1989, 
exchanging knowledge with foreign law enforcement agencies has become 
one of the mechanisms contributing to police training directed towards 
modernization. Part of this process has been a drive for the international-
ization of policies, including international collaboration with Interpol and 
Europol and involvement in other external programmes (e.g. EULEX, 
Leonardo da Vinci and NEXUS) (Karolewski & Benedikter, 2017). It is 
also worth mentioning that, in 2008, the Polish police received access to 
Interpol’s DNA database through the International DNA Gateway portal 
(Sándor et al., 2009). Karolewski and Benedikter (2017) understand these 
endeavours as giving Polish officers the opportunity to participate in vari-
ous undertakings that have allowed them to compare, contrast and 
exchange experiences. In the context of forensic genetics at the European 
level, the Central Forensic Laboratory of the Police (CFLP) has been a 
member of ENFSI since 1995.
The Implementation of Prüm Decisions. Preparations of the joint police 
operations in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland project is a further 
example of Poland’s proactive approach to training police officers. It was 
led by the Lithuanian Police, funded by the EU, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland, began in 2011 and ran until 2013.6 According to Karolewski 
and Benedikter (2017), police training in Poland provides a mechanism 
for the professionalization of the police that responds to international risks 
and follows worldwide training standards. The regional collaboration, 
including the collaboration with Nordic and other East European coun-
tries, is not only of interest for its part in police training, it was also of use 
in intensifying the flow of police information where the flow of risky peo-
ple is suspected to be of higher volume.
The development of DNA technology in Poland has been influenced by 
an experimental and wide use of DNA technology in the criminal justice 
system. Its development is oriented towards highlighting the country’s 
openness to innovation and its modernity. This openness extends even to 




those new and emergent technologies that have been critically assessed 
and strictly regulated in other countries.
Among those critically assessed technologies are familial searching and 
forensic DNA phenotyping. Familial searching allows for the analysis of 
kinship relations based on an individual DNA profile. Poland was one of 
the earliest countries in Europe to use Y-STR profiles, which can be anal-
ysed in order to assess the familial connections of male profiles. The tech-
nology was used as early as 2000, when it was used in the elimination 
process of a mass screening in the case of a serial rapist and murderer 
known as the ‘Vampire from S ́winoujście’ in Northern Poland (Dettlaff- 
Kakol & Pawlowski, 2002). The case received special media attention 
because about 11,000 men were screened. One of them showed an identi-
cal profile in all Y-STR loci, e.g. a short tandem repeat (STR) on the 
Y-chromosome, with the DNA profile of the unknown suspect drawn 
from crime scene samples; this suggested that the rapist and the typed 
volunteer were closely related males. The volunteer’s brother turned out 
to be the person with an identical profile of the person which had been 
found at the crime scene and was convicted.
Forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP) is a set of techniques that aims to 
use biological material to infer the externally visible characteristics—such 
as eye, hair and skin colour—and continent-based biogeographical ances-
try, that is, what larger genetic population(s) they belong to, of an 
unknown person. Outside Poland, the ethical and social implications of 
FDP are regarded ambiguously (Wienroth, 2018a, 2018b). Inside Poland, 
however, ambiguous legal regulation of FDP means that its techniques 
have been put into practice (Samuel & Prainsack, 2018, p. 44).
As mentioned, according to legal rules in Poland, only data concerning 
the non-coding part of the DNA can be gathered and processed. Data 
regarding the coding part of DNA cannot be gathered or processed by the 
police. A recent regulation (No. 26 from the Commander in Chief of the 
Police, dated 10 July 2017 and published in the Official Journal of the 
Main Police Headquarters, item 48 (Appendix A.3.2)) defined the process 
for managing the DNA database and information about the results of 
DNA analysis. Interpreting the document, Samuel and Prainsack (2018, 
p. 45) suggest that the findings of forensic DNA analyses that derive from 
the context of storing short tandem repeat (STR)7 profiles in the national 
DNA database are regulated, but not what types of DNA analyses may be 
7 STR analysis is a common method of molecular biology to compare DNA from two or 
more samples.
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performed. Their interpretation continues by assuming that non-coding 
regions of DNA may be analysed and stored as forensic DNA profiles, 
while coding region can be at least analysed but not stored (Samuel & 
Prainsack, 2018, pp. 41–45). Consequently, FDP is used in Poland for 
determining potential biogeographical ancestry, age and appearance 
(Samuel & Prainsack, 2018).
Advocating the normalization of analysis of the coding area and the 
establishment of new forensic genetic technologies, leading Polish foren-
sic geneticists have argued in favour of expert training:
It also seems that the potential of the national DNA database in Poland has 
not been fully developed, and it is necessary to implement an appropriate 
information policy in order to improve it. Novel methods that can be applied 
at the level of investigation include analysis of biogeographic ancestry, pre-
diction of visible traits, and estimation of human chronological age. 
Moreover, next-generation sequencing has a potential to entirely replace 
capillary electrophoresis in forensic genetics. Further works are necessary to 
ensure a proper implementation of uniform standards of data interpretation 
and evaluation of DNA evidence in forensic genetics. In order to maintain 
proper standards of forensic DNA assessment, continuous training of DNA 
experts and appropriate information policy for recipients of DNA assess-
ments are required. (Branicki, Pos ́piech, Kupiec, & Styrna, 2014)
The argument for further training and broader knowledge production 
accords with a tendency towards further professionalization that can be 
observed in the general organizational imperatives and principles of the 
criminal justice system since the fall of the communist regime in Poland 
in 1989.
The Polish case is marked by its iconic use of forensic genetic technolo-
gies to identify missing persons, particularly victims of the totalitarian 
occupations Poland has experienced (Ossowski et  al., 2016a, 2016b, 
2017). DNA technologies have been also used increasingly by forensic 
geneticists to provide evidence about mass graves from the Second World 
War and Nazi occupation of Poland, when almost 3 million people were 
killed; from the Soviet occupation, when 570,000 people died; and from 
the communist terror of 1944–1956, when more than 50,000 people 
died. Thus, in Poland, DNA technology has become closely connected 
with historical reprocessing and overcoming historical trauma (Granja & 
6 POLAND 
98
Machado, 2019). In 2012 forensic scientists from the Pomeranian Medical 
University in Szczecin, in cooperation with historians from the Institute of 
National Remembrance (Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes 
against the Polish Nation), created the Polish Genetic Database of Victims 
of Totalitarianism with the aim of identifying all those who went missing 
or were killed between 1939 and 1956. The forensic genetic technique 
used to identify the victims is a variation of familial searching. Together 
with other technologies and strategies—such as dental records, x-rays and 
photographic comparisons—the procedures use DNA to match unidenti-
fied bodies and/or persons with individuals thought to be their biological 
relatives.
Poland is also concerned with identifying human remains and finding 
missing persons from the present (Granja & Machado, 2019). To this end, 
a dedicated DNA database of missing persons and their families has been 
established by the Centre for the Search of Missing Persons, which evolved 
from a collaboration between the police and a civil society foundation and 
has received relatively high media attention (TVP, 2015). Identifying 
familial relationships with the help of DNA technology has been key to its 
efforts.
borderIng practIces and orderIng transnatIonal 
dna data exchange
Poland prepared the path for DNA data exchange and conformity with the 
Prüm Decisions from 2005. Its readiness for DNA data exchange was 
assessed in October 2012, and, shortly after, in January 2013, Poland 
began to exchange data on a routine basis. The country is among the most 
proactive Member States and has established connections with 22 other 
countries (Council of the European Union, 2020, p. 21). Poland repre-
sents a country ambitious to catch up with an expansive mode of 
debordering.
Poland exchanges a higher number of data categories than many other 
Member States, but does not only allow access to data on ‘suspects’ and 
‘crime stains’, which are the most common categories exchanged. It does, 
however, exchange data on ‘unidentified persons’, ‘unidentified human 
remains’ and ‘missing persons’, which are among the less common catego-
ries to be identified (Council of the European Union, 2020, p.  22). 
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According to the ENFSI, Poland is among the EU Member States that 
include data on missing persons in their criminal databases (ENFSI, 2017, 
p. 59). In Portugal, there is one forensic DNA database. It serves both 
criminal investigation and civil identification purposes. However, there are 
separate files for criminal investigation purposes and for missing persons 
(see Chap. 7). The other countries in our study—Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK—store data on missing persons in databases separate from 
their criminal DNA databases.
The specific national legacies of DNA databases and DNA technologies 
in Poland rely, in particular, on the securitization of the nation-state 
through internationalization. As Baylis and Matczak (2019) suggest, the 
Polish police continues to be the subject of transformation. They argue 
that the transformation of Poland’s police organizations consists of many 
layers that aim to shift them from the repressive orientations shaped before 
1989 to orientations that are sensitive to human rights through interna-
tionalization and Westernization.
Baylis and Matczak (2019) argue that, while structural changes in the 
police are easy to achieve, changes in values and attitudes are more diffi-
cult to achieve but have been targeted by training in Poland. Thus, it can 
be assumed that the international police collaboration strengthened 
through the Prüm Decisions should be understood through the rationale 
of internationalization and professionalization. Thus, the Prüm system per 
se is seen to come with the promise of support for more effective crime 
control through internationalized and professionalized police collabora-
tion, which in turn is used to increase acceptance of the mechanisms of 
Prüm in times of transnationally organized crime and the criminalization 
of migration.
Regarding the motifs of Member States complying with the Prüm regime, 
it should by now be obvious that Poland fully supported the implementa-
tion of Prüm and was ambitious and quick in realizing its integration into 
the system in order to catch up with Central European and Nordic EU 
Member States. Yet, another motif that marked its swift integration into 
Prüm was that Polish offenders are considered to be overrepresented in 
comparison with other nationalities of foreign criminals in several EU 
Member States (Ludwig & Johnson, 2016). Assumptions about the role 
of Polish criminal networks frame the discourse of professionals operating 
the Prüm system about the importance of joining collective efforts to 
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control cross-border criminality in the EU (Machado et  al., 2020) and 
help explain the interest of other Member States in data exchange with 
Poland. At the same time, however, Polish agents also reproduce the idea 
that Poland ‘exports’ criminals.
In terms of hidden (dis)integration, it could be argued that techni-
cally, scientifically and in terms of organizational matters, Poland’s 
debordering approach has led to some integration and harmonization, 
thus contributing to the more hidden techno-scientific forms of integra-
tion. From the start of the DNA database, issues of standardization and 
the facilitation of international DNA data exchange were considered as 
fundamental to Poland’s project to catch up with international crime 
control standards.
Poland has passed a couple of laws reforming its judicial and criminal 
justice system, including its police law of 2016, which have been investi-
gated by the EU to assess whether they conform with EU democratic 
standards regarding the rule of law and human rights (European 
Commission, 2016). What seems to have created tension is Poland’s cur-
rent tendency towards securitization and surveillance beyond that sanc-
tioned by EU standards. The reform of the police law in 2016 expanded 
the Polish police’s powers by allowing law enforcement agencies much 
broader surveillance measures over the population (Karolewski & 
Benedikter, 2017). Some civil society stakeholders in Poland are also ques-
tioning the free border-crossing and debordering dynamics of the country 
(Limone, 2017). In this context, it is important to acknowledge the ten-
sions between the EU and Poland regarding the latter’s status as a demo-
cratic and constitutional state on the one hand. On the other hand, 
however, Poland’s commitment to expansive debordering dynamics, 
enabling free data flow within the EU, conforms with the EU’s agenda of 
integrating security policies.
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Abstract The Portuguese DNA database was established in 2008 and is 
one of the smallest DNA databases in the EU. Portugal has one of the 
most restrictive regulatory frameworks in the EU in relation to the criteria 
for the entry and deletion of DNA profiles. The country started connect-
ing with the Prüm system’s genetic data exchange in 2015. In terms of 
bordering practices, Portugal serves as an example of latent rebordering 
dynamics. This is because the requirements of the EU regulations regard-
ing Prüm have been fully implemented in Portugal in terms of techno- 
scientific and operational infrastructures, yet Portugal simultaneously 
severely restricts access to biometric data. This situation derives from par-
ticularities of Portugal’s national policy regulations on data protection and 
its judicial traditions as well as regulations on ethical oversight.
Keywords Portugal • DNA database • Data exchange • 
Rebordering • Prüm
IntroductIon
Portugal established its forensic DNA database in 2008 by Law 5/2008 
of 12 February. The Portuguese database has one of the most restrictive 
regulatory frameworks in Europe with regard to the criteria for the entry 
and deletion of DNA profiles (Santos, Machado, & Silva, 2013). According 
to the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI), in June 
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2016, the database had 5339 profiles from individuals, which represented 
just 0.05 per cent of the resident population in Portugal.1 More recent 
data shows that, on 31 December 2019, the database contained 10,270 
profiles from individuals convicted of a crime, which represents 0.1 per 
cent of the population (of 10,257,9342).3 This situates Portugal as one of 
the European countries with the smallest DNA databases and comparable 
to Poland.
In 2015, Portugal started connecting with the Prüm system’s DNA 
data exchange. Portugal’s integration into Prüm was characterized by the 
full enforcement of the requirements of the European Union (EU) regu-
lations and speedy implementation. One indicator for integration is that, 
since 2015, Portugal has established connections with 19 countries 
(Council of the European Union, 2020). However, Portugal has severely 
restricted the number of data categories available for exchange: it only 
exchanges data pertaining to convicted individuals and crime scene sam-
ples (Brito et al., 2019; Council of the European Union, 2020), making it 
one of the countries that exchange the least data categories among all 
operational countries, together with Greece (Council of the European 
Union, 2020). The Portuguese bioborders regime is thus addressed as an 
example of latent rebordering dynamics.
Portugal’s historical and cultural specificities also make the country a 
particularly interesting case through which to address the dynamics of 
bioborders. Portuguese history is heavily marked by a long period of 
political dictatorship in the twentieth century (1926–1974), characterized 
by political and police repression and censorship (Durão, 2008; Pimentel, 
2007; Ribeiro, 1995), which left an indelible mark on society and particu-
larly on Portugal’s legal and criminal justice culture. For example, the 
police forces were perceived in the collective imagination as strongly linked 
to the authoritarianism of the dictatorship period (Durão, 2008). 
According to Machado and Prainsack (2012), this cultural mark of dicta-
torship and lack of trust in Portugal’s police forces had a profound impact 
on the development of the national DNA database in Portugal: for 
1 As the ENFSI report is to our knowledge the latest statistic which provides comparable 
information across countries, we refer to it to situate Portugal in comparison to the other 
country cases in this study. Data available at http://enfsi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/
ENFSI-Survey-on-DNA-Databases-in-Europe-June-2016.pdf (last access on 23 June 2020).
2 Data available here: https://www.pordata.pt/Portugal (last access on 23 June 2020).
3 Data available here: https://www.cfbdadosadn.pt/pt/bdpadn/sobreabd/Paginas/
ConteudoFicheiros.aspx (last access on 23 June 2020).
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example, it explains why the custody of the DNA database is in the hands 
of the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences and not 
in the hands of the police (see also Frois & Machado, 2016; Machado & 
Frois, 2014).
After the democratic revolution of 1974, the Portuguese state began to 
focus on investing on modernization and progress. According to Frois and 
Machado, ‘[i]n Portugal, the ideal of modernity and the fight against 
backwardness is so deeply rooted that it has been assimilated into a kind of 
official rhetoric, to the point where we could almost say it has become a 
national trait, readily identified by the Portuguese as a defining feature of 
the national character’ (Frois & Machado, 2016, p. 396). Within this tra-
jectory, forensic DNA technology has emerged as a symbol of the mod-
ernization and progress that has increasingly become introduced in most 
areas of state activity, including criminal investigation, as a way to emulate 
the models of other European countries (Machado & Frois, 2014).
The political project of modernization of criminal investigation through 
technology—including by establishing a national DNA database (Machado 
& Silva, 2010)—is nevertheless influenced by Portugal’s cultural particu-
larities, which are marked by scarce economic resources, low criminality 
rates and low levels of public confidence in the state, the police and the 
criminal justice system (Transparency International, 2019). We, therefore, 
consider Portugal’s development of its DNA database and involvement in 
transnational DNA data exchange to be embedded in a particular project 
of nationhood that is linked to the aspiration to modernize through tech-
nology. This project is, nevertheless, challenged by cultural ambiguities: 
on one side, the judiciary powers want to ‘modernize’ the criminal justice 
system by resorting to forensic DNA technologies; on the other, judges 
and public prosecutors are orientated to implementing a highly protective 
regime that aims to safeguard the rights of citizens from potential abuses 
by the police forces (Amelung & Machado, 2019; Machado & Silva, 2010).
natIonal dna database development
Portugal established its national forensic DNA database in 2008 with the 
aim of assisting both civil identification and criminal investigation. The 
initial proposal put forward by the Portuguese government included the 
establishment of a universal database of Portugal’s entire population 
(Machado & Silva, 2010, p.  218). However, several factors led to the 
abandonment of this initiative. According to the study conducted by 
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Helena Machado and Susana Silva, three main factors conditioned the 
creation of a universal DNA database in Portugal: (i) the practice was not 
in line with the decisions and practices of most European countries, which 
restrict national DNA databases to populations with some type of involve-
ment with the criminal justice system; (ii) the incidence of serious crime in 
Portugal is relatively low when compared to other countries; (iii) in a 
country with limited economic resources, the establishment of a national 
DNA database would require a massive economic investment (Machado 
& Silva, 2010, p. 218). Moreover, despite the initial desire to establish an 
expansive DNA database, the legislative framework of the Portuguese 
forensic DNA database turned out to be one of the most restrictive in 
Europe in terms of data inclusion and information preservation (Machado 
& Silva, 2010; Santos et al., 2013). The regulations and legislative frame-
works determining the collection, use and retention of particular DNA 
data in Portugal can be understood as derived from a particularly protec-
tive regime in terms of personal data and genetic privacy (Amelung & 
Machado, 2019; Machado & Silva, 2010).
The legislative framework in Portugal is also characterized by its inquis-
itorial orientation, in which judges play a prominent and active role in the 
examination process and the imposing of rules of evidence and court pro-
cedures. This orientation is reflected in the Portuguese DNA database: the 
inclusion of profiles in the DNA database requires a judge’s order. Several 
criminal justice stakeholders see this dependence on judges as an obstacle 
to criminal investigation and the expansion and enhanced efficacy of the 
DNA database (Machado, 2016): first, because some judges do not order 
the insertion of profiles into the database (Frois & Machado, 2016) and, 
second, because the legislation has established circumscribed criteria con-
cerning the paths of communication between the entity that manages the 
database—National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences 
(Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal e Ciências Forenses [INMLCF])—
the judges and the police forces. More particularly, judges have the power 
to decide if and how information should be transmitted to the police. 
According to the police, this has created several challenges in criminal 
investigation and compromises the efficacy of the DNA database (Costa, 
2014; Machado & Costa, 2013; Santos, Costa, & Machado, 2012).
In 2013 and 2017, the law was altered in an attempt to overcome the 
challenges posed by the 2008 legislation on the Portuguese forensic DNA 
database and with the aim of expanding database usage and size (Laws 
40/2013 and 90/2017). There were three significant changes. First, 
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changes to the law introduced the possibility of creating samples from 
official suspects (arguidos4) and inserting them into the national DNA 
database files. Second, amendments also allowed the Laboratory of 
Judiciary Police to insert profiles obtained from samples collected from 
crime scenes; previously, only the INMLCF could insert such samples. 
Third, the 2017 law also simplified the procedure for inserting profiles 
into the database. Previously, two judgements were required from a judge: 
the first to request sample collection for DNA profiling and the second to 
request insertion into the database. Nowadays, the judge’s requests for 
sample collection and insertion of DNA profiles are made simultaneously. 
This easing of the inclusion criteria might, at least partially, explain why 
the Portuguese DNA database, one of the smallest in the EU, has grown 
disproportionally quickly over the last few years: between 2010 and 2016, 
8139 profiles had been inserted into the database; between 2017 and 
2018, the number grew to 11,774 profiles.
Currently, the Portuguese DNA database includes eight types of files 
(Brito et al., 2019): (i) profiles obtained from samples for civil identifica-
tion purposes; (ii) reference profiles for missing people and (iii) their rela-
tives; (iv) profiles obtained from samples collected from crime scenes; (v) 
profiles from professionals who collect and analyse samples for elimination 
purposes; (vi) profiles from offenders convicted to a prison sentence of 
three years or more for committing an intentional crime; (vii) samples of 
official suspects (arguidos) in criminal proceedings for intentional crimes 
carrying a prison penalty of three years or more; (viii) and profiles from 
volunteers (see Machado & Silva, 2009, 2016). In the context of the 
Portuguese legislation, a volunteer is a citizen who agrees to have his/her 
DNA profile included in the national database on their own initiative—
that is, without being approached by an agent of the justice system—and 
on the basis of free and informed consent. According to Machado and Silva:
A request by a volunteer for their DNA profile to be included in the data-
base may symbolically signify maximization of choice and a sense of 
4 According to Article 57 of the Código de Processo Penal (Code of Criminal Procedure 
2007), arguido is the status of an individual who is under criminal investigation or who has 
been formally accused. Article 58 states that a person may be made an arguido based on a 
justifiable suspicion of a crime. Arguido status is designed to provide individuals with certain 
rights, such as knowing the details of charges, together with obligations that may range from 




 individual responsibility toward maintaining social order. In addition, the 
genetic profile of the volunteer is received by the state as a voluntary gift and 
as the citizen’s contribution toward expanding a database designed to fight 
crime and ensure public peace and security. (Machado & Silva, 2016, p. 329)
The number of volunteers in the national DNA database remains signifi-
cantly low: by 31 December 2019, there were solely six profiles of volun-
teers in the database.5
With regard to the deletion of information, the legislative framework of 
the Portuguese forensic DNA database does not allow the indefinite reten-
tion of DNA profiles and personal information in the database. All data, 
including both the DNA sample and the DNA profile, has deadlines by 
which it must be eliminated and/or destroyed (Wallace, Jackson, Gruber, 
& Thibedeau, 2014). More particularly, non-identified profiles must be 
deleted 20 years after they were inserted (N.° 2, Article 26, Law 90/2017). 
The data of convicted individuals is removed from the database five, seven 
or ten years after they have served their sentence, according to whether its 
duration was less than five years, between five and eight years or more than 
eight years, respectively (N.° 3, Article 26, Law 90/2017).
Regarding the technical database infrastructure, the National Institute 
of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (INMLCF) is responsible for the 
database and operations that apply to it. The INMLCF is a public institu-
tion under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice. It is responsible for 
cooperating with the courts, the public prosecution service and the police 
forces, along with other services and entities that intervene in the admin-
istration of the justice system. The INMLCF performs forensic examina-
tions and provides specialized technical and laboratory support.
The competent entities for the analysis of biological samples in order to 
obtain DNA profiles are the Forensic Genetic Laboratories of the INMLCF 
and the Scientific Police Laboratory of the Judicial Police. These analyses 
can only be carried out by other laboratories if they are authorized to do 
so by the Ministry of Justice and the ministry supervising them (Brito 
et  al., 2019). The Portuguese DNA database uses CODIS (Combined 
DNA Index System), an IT system developed by the FBI.
The scientific standards adopted in the Portuguese forensic DNA data-
base are meant to be solely restricted to the coding region of the DNA and 
5 Data available here: https://www.cfbdadosadn.pt/pt/bdpadn/sobreabd/Paginas/
ConteudoFicheiros.aspx (last access on 23 June 2020).
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to be in line with international standards, which include the ISO 17025 
laboratory standards and the scientific standards of European forensic 
genetics (the selection of genetic markers conforms with the European 
Standard Set). Regarding the procedural process of defining DNA mark-
ers, the law governing the Portuguese DNA database defines that DNA 
markers must be defined in accordance with international standards and 
scientific knowledge, but also in consultation with the National 
Commission of Data Protection, thereby giving precedence to respect for 
and protection of genetic privacy. The National Commission of Data 
Protection is an independent administrative entity that works with the 
Portuguese Assembly of the Republic. Its general purpose is to control 
and supervise the processing of personal data in strict accordance with the 
human rights and guarantees prescribed in the constitution and the law. 
The DNA markers to be incorporated into the file of DNA profiles are 
fixed after consultation with the National Commission of Data Protection 
by joint order of the members of the government responsible for the areas 
of justice and health and in accordance with international standards and 
scientific knowledge on the matter.
In terms of organizational imperatives and principles, the 2008 law also 
defined that the INMLCF, responsible for the activities carried out within 
the framework of database management and maintenance, must be over-
seen by an independent entity created for that purpose: the Supervisory 
Board for the DNA Database (Conselho de Fiscalização da Base de Dados de 
Perfis de ADN). The Board is responsible for providing information in the 
form of publicly available annual reports and statistics about the DNA 
database; it also provides reports to the Portuguese Parliament. The Board 
for the Portuguese forensic DNA database must also consult the National 
Data Protection Commission for any clarifications regarding the process-
ing of personal data and must comply with its decisions.
Supervisory boards do not commonly accompany DNA database sys-
tems among the European Member States. ENFSI recommends that the 
Member States should set up an infrastructure that addresses the role of 
DNA databases in society: ‘Because DNA databases have a very important 
yet very delicate role in society, the custodian of a DNA database should 
develop tools to make objective information about the DNA database 
available to politicians, the public and the media’ (ENFSI, 2017, p. 49). 
However, it remains the responsibility of each state to translate responsible 
governance principles into operational routines. The organizational 
imperatives of the forensic DNA database in Portugal thereby reflect how 
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governance principles, such as commitments to high levels of data protec-
tion and public accountability, are translated into the operational and 
organizational infrastructures of the database.
The most recent report from the Supervisory Board for the DNA 
Database states that, as of 31 December 2019, the Portuguese forensic 
DNA database contained 12,980 DNA profiles. The distribution is as fol-
lows: 6 profiles from volunteers; 31 profiles obtained from samples for 
civil identification purposes; 18 reference profiles of missing people and 
their relatives; 2508 profiles obtained from samples collected from crime 
scenes; 10,270 profiles from offenders convicted to a sentence of three 
years or more; and 146 samples of professionals.6 The Portuguese DNA 
database is thus small in comparison to those of other European countries 
(Reed & Syndercombe-Court, 2016; Santos et al., 2013).
In terms of public understandings of DNA databases in Portugal, there 
exists a broad acceptance of such technology as a tool for criminal investi-
gation. Based on an online survey of 628 individuals in Portugal, Helena 
Machado and Susana Silva outline that more than three quarters of the 
respondents believed that the Portuguese forensic DNA database could 
help fight crime more efficiently and provide swifter and more accurate 
justice. However, only approximately half of the surveyed sample consid-
ered that DNA databases could deter and prevent crime. In terms of risks, 
respondents outlined the lack of security and control over access to data 
and the possibility of unforeseen misuses of genetic information in the 
future as concerns (Machado & Silva, 2015). The general acceptance of 
DNA databases should, however, be framed within a wider context, in 
which Portuguese citizens have, for long, demonstrated apparently passive 
compliance with the state’s collection of diverse types of personal identifi-
cation data, including fingerprints, for civil identification purposes 
(Machado & Prainsack, 2012, p. 42)
Finally, in terms of the development of DNA technology and other uses of 
DNA technologies, up to the date of writing, there has not been a detailed 
debate and/or deliberation about the use of technologies such as familial 
searching and forensic DNA phenotyping in Portugal. Contributing to 
the lack of debate might be the fact that, given that the scientific standards 
adopted in the Portuguese forensic DNA database are meant to be solely 
restricted to the coding region of the DNA, the use of the potentially 
6 Data available here: https://www.cfbdadosadn.pt/pt/bdpadn/sobreabd/Paginas/
ConteudoFicheiros.aspx (last access on 23 June 2020).
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controversial technologies of familial searching and forensic DNA pheno-
typing is, in legal terms, not allowed.
borderIng practIces and orderIng transnatIonal 
dna data exchange
Portugal’s aim to ‘keep up’ with more experienced countries in terms of 
criminal investigation and transnational cooperation has been emphasized 
since the creation of the Portuguese DNA database in 2008 (Machado & 
Silva, 2010, p. 219). In terms of the motifs and notions of nationhood mobi-
lized to comply with the Prüm system, Portugal joined other countries in 
technologically modernizing, integrating into Europe, and catching up 
with international crime control standards. In this, Portugal’s trajectory is 
similar to Poland’s (see Chap. 6).
On 23 June 2006, Portugal requested access to the Prüm Convention. 
The countries that had signed the Convention—Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain, France, Luxembourg and Austria—welcomed the 
Portuguese request. This allowed Portugal to start participating in the 
working groups preparing the implementation and full operation of the 
measures contained in the Prüm Convention (Ministério da Administração 
Interna, 2006, p. 78). In 2011, following an evaluation visit carried out by 
experts from Germany and a successful pilot run, Portugal was authorized 
by the EU Council to exchange data (Council of the European Union, 
2011). However, the country only began to connect with the Prüm sys-
tem’s genetic data exchange in 2015 (Council of the European 
Union, 2015).
As mentioned above, Portugal’s integration into Prüm was character-
ized by the full enforcement of the requirements of the EU regulations 
and by swift implementation. One indicator of that is that Portugal has 
established connections with 19 countries since 2015 (Council of the 
European Union, 2020). According to the annual report of the Supervisory 
Board for the DNA Database, among all countries with which Portugal is 
exchanging data, there have been more hits (valid matches) with Spain, 
France, Germany and, to a lesser extent, also Austria and the Netherlands.
As previously discussed, the national legacies of DNA databases and 
DNA technologies in Portugal are derived from the strength of the judicial 
regime, which works through formal and bureaucratic procedures, in con-
trast with the more informal and pragmatic orientation of the police forces 
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(Machado & Granja, 2019). The regulatory regime prevailing in Portugal 
allocates significant power to judges, who play a prominent and active role 
in assessing evidence and processing court procedures. In this sense, 
Portugal’s approach to bioborders is influenced by its inquisitorial system, 
as well as by its restrictive database legislation. The legislation and regula-
tion in Portugal have created a tendency to oppose the EU imperative to 
expand transnational DNA data exchange. This is the case because the 
transnational exchange of genetic data requires the authorization of a 
judge (Article °21 of Law 90/2017) and because Portugal has severely 
restricted access to border-crossings of specific data categories. That is, 
despite the different types of genetic profiles held in the national database, 
Portugal only exchanges data pertaining to convicted individuals and 
crime scene samples (Brito et al., 2019; Council of the European Union, 
2020). In fact, Portugal and Greece exchange the least number of data 
categories among all operational Member States (Council of the European 
Union, 2020). Brito and colleagues (Brito et al., 2019)—members of the 
National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, which deals 
with the daily management of Portugal’s DNA database and acts as the 
first step of the Prüm system—have conducted a study on the impact of 
the Prüm system on the Portuguese forensic DNA database. According to 
their analysis of the number of hits obtained with other countries specified 
by sample type, there has been a decrease in the number of forensic 
unknown genetic profiles exchanged with other countries through the 
Prüm system. According to the authors, this reflects the reduced number 
of profiles for this category in the national database (Brito et al., 2019). 
Finally, through the reporting activities of the Supervisory Board for the 
DNA Database, Portugal enforces organizational imperatives of transpar-
ency that run counter the opacity of the Prüm system as a whole (Toom, 
Granja, & Ludwig, 2019). The Portuguese mode of biobordering, there-
fore, results in latent rebordering dynamics. It is, however, important to 
note that such rebordering dynamics are more a consequence of the par-
ticularities of the Portuguese historical–political regime than of intentional 
opposition to the EU’s vision of borderless data circulation.
The particularity of the historical and political context of Portugal is 
even more prominent when we consider Portuguese circumscribed debor-
dering efforts, which co-exist with the country’s latent rebordering dynam-
ics. Such circumscribed debordering efforts are expressed, firstly, in the 
decision to use CODIS, the de facto standard software used by most of the 
Member States to facilitate data exchange. Secondly, circumscribed 
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debordering efforts are also expressed through the relatively quick progress 
made in connecting with the Member States: as mentioned, Portugal has 
established connections with 19 Member States in a relatively short period 
of time (Council of the European Union, 2020).
In terms of hidden (dis)integration, it can be argued that Portugal has 
followed a debordering approach in terms of techno-scientific and opera-
tional infrastructures. Simultaneously, the Portuguese case is also an illus-
trative example of how the particularities of judicial and legal traditions, as 
well as regulations foreseeing ethical oversight of DNA data exchange, 
partially counter and balance the debordering dynamics of the EU level 
(Amelung & Machado, 2019).
From the Portuguese biobordering approach, we therefore learn about 
latent rebordering dynamics. Portugal has enforced restrictive modes of 
biobordering by, for example, severely restricting the type of data 
exchanged and by enforcing control principles of oversight and transpar-
ency deriving from judicial and legal cultures. However, as such dynamics 
co-exist with circumscribed debordering efforts expressed by the speed of 
developing connections and the number of connections established with 
other countries, we refer to latent rebordering.
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CHAPTER 8
The United Kingdom (UK)
Abstract The UK is the possessor of the world’s oldest and largest DNA 
database by proportion of population: the National Criminal Intelligence 
DNA Database, established in 1995. As a nation-state that holds one of 
the world’s largest DNA databases, the UK has been dealing systematically 
with the societal effects triggered by various ethical controversies. In terms 
of bordering practices, the UK serves as an example of an ambivalent mode 
of re- and debordering. This ambivalence derives from the UK’s changing 
position regarding the Prüm system. In 2014, the UK government, driven 
by the parliament, decided to opt out of the Prüm Decisions. In 2015, 
after a Prüm-style pilot project run with other EU Member States, the UK 
decided to opt in. This decision, nonetheless, included the imposition of 
limits on other EU countries’ access to the UK’s data. Consequently, the 
UK’s debordering practices co-exist with rebordering attempts aimed at 
restricting access to their own data.




Established in 1995, the UK’s National Criminal Intelligence DNA 
Database (NDNAD) is believed to be the oldest national forensic DNA 
database (Downey, Stephens, & Flaherty, 2012; Johnson & Williams, 
2007).1 According to the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes 
(ENFSI), in June 2016, the NDNAD contained 4,733,755 profiles of 
individuals in the DNA database.2 This represented 8.8 per cent of the 
resident population. More recent data shows that, on 31 March 2020, the 
number of subject profiles held had increased to more than 6 million3 and 
that the database held more than 600,000 crime scene profiles.4 Holding 
the equivalent of about 10 per cent of the UK’s resident population5 (of 
67,879,4886), the NDNAD is the world’s largest database by proportion 
of population (Amankwaa, 2018).
The UK’s assimilation into the Prüm system for the transnational 
exchange of DNA data for police and judicial cooperation in the European 
Union (EU) has not been straightforward. In December 2014, the UK 
decided to withdraw from the Prüm system. However, after running tests 
with the Netherlands, Spain, France and Germany, it decided to rejoin 
Prüm in 2015. However, there were successive delays, in which the uncer-
tainties emerging around Brexit played a role, and the UK only became 
1 In the UK, the National Criminal Intelligence DNA Database (NDNAD) is used solely 
for criminal investigation purposes. Other forensic purposes, such as the identification of 
missing persons and unidentified body investigations, are managed by the UK Missing 
Persons Bureau, which has operated and maintained a Missing Persons DNA Database since 
May 2010 (Granja & Machado, 2019).
2 As the ENFSI report is to our knowledge the latest statistic which provides comparable 
information across countries, we refer to it to situate the UK in comparison to the other 
country cases in this study. Data available at http://enfsi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/
ENFSI-Survey-on-DNA-Databases-in-Europe-June-2016.pdf (last access on 23 June 2020).
3 It is currently estimated that 14.1 per cent of the subject profiles held on the entire 
NDNAD are duplicates. Duplicate profiles arise when samples are taken from the same indi-
vidual on more than one occasion. This may happen as a result of a person giving different 
names, or different versions of their name, during separate arrests. There may also be situa-
tions where a police force chooses to resample an individual (Home Office, 2019).
4 National DNA Database statistics, Q4 2019 to 2020. Available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/statistics/national-dna-database-statistics (last access on 23 June 2020).
5 We use the term ‘the equivalent’ because the NDNAD holds a significant number of 
duplicates (see footnote 3).
6 Data available at https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/uk-population/ 
(last access on 23 June 2020).
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operational in 2019 (Council of the European Union, 2019). According 
to the latest DAPIX data, the UK is operational with seven countries 
(Council of the European Union, 2020). Developments on the path to 
Brexit made the UK’s integration into the Prüm system additionally com-
plex as the country current participation in the Prüm system ends on 31 
December 2020. The UK is currently involved in the negotiation of an 
agreement that would allow the continuity of law enforcement and judi-
cial cooperation in criminal matters. The UK is, therefore, addressed as an 
ambiguous mode of debordering.
The UK’s cultural and political specificities also make the country’s 
biobordering dynamics particularly interesting. The UK joined the 
European Community in 1973. During the negotiations for the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992, the UK secured an opt-out from adopting the Euro as its 
official currency. In addition, in 1999, the UK also decided not to join the 
Schengen system. This special status was secured by a legally binding pro-
tocol, negotiated as part of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Scepticism towards 
EU policies has, therefore, long been a central part of the UK’s relations 
with the EU. This scepticism was made even more evident in the context 
of the Brexit referendum, in which a small majority voted to leave the 
EU. Historically, the UK–EU relationship has been particularly ambigu-
ous, and this plays out in the UK’s bioborders regime. Enhancing the 
UK’s ability to identify foreign criminals, while still enforcing limitations 
to data exchange aimed at protecting the UK’s citizens, emerges as one of 
the major motifs and notions of nationhood mobilized in the compliance 
with the Prüm system.
natIonal dna database development
DNA fingerprinting was discovered in the UK in 1985 by Professor Sir 
Alec Jeffreys at the University of Leicester, and the UK was the first coun-
try to create a national forensic DNA database (in 1995)—the 
NDNAD. This database contains DNA data from all the police forces in 
England and Wales, as well as data from the Northern Ireland DNA 
Database (NIDNAD) and the Scottish DNA Database (SDNAD), and 
DNA profiles from the Crown Dependencies7 (Amankwaa & McCartney, 
2018; Skinner & Wienroth, 2019). Regarding its legislative framework, 
the UK operates an adversarial legal system—which makes it different 
7 Namely, Isle of Man, the Bailiwick of Jersey and the Bailiwick of Guernsey.
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from the continental cases considered in this book, which have in com-
mon to different degrees an inquisitorial tradition. In the UK’s system, the 
court acts as a referee between the prosecution and the defence. In the 
UK, the first statute governing the NDNAD was the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994, which enabled the databasing of DNA profiles. 
The Act permitted DNA records of all individuals convicted of a record-
able offence to be retained indefinitely. Although samples from suspects 
were collected, the Act required that those who had never been convicted 
of a criminal offence should be considered ‘innocent’ and thus that their 
DNA records should be deleted after the conclusion of an investigation or 
any proceedings (Amankwaa & McCartney, 2018).
However, subsequent legislation supported the expansion of the 
NDNAD: the Criminal Justice and Police Act of 2001 allowed all samples 
collected to be retained indefinitely, irrespective of whether the person had 
been acquitted. This further expanded the collection of DNA samples and 
profiles by including in the database one-time suspects who may never 
have been charged with a recordable offence (Williams & Johnson, 2008). 
Another amendment also allowed samples from volunteers taking part in 
mass screenings to be retained indefinitely. The Criminal Justice Act of 
2003 further extended police powers by allowing DNA samples to be 
taken without consent from anyone arrested on suspicion of a recordable 
offence and to be kept indefinitely (Amelung & Machado, 2019).
Despite these moves towards expansion, there was scant public debate 
on how the NDNAD posed challenges to the protection of human rights 
(Downey et  al., 2012). The NDNAD only began to be perceived and 
discussed by mass media and politicians as a potential danger to the civil 
liberties of British citizens in the aftermath of the ‘S. and Marper’ case. 
‘S.’8 was 12 years old when he was arrested for attempted robbery in 
January 2001 and was cleared 5 months later. Michael Marper was arrested 
in March 2001 and charged with harassing his partner; the case was dis-
continued. Both S. and Marper’s DNA were taken and added to the 
NDNAD; after their release, they applied for the removal of their profiles. 
Their applications were rejected by the British Appeal Courts on the 
grounds that the inclusion and removal criteria of the NDNAD at the time 
allowed the profiles of persons who had been arrested but not convicted 
of a crime to be retained. S. and Marper then resorted to the European 
Court of Human Rights, which held that retaining the DNA samples of 
8 Due to privacy protection issues, he was named in court only as S.
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individuals who were arrested but later acquitted or who had the charges 
against them dropped was a violation of the right to privacy under the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Consequently, the European 
Court forced the NDNAD to destroy the samples of non-convicted peo-
ple (Amankwaa & McCartney, 2018; Amelung & Machado, 2019). The 
S. and Marper case, thereby, provided a landmark that oriented the possi-
bilities and limitations of using forensic DNA.
The repercussions of the European Court’s decision led to the amend-
ment of the laws governing the collection, use and retention of forensic 
DNA in the UK through the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA), 
implemented in October 2013. In summary, the PoFA defined that DNA 
samples must be destroyed after profiling or within six months of their 
collection; DNA profiles of convicted individuals could be held indefi-
nitely; and profiles from innocent individuals must be deleted after the 
conclusion of an investigation or any proceedings. Exceptions to these 
rules included temporal profile retention periods for some first-time con-
victed minors, those charged or arrested for a qualifying (serious) offence, 
those issued with a penalty notice for disorder or on national security 
grounds (Amankwaa & McCartney, 2018, p. 119). Since the implementa-
tion of the PoFA, over 1.7 million forensic DNA profiles from innocent 
individuals have been deleted, and over 7.7 million DNA samples have 
been destroyed (Amankwaa & McCartney, 2018, p. 119). Such deletion 
has, however, received relatively little public attention (Skinner & 
Wienroth, 2019). As noted by David Skinner and Matthias Wienroth:
The story of the NDNAD is intriguing in part because of what it reveals 
about the difficulties of enacting the results of legal, political and ethical 
deliberations about the scope and format of this type of collection, but also 
how such deliberative infrastructures and discourses can emerge in order to 
prevent, ameliorate or reframe processes of ending [of genetic collections]. 
(Skinner & Wienroth, 2019, p. 101)
Since October 2012, the Home Office has been in charge of the man-
agement of the technical database infrastructure of the NDNAD, which 
means that it is under police custody. In terms of software, the NDNAD 
uses a self-developed programme (ENFSI, 2017). According to the 
NDNAD Strategy Board’s annual report, 36 vetted Home Office staff 
have access to it (Home Office, 2019). Police forces own the profile 
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records in the database and receive notification of any matches, but they 
do not have access to it (Home Office, 2019).
A particularity of the UK case that had a direct impact on the technical 
database infrastructure was the closure in 2012 of the Forensic Science 
Service (FSS), the public provider of scientific support to police investiga-
tions in the UK. The main reason for the Service’s closure was linked to its 
considerable financial losses (Lawless, 2011). The closure meant that 
DNA profiling services were transferred to private providers, although 
some forensic scientific work remains the preserve of the police forces 
themselves, through in-house facilities (Lawless, 2011).
In terms of organizational imperatives and principles, as a nation-state 
that holds one of the world’s largest DNA databases, the UK has been 
dealing systematically with the societal effects triggered by various ethical 
controversies. Those issues relate to the size of the database, in terms of its 
proportion of the entire population (Amankwaa, 2018), as well as its 
scope. As previously explained, until the S. and Marper case, the NDNAD 
included profiles of individuals who had been acquitted of a crime. The 
expansion of the number of profiles and the subsequent decisions about 
the database engendered significant public debate (Skinner & Wienroth, 
2019). Other controversies that have been heavily discussed within the 
framework of the NDNAD relate to the racialization of the database, for 
instance, to the overrepresentation of black people in the database popula-
tion and to the classification of DNA profiles according to ‘ethnic appear-
ance’ (Human Genetics Commission, 2009; Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, 2007; Skinner, 2013, 2018). Civil society organizations, such as 
GeneWatch, Liberty and Black Mental Health, have also articulated con-
cerns about an overemphasis on genetic explanations that relate to crimi-
nality, the retention of children’s DNA and the overrepresentation of 
specific minorities (Amelung & Machado, 2019; Skinner, 2012).
Such ethical controversies, coupled with public protests and criticism, 
have stimulated the development of stricter regulation, designed to pro-
tect citizens’ rights; by extension, they have also motivated particular gov-
ernance forms aimed at responding to certain needs for stronger public 
accountability and transparency (Amelung & Machado, 2019; Granja & 
Machado, 2019). Nowadays, the use of forensic DNA technologies is 
overseen by a partnership of boards and appointed experts.
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The NDNAD Strategy Board9 provides governance and oversight over 
the retention and destruction of DNA profiles and rules for the database; 
it also produces reports and statistics concerning the operation of 
the NDNAD.
The UK NDNAD Ethics Group was created in 2007 and operated as a 
non-statutory body, providing independent advice on ethical issues around 
the operation of the database to Home Office ministers and the NDNAD 
Strategy Board. The NDNAD Ethics Group’s role changed in 2016 with 
the introduction of the new National Forensic Science Strategy, which 
defined a wider role for the Group as part of the enhanced governance 
structure for the forensics system (Amelung & Machado, 2019). The 
Ethics Group was replaced by the Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group 
in 2017. The goal of the group includes consideration of the ethical impact 
on society, groups and individuals of the collection, retention and use of 
human samples and biometric identifiers for purposes that fall within the 
purview of the Home Office. More particularly, the Biometrics and 
Forensics Ethics Group considers the application, operation, research and 
services related to technologies that produce biometric and forensic data 
and identifiers.
The Forensic Science Regulator, a role created in 2008, ensures that 
the provision of forensic science services across the criminal justice system 
is subject to appropriate scientific quality standards. The Biometrics 
Commissioner’s role is to keep under review the retention and use by the 
police of DNA samples, DNA profiles and fingerprints. Although this role 
was mentioned in the Protection of Freedoms Act (2012), it was formally 
established only in 2013. As ‘independent’ expert authorities, the Forensic 
Science Regulator and the Biometrics Commissioner contribute to advis-
ing the Home Office.
In terms of public understandings of DNA databases and forensic 
genetics in the UK, there is a substantial body of literature, especially 
when compared with other countries under study. Williams and Johnson 
(2004) distinguish between three types of representations of DNA 
detected across the UK’s societal stakeholders’ views: (i) ‘genetic 
9 The Strategy Board comprises representatives of the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the 
Home Office, the DNA Ethics Group, the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, 
the Forensic Science Regulator (or her representative), the Information Commissioner’s 
Office, the Biometrics Commissioner (or his representative), representatives from the police 
and devolved administrations of Scotland and Northern Ireland and such other members as 
may be invited (Granja & Machado, 2019).
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exceptionalism’, stressing the unique character of genetic material; (ii) 
‘genomic minimalism’ emphasizing the mundane character of non-coding 
sequences of DNA; (iii) ‘biometric pragmatism’ that distinguishes between 
the legitimate and illegitimate sources and uses of DNA for forensic pur-
poses. Other scholars have focused on the perspectives of lay citizens 
(Anderson, Stackhouse, Shaw, & Iredale, 2011; Stackhouse, Anderson, 
Shaw, & Iredale, 2010; Wilson-Kovacs, Wyatt, & Hauskeller, 2012). In a 
review of studies on public perceptions of forensic DNA retention in the 
UK and around the world, Amankwaa (2018) shows that there is consid-
erable public support for the retention of DNA for criminal investigation 
purposes since the public believe that DNA databases have strong crime- 
solving abilities. Reported concerns are mainly related to the potential 
misuse of DNA and the retention of DNA from innocent individuals 
(Amankwaa, 2018).
The UK has been a pioneer in the development of DNA technology. For 
example, in 2002, the UK was the first country to implement familial 
searching for criminal investigation purposes using the NDNAD (Haimes, 
2006; Prainsack, 2010). The particular circumstances in which familial 
searches are performed are described as ‘operationally sensitive’ and are, 
therefore, not available publicly (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007, 
p. 78). Based on interviews conducted with key stakeholders in the UK, 
Rafaela Granja and Helena Machado argue that the use of familial search-
ing is regulated through exceptionality. This entails giving consideration 
to the seriousness of a criminal case, other avenues of investigation and 
what is contemplated as ethically acceptable (Granja & Machado, 2019).
The now-closed UK’s Forensic Science Service was also pioneering in 
the area of forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP), as it developed the first 
FDP test, for detecting red hair. Similarly to other countries, the UK does 
not have explicit legislation governing FDP; instead, the use of FDP is 
overseen on a case-by-case basis by various regulatory oversight bodies 
(Samuel & Prainsack, 2018).
borderIng practIces and orderIng transnatIonal 
dna data exchange
The UK’s ambiguous bordering practices concerning crime control can be 
traced back to the decision on the Treaty of Lisbon. When the Treaty of 
Lisbon—which aimed to provide a stronger basis for the development of 
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a criminal justice area while stipulating new powers for the European 
Parliament10—was being negotiated, the UK mobilized Article 10 of 
Protocol 36. This allowed the UK five years in which to decide whether or 
not it would continue to be bound by the police and criminal justice coop-
eration prescribed within the Treaty. This implied that the UK had until 
May 2014 to decide whether to exercise its ‘opt-out’ option in matters 
concerning justice and home affairs (McCartney, 2013, p. 546). In July 
2013, the government decided to opt out of police and criminal justice 
measures, which included the Prüm Decisions; its decision took effect on 
1 December 2014. The UK government, however, displayed an ambigu-
ous position towards bordering practices: that same day it also decided to 
rejoin 35 measures considered to be in the nation’s interests (Home 
Office, 2015).
The decision to remain out of Prüm was formally justified by the gov-
ernment’s belief that the implementation of Prüm’s technical require-
ments would be a lengthy and expensive process. The time it would take 
to establish Prüm raised concerns over the possibility that the EU 
Commission would initiate infringement proceedings, which involved 
substantial fines against Member States that did not implement measures 
or did so incorrectly. Also, the government estimated that it would cost 
£31 million to establish the Prüm system in the UK (McCartney, 2013). 
As stated by the Home Secretary in Parliament on 10 July 2014:
One measure that we have successfully resisted joining is Prüm (…). I have 
been clear in the House previously that we have neither the time nor the 
money to implement Prüm by 1 December. I have said that it will be sense-
less for us to rejoin it now and risk being infracted. (Home Office, 2015) 
[italics added]
The government also argued that Prüm’s ‘technical requirements’ were 
out of date (HM Government, 2014) and that the size of the UK data-
base—as one of the largest DNA databases in the EU—might lead to a 
disproportionate number of requests from other EU states (HM 
Government, 2014). It is, nevertheless, clear that the decision to opt out 
reflects a broader framework of scepticism towards the EU and intentional 
rebordering attempts aimed at countering the EU’s doctrine of borderless 
10 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/155/judicial-cooperation-
in-criminal-matters (last visited 8 November 2019).
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data flow. As stated by Carole McCartney, ‘The decision to use the opt- 
out has been cast as “taking back” powers from the EU. Areas such as the 
criminal law, policing and sentencing are seen as “last bastions of national 
state power”’ (McCartney, 2013, p. 549).
Despite the government’s initial decision, the UK’s ambiguous border-
ing practices have evolved in different phases aimed at finding a balance 
between the narratives of the benefits of data exchange for national secu-
rity and the need to maintain control of costs and ownership of data. 
Following the advice from law enforcement agencies that Prüm would 
offer the UK significant potential benefits for the investigation and pre-
vention of crime, the government agreed to conduct a small Prüm-style 
pilot test on the exchange of DNA profiles, after which the parliament 
would make a final decision on whether or not to rejoin the Prüm system.
The Prüm-style pilot project began on 30 September 2015 and aimed 
to explore how the exchange of the UK’s genetic data across borders 
could be effected, what the technical challenges of implementation would 
be and what safeguards should be in place. The Netherlands, Spain, France 
and Germany participated in the UK’s pilot test. Close to 2500 DNA 
profiles from forces across the UK were sent, and there were a total of 118 
hits (Home Office, 2015). A report entitled Prüm Business and 
Implementation Case (Home Office, 2015) was drafted afterwards to anal-
yse in depth the three options open to the UK: to maintain the status quo 
and remain out of Prüm, to rejoin the Prüm Decisions, or to develop an 
alternative mechanism for police cooperation and data exchange. The 
report was then debated in the House of Commons and in the House of 
Lords in December 2015. The debates were heavily influenced by the 
recent terrorist attacks in Paris (November 2015) and, consequently, by 
the perceived need to step up transnational police cooperation for identi-
fying and convicting foreign criminals.
The Prüm Business and Implementation Case (Home Office, 2015) 
stated that the benefits of the UK fully implementing the Prüm Decisions 
would be (i) simplified processes for requesting information and/or data; 
(ii) efficiency gains in international searches; (iii) an increase in resolution 
of unsolved crimes; (iv) an improved response rate to requests for infor-
mation associated with crime and terrorism; (v) ability to exploit the UK’s 
investment in other data systems; (vi) improved detection of volume 
crimes and serious crimes; (vii) an enhanced crime and terrorism intelli-
gence picture; (vii) access to EURODAC for criminal investigation 
searches (EURODAC is inaccessible unless Prüm searches have already 
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taken place). Theresa May, then Secretary of State for the Home Office, 
also outlined the benefits brought by the UK’s inclusion in Prüm when 
she kicked off the debate in the House of Commons on 8 December 2015:
I beg to move, that this House, wishing to see serious crimes solved, to 
counter terrorism and to see foreign criminals prosecuted and deported, 
supports opting in to the Prüm Decisions; notes the views of senior law 
enforcement officers that the Prüm Decisions are an important aid to tack-
ling crime; notes the success of a pilot that demonstrated that the Prüm 
Decisions mechanism is both swift and effective.11
The risks and associated recommendations for integration with Prüm 
were also outlined. The protection of the civil liberties of UK citizens, 
doubts about other countries’ practices in processing DNA data and con-
cerns about the extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) took front stage both in the report and the 
debates in the Houses of Commons and Lords. As stated by Sir William 
Cash, Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, House of Commons, 
during the debate:
The Government say that they will apply higher technical standards than 
required by Prüm (…) for the UK’s DNA and fingerprint databases, but we 
should recall that DNA profiles and fingerprints of British citizens may be held 
on foreign databases, which may be subject to less rigorous standards than those 
proposed by the Government. All in all, this is not a motion that should be 
passed, for the reasons that I have given: it interferes with parliamentary 
sovereignty, it extends the range of the European Court (…) For many of 
us, this is a step too far.12 [Italics added]
It is important to note that scepticism and doubts about other coun-
tries’ practices and standards in processing DNA data are not unique to 
the UK.  Machado and Granja, analysing the views of Prüm National 
Contact Points working in Prüm Step 1, outlined that forensic practitio-
ners remain doubtful that ethically sound science is conducted in other 
11 House of Commons Hansard Debates for 8 December 2015. Available at https://pub-
lications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm151208/debtext/151208-0003.
htm (last visited 6 December 2019).
12 House of Commons Hansard Debates for 8 December 2015. Available at https://pub-
lications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm151208/debtext/151208-0003.
htm (last visited 6 December 2019).
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countries (Machado & Granja, 2018). In order to diminish the risk of 
innocent UK citizens being targeted, the Prüm Business and Implementation 
Case suggested that, if the UK’s parliament were to opt in to Prüm, only 
the DNA data and fingerprints of convicted individuals should be made 
available for transnational exchange. This caveat reiterated a strong notion 
of protection of the UK’s nationhood and citizens:
For example, the Government would legislate to ensure that other Member 
States could only search against UK held DNA profiles and fingerprints of 
those actually convicted of a crime. This would help to avoid innocent 
British citizens becoming caught up in overseas investigations. (Home 
Office, 2015)
Other risks mentioned both in the report and during the parliamen-
tary debates related to the possibility of DNA adventitious matches. Given 
that DNA profile matches of six and seven loci have a high probability 
of being false positives, the report stated that only crime scene profiles 
with more than eight loci should be shared with the other Member 
States on the UK Prüm exchange. In addition, it also suggested that the 
UK should exchange DNA profiles with the other Member States, but 
that demographic data should only be exchanged following a match of 
ten or more loci.
Forensic practitioners working within Prüm operational countries also 
view the occurrence of a large number of false positives in transnational 
data exchange as ethically problematic (Machado & Granja, 2018). Thus, 
despite being framed by high levels of scepticism towards EU policies, the 
UK’s assessment of the risks involved in transnational DNA data exchange 
within Prüm accords with what practitioners already working with Prüm 
also perceive as risks (Machado & Granja, 2019).
Finally, the report mentioned two further risks regarding (i) the volume 
of work brought by Prüm, especially taking into account that the UK has 
one of the largest forensic DNA databases, and (ii) the cost of implemen-
tation, which the report revised down to £13.5 million from the previ-
ously indicated £31 million (Home Office, 2015).
Following the publication of the Prüm Business and Implementation 
Case (Home Office, 2015), in December 2015, the UK decided to opt 
back in to the Prüm system. However, it did so on condition that the 
dynamics of data border-crossings would be restricted to ‘only a subset of 
the relevant national DNA and fingerprint databases, containing data 
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relating to individuals convicted of recordable offences, will be made avail-
able for searching by other participating States, and that the higher UK 
scientific standards will be applied to matches in the UK’.13 Enhancing the 
UK’s ability to identify foreign criminals while still enforcing limitations to 
data exchange aimed at protecting UK citizens thus emerges as one of the 
major motifs and notions of nationhood mobilized in complying with the 
Prüm system.
The UK adopted a protectionist view of data ownership by reducing 
the type of data made available for transnational DNA exchange. However, 
this position, although more clearly evidenced in the UK case, is not lim-
ited to the UK case. In Portugal—and most likely in other countries—a 
protectionist view of data ownership resulted from the country’s own 
restricted legislative framework (see Chap. 7). Protectionist views of data 
ownership are also evidenced by the variable number of data categories 
made available by each Prüm operational country (see Chap. 3).
On 6 June 2019, the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted a 
Council Implementing Decision officially launching the automated 
exchange of DNA profiles between other Prüm participants and the 
UK. Since the NDNAD uses self-developed software (ENFSI, 2017), in 
order to make transnational exchange viable, CODIS had to be installed 
(Council of the European Union, 2018). As well as authorizing DNA 
exchanges to commence from 14 June 2019, the Decision also stated the 
Council’s request that the UK review its policy of excluding suspects’ pro-
files from automated DNA data exchange within 12 months. Furthermore, 
it outlined that ‘if the operational experience acquired with Prüm DNA 
data exchange within the first 12 months has not led the UK to notify the 
Council that it has reviewed its policy, the Council should re-evaluate the 
situation with a view to the continuation or termination of DNA Prüm 
automated exchange with the UK’ (Council of the European Union, 2019).
Responding to the imposed deadline to review the policy of limiting 
data exchange via Prüm to profiles from convicted offenders, crime stains 
and unidentified human remains, on 15 June 2020, James Brokenshire, 
the Minister of State for Security, announced that it is the government’s 
intention to begin exchanging suspects’ data via Prüm.14 Such decision has 
13 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmeuleg/301-
lxx/30106.htm (last visited 8 November 2019).
14 Prüm—Data Sharing Update: Written statement—HCWS290 https://www.parlia-
ment.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/
Commons/2020-06-15/HCWS290/ (last visited on 19 June 2020).
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been, according to the UK governmental view expressed in the written 
public statement, based upon a balance between benefits and risks associ-
ated with exchanging suspects’ data, maintaining a concrete focus on the 
protection of UK citizens:
In considering whether to include suspects’ data, the Government has care-
fully balanced the potential public protection benefits against concerns that 
a UK citizen could be caught up inappropriately in criminal investigations in 
EU Member States and has considered the effectiveness of the safeguards put 
in place to prevent such instances occurring. In light of the benefits reaped 
from exchanging DNA since July 2019 and the way in which the safeguards 
have been applied, the Government has concluded that the important pub-
lic safety benefits in exchanging suspects’ data outweigh the risks associating 
with sharing it. [Italics added]15
Such decision to exchange suspects’ data within Prüm may be inter-
preted as a concession to the EU requirement to adopt logics of reciprocal 
data exchange. As EU officials have previously reported a perceived ‘lack 
of reciprocity’ in how the UK cooperated within Prüm (Brunsden & Peel, 
2020), the decision to review the policy of limiting data exchange via 
Prüm seems to be a strategic move to keep doors open for post-Brexit 
participation in Prüm-like agreements, as the UK’s current participation 
in the Prüm system ends on 31 December 2020, when the Brexit transi-
tion period expires. The UK has already stated interest in ensuring the 
continuity of law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal mat-
ters. In particular, the report entitled ‘The Future Relationship with the 
EU: The UK’s Approach to Negotiations’ (HM Government, 2020) 
states that the UK is interested in discussing an agreement. In terms of the 
exchange of DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration data, the report 
states that
The agreement should provide similar capabilities to those currently deliv-
ered through the Prüm system, drawing on the precedent for such coopera-
tion between the EU, Norway and Iceland as well as between the EU and 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein. These precedents include a political dispute 
15 Prüm—Data Sharing Update: Written statement—HCWS290 https://www.parlia-
ment.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/
Commons/2020-06-15/HCWS290/ (last visited on 19 June 2020).
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resolution mechanism with no jurisdiction in those third countries for the 
CJEU. (HM Government, 2020, p. 26)
The UK case thereby serves as an example to learn about an ambiguous 
mode of debordering. Its ambiguous nature is the result of the govern-
ment’s changing position regarding the maintenance or suspension of 
borders for data crossing. In 2014, there was a decision to opt out of the 
Prüm Decisions. In 2015, after a Prüm-style pilot project run with other 
EU Member States, the UK decided to opt in. The UK therefore enacted 
circumscribed debordering practices by agreeing to participate in data 
exchange across the EU and thereby expanding the data flows bounded to 
the own nation-state’s bioborders. However, the decision to deborder was 
made on the condition that limits be imposed on other EU countries’ 
access to the UK’s data, therefore reflecting rebordering attempts anchored 
upon restrictive bioborders. However, in light of the negotiating scenario 
caused by Brexit, limits to data exchange have been recently reduced. The 
UK’s debordering practices—fuelled by claims to access ‘foreign’ data—
thereby co-exist with rebordering attempts aimed at ensuring adequate 
protection of ‘own’ data and national citizens. Additionally, the UK case 
reveals the politics of (non)belonging entangled with biobordering 
dynamics. It does so in the sense of negotiating who is exposed and who 
needs to be protected from exposure to international police 
collaboration.
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Abstract The concluding chapter reviews and compares the modes of 
biobordering at the EU level and in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal and the UK with a particular focus on the transnational exchange 
of DNA data within the Prüm system. This analysis reveals the multiplicity 
of heterogeneous biobordering regimes that enact different visions of 
Europe and nationhood and that have implications for de facto hidden 
integration and disintegration processes in the EU. ‘European integra-
tion’ is believed to be achievable by the harmonization of scientific and 
technical procedures in different countries. However, the mandatory ele-
ments of the Prüm Decisions were politically enforced without taking into 
consideration the significant differences between EU countries. Thus, hid-
den disintegration comes as a contingency regarding operational and 
organizational traditions, legislation, the nature of the criminal justice sys-
tem, and national variations around the human and economic resources to 
invest in forensic DNA databases and DNA profiling technologies. The 
conclusion ends with a proposal of a typology systematizing biobordering 
dynamics derived from the empirical case studies.




Over time, there has been an increasing expansion, in reach and scope, of 
biometric technologies and database systems used in the context of crime 
and migration control. Our brief summary of this range of biometric tech-
nologies and systems (in Chap. 2) showed how the melange of biometrics, 
datafication and technologies has reconfigured how we think about the 
mobility of people, surveillance, human rights and ethics. Furthermore, 
we demonstrated what modes of regulation are being enforced by that 
process and how notions of bioborders are being reconfigured.
We delved deep into the concept of biobordering (Chap. 3) in order to 
capture reverse patterns of bordering and ordering practices linked to 
transnational biometric data exchange regimes. The concept is useful in 
reconstructing how the territorial foundations of national state autonomy 
are partially reclaimed and, at the same time, partially purposefully sus-
pended. In this sense, we mobilized the concept of biobordering to foster 
an understanding of the dynamics and impacts of the large-scale database 
infrastructures that archive and exchange biometric data across national 
borders.
Based on this framework, we provided a sustained analysis of the het-
erogeneous processes involved in ordering transnational biometric data 
exchange and the control of criminalized populations across EU Member 
States’ borders, with a particular focus on the transnational exchange of 
DNA data within the Prüm system. We did so by, on the one hand, por-
traying the modes of biobordering at the EU level (Chap. 3) and, on the 
other, describing, analysing and comparing in detail the experiences and 
traditions of five EU countries that are part of the Prüm system: Germany, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the UK (Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8). 
More particularly, we explored how each country approaches the use of 
forensic DNA databases, the exchange of DNA data regulated under the 
Prüm system and recent applications of forensic genetic innovations. We 
have argued that, taken together, these co-dependent components reveal 
the multiplicity of heterogeneous biobordering regimes and enact differ-
ent implicit visions of Europe and nationhood, with implications for de 
facto hidden integration and disintegration processes in the EU.
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comparatIve InsIghts
At a time when the European Union as a political institution as well as 
ideas of Europe are being challenged, the theme of simultaneous hidden 
disintegration and integration configured by technological projects is par-
ticularly relevant. Considering in particular the pressing contemporary 
challenges in the area of transnational crime control, the modes of biobor-
dering that come along with hidden integration and disintegration found 
throughout our cases demonstrate a complex picture. In the following, we 
will summarize our major findings about the cases of Germany, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the UK.
As a starting point, we assessed the specific situations of the countries 
by looking at the constitutive components of bioborders: (i) national 
DNA database regulations, legislative frameworks and governance princi-
ples in terms of norms sanctioning the collection, use and retention of 
DNA data, including data protection regimes; (ii) DNA technology devel-
opment, including the scientific knowledge that DNA technologies build 
on; (iii) the technical database infrastructures necessary to digitally store 
and compare data and the definition and management of which data cat-
egories are and are not made accessible for data exchange; (iv) organiza-
tional imperatives and principles, such as reliability, transparency and 
public accountability.
Based on these country-specific insights, we then mobilized the three 
following dimensions to understand and compare the modes of biobor-
dering at stake: (i) what data travels across borders, and data of what types 
of crimes and what types of criminals are potentially detected by Prüm 
and, thus, who counts as a suspect, offender or differently eligible for data 
exchange; (ii) the national legacies of DNA databases and DNA technolo-
gies and how they produce particular notions of nationhood and are linked 
to nation-state-bound legitimacy claims; (iii) the promises/expectations/
concerns of Member States in deciding whether to commit, or not, to 
joining the transnational DNA data exchange system and how these co- 
produce notions of the integration/disintegration of Europe.
In terms of the first dimension—what data travels across borders and 
data of what types of crimes and what types of criminals are detected by 
Prüm—our analysis shows that multiple modes of biobordering occur and 
result in the creation of classifications of what counts as eligible categories 
for exchange via the Prüm system. Although data categories are techni-
cally standardized, the national DNA databases have very different 
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compositions—some are expansive and some more restrictive—and incor-
porated very differently affected social groups. While the UK holds about 
10 per cent of its resident population in its database, Poland and Portugal 
hold about 1 per cent. In addition, when comparing across countries 
which data crosses borders, it becomes obvious that not only does the 
number of data categories made available vary (ranging from convicted 
offenders to suspects to missing persons) but does what is referred to by 
each category. While Germany stores and exchanges DNA data on offend-
ers convicted for crimes such as full intoxication, defamation or burglary, 
Portugal exchanges data of offenders convicted to an effective prison sen-
tence of three or more years for committing an intentional crime, which 
corresponds to crimes such as homicide and robbery with violence. 
Retention schemes are also very different across countries. While the UK 
allows for indefinite retention of convicted offenders, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, and Poland have clearly defined retention periods (Reed & 
Syndercombe-Court, 2016). Germany has defined periods for reviewing 
DNA profiles in order to either correct or delete them. Thus, categories 
that are technically standardized for data exchange assemble very different 
sets of data in the national DNA databases. Different types of crimes, vari-
able timeframes and categories of involvement with the criminal justice 
system are thus integrated in the Prüm system, and the categories of data 
create ambiguity about what counts as ‘suspect’ or ‘criminal’, with conse-
quences for affected person groups across Member States.
In addition, the dynamics of expanding data crossings across borders 
are also motivated by different rationales driven by each country’s strate-
gic ambitions in international police collaboration. For example, Poland 
has quickly mobilized its resources and made data available as this made 
sense in the context of its own regulatory efforts of modernization and 
internationalization of police collaboration. The UK represents a very dif-
ferent situation: although it demonstrates interest in accessing data from 
other Member States, the UK has also engaged in regulating data cross-
ings with attempts to limit exchange of its own data.
Regarding the second dimension, our analysis shows that the national 
legacies of DNA databases and DNA technologies produce particular 
notions of nationhood in relation to debordering and rebordering dynam-
ics. Germany, the Netherlands and Poland can be classified as having 
implemented forms of debordering bioborders that facilitate cross-border 
DNA data exchange. Yet, the three of them have played different roles in 
diffusing this approach. Germany, in particular, performed the role of the 
political architect of the initial Prüm plan and attempted to expand it 
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beyond the starting group of Member States. In the aftermath of the 
Prüm Decisions, Germany continued to claim political and moral author-
ity over other Member States in calling for proof of their commitment to 
debordering. The Netherlands has led the techno-scientific process of sup-
porting the forensic technocracy across Member States through its contri-
bution to the establishment of the technological scientific infrastructure 
for data exchange, as well as its support for training, pilot tests and evalu-
ation visits for other Member States. However, the Netherlands has also 
had strong support from Germany and Austria in carrying out these tasks. 
The Netherlands has also engaged in explicit debordering dynamics by 
having Dutch forensic experts sharing expert and tacit knowledge on 
operating DNA data exchange and expending considerable effort in study-
ing and monitoring cross-border DNA matches between the Netherlands 
and other operational Member States which also serves as an implicit con-
trol mechanism (see, e.g. Taverne & Broeders, 2015, 2016). Poland has, 
in a relatively short period of time, established a substantial number of 
connections with other Member States. In addition, Poland has caught up 
with the front-runners among the Member States, and it took the Prüm 
process as a stimulus for the establishment, implementation and expansion 
of its own DNA database. Portugal and Poland have in common that the 
national techno-scientific developments and advancements regarding their 
own DNA databases were motivated and stimulated by the establishment 
of the Prüm system. In both countries, joining the transnational exchange 
of DNA data and engaging with debordering dynamics represent another 
step in their quest for modernization, achieved through compliance with 
the international and EU standards of crime control and forensic genetics. 
Yet, Portugal remains a complex case because of its latent mode of rebor-
dering (Amelung & Machado, 2019a).
Focusing on the latent modes of rebordering (in the case of Portugal) 
and ambiguous modes of rebordering (in the case of the UK), we come 
back to the legitimate rationales for hindering data exchange proposed by 
Hufnagel (2017) (referred to in Chap. 3). According to Hufnagel, specific 
arrangements—such as treaties or agreements with specific conditions 
attached to them—can stop data flows for specific purposes. We have seen 
that Portugal, due to its legal and judicial traditions, has maintained a 
regime of restrictive data inclusion criteria in its national DNA database 
and has defined very selective data categories for data exchange. More 
specifically, Portugal only exchanges data pertaining to convicted individ-
uals and crime scene samples. In this sense, although Portugal has also 
fully enforced the requirements of the EU regulations and established, in 
9 CONCLUSION 
142
a relatively short period, connections with a considerable number of oper-
ational Member States, it still engages with rebordering dynamics by 
severely restricting the data categories available within Prüm. In the case 
of the UK, specific arrangements were installed as conditions for its par-
ticipation in Prüm. Among them was the condition that it would only 
exchange categories of profiles from convicted offenders, crime stains and 
unidentified human remains and would not provide access to DNA pro-
files of suspects—one of the other very usual categories exchanged across 
Member States (Council of the European Union, 2019). This decision 
was modified in 2020, as the UK government announced its intention to 
begin exchanging suspects’ data via Prüm. Such a decision that may be 
interpreted as a concession to the EU requirement to adopt logics of 
reciprocal data exchange in light of post-Brexit negotiations. The UK’s 
restrictive arrangements came with the justification of Britain being 
responsible for its ‘data subjects’ in the database and for preventing their 
exposure to other foreign criminal justice systems. The UK, thereby, 
established a restrictive regime for exchanging the data stored in its rather 
expansive database, but the country’s ambiguous approach originated in 
its generally sceptical attitude towards the other EU Member States 
(McCartney, 2013).
With regard to notions of nationhood, we have explored the cultural 
meanings of forensic DNA technologies in different countries, which are 
often embedded in a particular sociohistorical context. They are often 
interpreted as reconfirming politics of (non)belonging. This can play out, 
on the one hand, in the countries’ internal relationships of belongings by 
affirming differences between typified suspect populations and typified 
non-suspect populations. This position has been explored through cases 
exploring modes of racism and discrimination towards minority groups in 
the Dutch and German context. On the other hand, the politics of (non)
belonging can also play out in the complex relationships between a coun-
try and the EU by emphasizing non-belonging to (particular visions of) 
Europe. This was explored through the case of the UK’s ambiguous mode 
of rebordering.
In terms of the third dimension broadening our understanding of 
modes of biobordering—that relating to the promises/expectations/con-
cerns of Member States deciding to commit to joining the Prüm system 
and how these co-produce notions of the hidden integration/disintegra-
tion of Europe—the country cases presented examples of the dynamics, 
tensions and ambivalences of biobordering processes. The modes of 
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biobordering at the EU level result in debordered bioborders, and such 
modes emphasize in particular their legal, scientific, technical and political 
components. The levelling mode of ordering of the actor network at the 
EU level enforces a particular version of bioborders that reflects the politi-
cal belief that the interoperability of DNA databases is a mere technical–
scientific issue.
‘European integration’ is believed to be achievable by the harmoniza-
tion of scientific and technical procedures between laboratories and police 
forces in different countries. However, as we have discussed, the manda-
tory elements of the Prüm Decisions were politically enforced without 
taking into consideration the significant differences between EU coun-
tries. Thus, hidden disintegration comes as a contingency regarding, for 
example, operational and organizational traditions, legislation, the nature 
of the criminal justice system, and national variations around the human 
and economic resources to invest in forensic DNA databases, DNA profil-
ing technologies and other kinds of police information databases. Member 
States’ modes of biobordering vary with regard to how national autonomy 
and sovereignty are claimed, negotiated and/or suspended not only 
through legal and political bordering processes but also through scientific 
and technical bordering practices that correspond with techno-political 
cultures and manifest specific regimes for biological data retention and 
exchange.
Finally, differences exist with regard to the democratic processes 
involved in establishing the Member States’ modes of ordering with 
respect to transnational DNA data exchange. While Portugal, the UK, the 
Netherlands and Germany all provide some form of official public data 
about the DNA data stored in their databases, as well as about its exchange, 
Poland apparently has no official statistics in place. Portugal provides offi-
cial data in the form of annual reports from its oversight body. Similarly, 
the Dutch custodian of the DNA database provides public data in its 
annual reports. Germany requires that requests for statistics on the DNA 
database be made through parliament (such requests are often initiated by 
opposition parties); the government then gives an official response about 
the data. In the UK, official statistics on the NDNAD are published sev-
eral times a year, and there is an annual report covering several aspects of 
the NDNAD. Regarding Prüm, at the date of writing, DNA data exchange 
has been operational for less than a year. So far, the information provided 
on the number of hits within Prüm was provided in the written statement 
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announcing the UK’s decision to exchange suspect data.1 Nevertheless, 
given the UK’s particular forms of governance, which respond to a com-
mitment to public accountability and transparency (Amelung & Machado, 
2019b; Granja & Machado, 2019), and the information made available in 
the ‘Prüm Business and Implementation Case’ (Home Office, 2015), it is 
highly probable that more data will be made available in the near future. 
Thus, we can distinguish between countries that proactively provide pub-
lic data (the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK), countries that only pro-
vide data on demand (Germany) and countries that do not provide public 
data (Poland) on data exchange activities to a better understanding of the 
complex, multi-layered and hidden processes of integration and disinte-
gration configured through the establishment of transnational technical 
infrastructures relying on forensic biological data, especially DNA data.
By reviewing our country case studies, we derived at a typology of 
biobordering dynamics which we summarize in order to provide a resource 
which may inspire future research (Table 9.1).
We distinguished debordering versus rebordering dynamics in order to 
explore expansive versus restrictive modes of biometric data exchange 
applied by countries, thereby making nation-state borders for biometric 
data flows more or less permeable. Furthermore, from the study of our 
country cases, we found different modes of debordering dynamics. 
Therefore, we specified that expansive biometric data exchange was either 
approached in a circumscribed or diffusive manner, for example, either 
focused on expanding nation-states’ own biometric data exchange or 
focused additionally on expanding and disseminating debordering dynam-
ics beyond own biometric data exchange. All country case studies, 
1 Prüm—Data Sharing Update: Written statement—HCWS290 https://www.parliament.
uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/
Commons/2020-06-15/HCWS290/ (last visited on 19 June 2020).
Table 9.1 Typology of biobordering dynamics
Debordering dynamics Rebordering dynamics
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Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the UK, we explored 
reveal that, by being operative in the Prüm system, they have incorporated 
as minimum conditions circumscribed debordering dynamics. Additionally, 
Germany and the Netherlands can be classified as cases of diffusive debor-
dering dynamics.
Regarding rebordering dynamics, we learnt from our country cases that 
rebordering dynamics co-exist with debordering dynamics, however, in 
different ways. The two cases we studied differed regarding their forms or 
co-existence of re- and debordering. Portugal was classified as an example 
of latent rebordering and the UK as an example of ambiguous reborder-
ing. For that reason we have specified a distinction of latent rebordering 
and ambiguous rebordering. While latent rebordering refers to some 
forms of restrictions to expansive biometric data exchange, we consider 
that description as suitable to cover permanent and stabilized latent forms 
of restrictions. Ambiguous rebordering instead emphasizes the uncertain 
and indistinct approach to establish or maintain reservations and excep-
tions from expansive biometric data exchange. Although motifs for rebor-
dering in those two cases are diverse, different notions of protection of 
data subjects are behind these dynamics. Thereby, rebordering can be also 
interpreted as contesting visions of Europe which assume the unlimited 
and unproblematic exposure of data subjects across European countries’ 
databases.
We hope that our typology may help future research to describe other 
countries’ situations in comparison to the findings of this study. Future 
research may also explore if the conceptual proposals offered in this study 
may inspire other transnational regimes of biometrics and databasing in 
law enforcement.
Future research challenges are the ongoing developments regarding 
the empirical phenomenon of transnational biometric database systems 
such as Prüm in the context of law enforcement. This refers to the interop-
erability initiative and the attempts of centralizing databases further and 
thereby overcoming rebordering ‘obstacles’ on the one hand. But it also 
refers to attempts to increase logics of Prüm beyond Europe on the other 
hand. This includes ambitions to make data accessible beyond European 
countries dedicated formally to inclusive and open democracies, applying 
legal principles of proportionality and safeguarding human rights. In that 
context, re- and debordering might need to be reassessed, and reborder-
ing once more might be even more important to maintain democratic and 
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Adversarial legal system Legal system in which the court acts as a referee 
between the prosecution and the defence. See, in contrast, inquisito-
rial system.
Crime stains Biological traces collected at a crime scene.
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) Chemical material that makes up each 
molecule found in chromosomes; it carries the genetic information of 
each organism. It typically contains different information in different 
individuals.
EDNAP European DNA Profiling Group, founded in 1988 to harmo-
nize the DNA technology for criminal investigations across Europe.
ENFSI European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI), 
founded in 1995 with the purpose of improving the quality of forensic 
science and the mutual exchange of information.
European Standard Set of loci (ESS) Adopted by the DNA working 
group of the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI). 
An ENFSI recommendation was formalized by the EU Council of 
Interior and Justice Ministers in 2009 that added five loci (to the exist-
ing seven loci) to the European Standard Set, making it currently a 12 
loci marker set.




Familial searching Process through which a DNA profile that does not 
match any other profile contained in a DNA database is subjected to a 
new analysis to determine whether there are partial matches. If partial 
matches exist, it is probable that the profile belongs to a biological rela-
tive of the person in the database.
Forensic DNA databases Used for the collection, storage and use of 
DNA profiles from nominated suspects, convicted offenders, victims, 
volunteers and other persons of interest to criminal investigation work.
Forensic DNA phenotyping Constellation of techniques that infers 
physical features, such as eye, skin and hair colour, as well as informa-
tion about biogeographic ancestry, from biological materials.
Hit Hits are the correspondences between DNA profiles discovered by a 
database search at a single instant in time. More particularly, a full hit 
implies that all the genetic markers of the compared loci are the same in 
the requested and requesting DNA profiles.
Inquisitorial legal system Legal system in which judges play a promi-
nent and active role in the examination process and in imposing rules of 
evidence and determining court procedures. See, in contrast, adversar-
ial system.
Locus/loci A locus (plural loci) is a specific, fixed position on a chromo-
some where a particular genetic marker is located. The number of 
matching loci depends on the number of loci present in the DNA pro-
files being compared. This implies that the lower the number of loci, 
the higher the match probability of the DNA profile and the higher the 
chance of an adventitious match. For this reason, DNA profiles included 
in the DNA database on a permanent basis should have a minimum 
number of loci.
Mass screenings Procedures that involve collecting DNA samples from 
‘volunteers’ who are members of a certain population to search for 
potential suspects among that population’s members by matching sam-
ples with those collected from a crime scene/victim.
Match See ‘hit’.
Near match Situation in which one locus does not match completely 
between two DNA profiles. Near matches are accepted in Prüm when 
the value of only one of all the compared alleles is different (one 
mismatch).
Person stains Biological traces collected from a given individual.
Prüm Convention/Prüm Decision/Prüm system ‘Prüm Convention’ 
refers to the 2005 Convention involving seven countries. ‘Prüm 
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Decision’ refers to the Council Decision that established the mandatory 
nature of transnational data exchange for all EU Member States. ‘Prüm 
system’ refers to the actual network of European Union countries 
exchanging DNA data.
Prüm Step 1 and Step 2 There are two different steps in the Prüm sys-
tem. Step 1 refers to the moment when a search is made in a national 
database for a DNA profile retrieved from a crime scene and no match 
is found; the Prüm Decisions then permit the DNA profile reference to 
be transmitted and searched in other Member States’ national data-
bases. A notification is then sent to the original Member State inform-
ing it of a match or no match. If a match is identified, Step 2 occurs and 
further requests for information are processed through the existing 
police and/or judicial channels.
